{"title":"Appropriability, institutions, and welfare in a Tullock contest","authors":"Ratul Lahkar","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12313","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecpo.12313","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We model institutional development through Tullock contests. We define appropriability in terms of the extent to which high effort can enable agents to acquire control of the resource in the contest. At low appropriability, all agents share the resource equitably at the Nash equilibrium. Hence, institutions are inclusive and have a high aggregate payoff and equality. Social welfare is high. However, with high appropriability, the strongest agents exclude others from the resource. Institutions are then exclusive. Excessive rent seeking by the strongest agents reduces payoffs but increases inequality. Social welfare is low. We also establish the robustness of the Nash equilibrium under the best response dynamic.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 1","pages":"115-145"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142218153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Draft deferments and higher education: New evidence from a totalitarian state","authors":"Vahe Lskavyan","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12310","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Previous studies report mixed results regarding the relationship between military conscription and educational incentives. We provide new evidence from a distinct institutional environment—the Soviet Union, a totalitarian and centrally planned superpower. We examine the impact of abolishing student deferments on higher education (HE) enrollments. Competing hypotheses about the value of Soviet HE imply an uncertain relationship. For a sample of individuals from Latvia, then part of the Soviet Union, we find that this change significantly reduced the odds of male but not female enrollments. There is no evidence that this relationship varied by nationality. Additionally, we find that males who enrolled in HE just before the deferments were abolished were less likely to complete their education. Our results confirm that Soviet HE was used, in part, to avoid military service.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 1","pages":"87-114"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12310","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143117259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pay for digitalization: The relationship between digital transformation and payment disparity","authors":"Changling Sun, Ziang Lin, Zixuan Dai, Shidi Dong, Zixi Zhang","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12311","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a sample of China's A-share listed firms from 2016 to 2021, this study empirically examines the influence of digital transformation on the pay gap within firms. Based on the optimal salary contract theory, we posit that digital transformation widens within-firm pay gap. Conversely, based on the managerial power theory, we posit the competing hypothesis that digital transformation is negatively correlated with the pay gap. Our findings support the optimal salary contract theory, suggesting that digital transformation is positively related to the pay gap, as evidenced by an increase in executive compensation rather than a decrease in the pay of rank-and-file employees. These findings are robust to various checks, including alternative measurements, quantile regression model, Heckman selection model, and IV-2SLS method. Further tests reveal that the positive relationship between digital transformation and the pay gap is more pronounced in labor-intensive enterprises and those with lower risk-taking abilities. This study argues that a widening internal pay gap in the digital era is a rational market choice, as evidenced by the positive impact of the within-firm pay gap resulting from digital transformation on firms' performance. This study extends our understanding of the impact of digital transformation and enriches the literature on compensation contract design.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 1","pages":"59-86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143116510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xiaoting Ling, Yuan George Shan, Wuqing Wu, Lu Zhang, Xinyue Zhang
{"title":"Do overpaid dividends drive stock price crash risk?","authors":"Xiaoting Ling, Yuan George Shan, Wuqing Wu, Lu Zhang, Xinyue Zhang","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12309","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore the impact of overpaid dividends on future stock price crash risk. Using a dataset of 2662 firms with 15,416 firm-year observations of China's A-share listed firms, our result indicates that overpaid dividends are positively related to the likelihood of future stock price crash risk. The results further suggest that high-quality corporate governance and financial analyst coverage can moderate the positive effect of overpaid dividends on the crash risk. Moreover, continuous overpaid dividends and state-owned enterprises with overpaid dividends have a stronger impact on the crash risk, and overpaid dividends are significantly affected by their peer firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"37 1","pages":"7-58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deficit aversion: Mercantilist ideas and individual trade preferences","authors":"Jeremy Spater","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12306","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecpo.12306","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What factors affect trade preferences? This article focuses on current-account balances, which despite being de-emphasized by mainstream economic theory, play an outsized role in political rhetoric regarding the costs and benefits of free trade. This article shows that individual preferences over trade openness reflect the mercantilist belief that when a country is running a current-account deficit, trade reduces that country's aggregate employment prospects and diminishes its status on the world stage. This article shows that current-account balances are an important driver of individual trade preferences. The theory's predictions are borne out by hierarchical analysis of cross-national observational survey data, and further supported by the results of an original survey priming experiment in the United States. These results contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the effect of macroeconomic factors on preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"36 3","pages":"1763-1817"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managerial ability and accounting comparability: Evidence from Chinese listed firms","authors":"Lu Zhang, Boyang Hao, Dan Yang, Guojun Wang","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12308","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecpo.12308","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore the impact of management team ability on firm-level accounting comparability. Through using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2022, the paper documents that accounting comparability has an inverse U-shaped association with management team ability where a certain level of managerial ability leads to the highest levels of accounting comparability. Further analysis shows that high-ability managers have different incentives on accounting comparability when compared to low-ability managers, especially when they suffer financing constraints, possess more proprietary information, experience weak market environment, bear excessive price risk and risk premium and work in the politically connected firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"36 3","pages":"1731-1762"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141825738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Engaged robots, disengaged workers: Automation and political alienation","authors":"Valentina Gonzalez-Rostani","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12307","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecpo.12307","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I investigate the impact of automation on political behavior in postindustrial societies, particularly focusing on political disengagement. I argue that structural changes in the labor market lead to political alienation due to increased economic insecurities, diminished resources from lower wages, and greater economic polarization. Using hierarchical logistic modeling with varying intercepts by country, I present evidence from survey data across several advanced democracies. I find that workers exposed to technological change are less likely to feel close to a political party, participate in elections, and take part in protests. The impact of automation on political engagement is smaller among wealthier citizens and in highly unionized environments. The political message from these interaction effects speaks to the reinforcing forces between economic inequality and automation and the role of collective organization. My findings have important implications for understanding the links between structural change in labor markets and politics, especially since disengaged workers are the reservoir for radical right parties.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"36 3","pages":"1703-1730"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12307","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141737376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli
{"title":"The myth of federal reserve de facto independence","authors":"Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12304","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecpo.12304","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the literature on central banks independence these institutions are considered as being apolitical. In reality, central banks are political actors and their de facto independence changes over time even if their de jure independence remains unvaried. An example of this is the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), whose de facto independence in the past decades has fluctuated significantly because of the pressures of Congress and the President. To counter these pressures, the Fed seeks support from certain interest groups. The success of this behavior is more likely when the President and Congress represent different political parties.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"36 3","pages":"1675-1702"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141588131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from political instability, political ideology, and corporate governance reforms in Pakistan","authors":"Irfan Haider Shakri, Jaime Yong, Erwei Xiang","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12303","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecpo.12303","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine impact of corporate governance on firm performance following the implementation of the changes to the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan in 2012. Our sample period from 2008 to 2022 include periods of political instability and shifts in Pakistan's political landscape, providing an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing accounting- and market-based firm performance measures. We find significant improvements attributed to reforms in the regulatory framework surrounding corporate governance practices particularly from expanded scope and composition of boards and audit committees. This led to broader capabilities and effective controls, thus improving firm performance and investor confidence more so during periods of political instability and changes in political ideology.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"36 3","pages":"1633-1663"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12303","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141523258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Caring for minorities: The Flexible Decision Rule","authors":"Bruno S. Frey, Andre Briviba","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12305","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecpo.12305","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Simple majority rule disregards the interests of the losing minority; their vote does not affect the outcome. When vote outcomes are narrow, close to 50% of voters, the concerns of a significant part of the voters are disregarded. This increases polarization in the population and endangers democracy. This paper proposes a new procedure for political decisions by referendums. The <i>Flexible Decision Rule</i> formally takes into account the percentage of voters accepting or rejecting a proposal. The higher the share y of voters accepting it, the more strongly the proposal is to be put into reality; the lower <i>y</i> is, the less strongly the proposal is to be put into reality. This procedure explicitly considers the concerns of both the supporters and the opponents thus raising the fairness of the vote procedure. In contrast to majority voting, each vote marginalizes the outcome and therefore raises the incentive to participate in the vote increase.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"36 3","pages":"1664-1674"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12305","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141505325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}