AI & Society最新文献_第2页

What makes full artificial agents morally different 全人工代理人在道德上有何不同

IF 2.9

AI & Society Pub Date : 2024-02-18 DOI: 10.1007/s00146-024-01867-6

Erez Firt

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引用次数: 0

Are we inventing ourselves out of our own usefulness? Striking a balance between creativity and AI 我们是在发明自己的用处吗？在创造力和人工智能之间取得平衡

IF 2.9

AI & Society Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s00146-023-01856-1

Noel Carroll

引用次数: 0

The age of machinoids 机械人时代

IF 2.9

AI & Society Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s00146-023-01858-z

Gabriel Lanyi

引用次数: 0

The achievement gap thesis reconsidered: artificial intelligence, automation, and meaningful work 成绩差距论再思考：人工智能、自动化和有意义的工作

IF 2.9

AI & Society Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s00146-023-01828-5

Lucas Scripter

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引用次数: 0

When discussing the desirability of religious robots: courage for theology! 在讨论宗教机器人的可取性时：神学的勇气！

IF 2.9

AI & Society Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1007/s00146-023-01860-5

Max Tretter

引用次数: 0

Architect, AI and the maximiser scenario 建筑师、人工智能和最大化方案

IF 2.9

AI & Society Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1007/s00146-023-01848-1

Mamun Rashid

引用次数: 0

Artificial influencers and the dead internet theory 人造影响者和互联网死亡论