{"title":"Prior’s turn from determinism to indeterminism","authors":"Per Hasle, Jakobsen David","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7990","url":null,"abstract":"Indeterminism assumes a central place in Arthur Norman Prior’s invention and development of modern tense logic. Before this indeterminism, Prior was for a number of years a devout determinist. But Prior’s turn from determinism to indeterminism, so important for his mature work, has never been explained properly. This article presents the enigma of Prior’s turn from determinism to indeterminism. We know much about his early determinism and recently have learned more about how he became a determinist, but, apart from the fact that he in the course of the years between 1949 and 1953 became an indeterminist, we know very little about how or why he became an indeterminist and what exactly he then understood by free will and indeterminism. He never explained this himself at any length, but scattered remarks in various texts provide some aid in approaching this issue. We here take a look at some important texts in which Prior writes about the free will to help us a step further toward solving this riddle.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"15 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135412948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A new grounding problem for presentism","authors":"Elton Marques","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7859","url":null,"abstract":"The presentist — if she wants her thesis to be consistent with venerable logical–semantic principles, namely, bivalence and excluded middle — must provide a convincing answer to the grounding problem. Given the idea — already present in classical antiquity — that truth supervenes on being, the grounding problem is used by the eternalist to accuse the presentist of not being in a position to offer an adequate ground for truths that concern the past or future. To address this problem, many thinkers evoke metaphysical doctrines regarding abstract object — a truth about Socrates does not include Socrates himself but only his essence or haecceity. Others seek present grounds for future or past truths — nomic presentism — while still others deny the semantic traditions in question or deny that truth supervenes on being. In this article, I present a new grounding problem to the presentist. Under the assumption that time is infinite, I claim that the presentist does not have at her disposal the foundations for truths that concern infinitely distant objects in the future. Moreover, I present a similar argument to refute 'temporalism', the thesis that at least some truths are temporally indexed. To conclude the argumentative phase, I evaluate the traditional presentist perspective that was advanced in some of the above responses to the typical versions of the problem. The objective is to show that the usual answers cannot address the new grounding problem. Accordingly, I conclude that eternalism is better positioned to provide a ground for some truths if time is infinite.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"20 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135412791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Future Bias and Regret","authors":"Sayid R Bnefsi","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7857","url":null,"abstract":"Although the rationality of future bias figures crucially in various metaphysical and ethical arguments (Prior 1959; Parfit 1984; Fischer 2020), many philosophers have challenged future bias as being either arbitrarily motivated or irrational (Dougherty 2011; Suhler and Callender 2012; Greene and Sullivan 2015). In particular, Greene and Sullivan (2015) have claimed that future bias is irrational because it implicates two kinds of irrational planning behaviors in agents who seek to avoid regret. In this paper, I join others (Dorsey 2016; Tarsney 2017) in arguing against their claims, but for different reasons that highlight the relationship between the alleged irrational planning behaviors and certain features of regret that it shares with future bias. First, regret is dynamic, involving preferences that change over time and in inconsistent ways. Second, regret comes in degrees, meaning that we can rank our potential regrets. Because regret has these features, I explain why the future-biased agents in Greene and Sullivan’s cases do not need to act in irrational ways to avoid regret.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"20 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135412944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Łukasiewicz, Bocheński, and Feys: Their Impact on the Early Prior","authors":"B. Jack Copeland, Aneta Markoska-Cubrinovska","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7892","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how Arthur Prior became a tense-modal logician, and which moderns influenced him in his early thinking about modality. His unpublished manuscript The Craft of Formal Logic, written in the period 1949–51, is in effect a record of his rather isolated apprenticeship as he trained himself in formal logic, during the two years before the commencement of his torrent of publications on modality. We analyse sections of this rich record of his logical development, especially those dealing with modal logic, and we extract a detailed account of the pattern of influences exhibited in The Craft. The Craft reveals that Prior’s first encounters with modern symbolic modal logic were the pioneering explorations by Bocheński, Feys, and Lewis. Von Wright was also an early influence. It was through Bocheński’s writings that Prior learned of Łukasiewicz’s approach to modality, and Łukasiewicz’s work quickly became a beacon for Prior. The roles of Lewis and von Wright appear to have been smaller than those of Łukasiewicz, Bocheński, and Feys—hence our focus on these three figures. As well as biographical material on these three outstanding logicians, we include numerous previously unpublished passages from The Craft in order to establish the nature and extent of their impact on Prior.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"36 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135413073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arthur N. Prior and Leśniewski’s Concept of Names","authors":"Zuzana Rybaříková","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7829","url":null,"abstract":"For a certain period, the concept of names that Stanisław Leśniewski and his followers developed had a certain impact on the concept that appeared in Arthur Prior’s temporal ontology. However, this impact seemed to vanish in time. The aim of this paper is to present why Prior was interested in Leśniewski’s concept of names and quantification and to discuss why in Prior’s later works Leśniewski’s influence is not as apparent as it was in the first works on temporal logic. Namely, the paper suggests three possible solutions; the differences that were between Prior and Leśniewski’s views on time and determinism, new concepts of names that occurred at that time, and Leśniewski’s extensionalism that opposed Prior’s preference for intensional logic.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"38 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135414300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arthur Prior: A Calvinist route to logic","authors":"Mike Grimshaw","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7860","url":null,"abstract":"Arthur Prior is best known for tense logic and recent interest has also turned to his work in philosophical theology. It is also well known that Prior was deeply interested in Scottish moral philosophy up to 1949. Prior was a theology student before he turned to philosophy and even when a philosophy student he continued to think about and write on theology, stating in a letter from 1936: “I have hopes of ending up eventually as the editor of a religious periodical.” Prior’s theology was strongly influenced by the Swiss neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth- and also by the nineteenth century theologian F.D. Maurice. What is far less well known is that Prior was also influenced by the work of John Calvin. This paper traces the influence of John Calvin on Prior’s thought via previously unknown (and recently published) letters and unpublished articles written by Prior. It argues that Logic and the Basis of Ethics (1948) is where Prior the theologian finally becomes Prior the logician, and does so because of the limits of Calvinist logic.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"47 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135414862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arthur Prior’s ‘memorial’ letter of Ursula Bethell, 1945","authors":"Mike Grimshaw","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7863","url":null,"abstract":"Providing contextualization for Arthur Prior’s brief ’memorial contribution’ of Ursula Bethell in a letter to Mary Prior (1945), this discussion considers why Prior was so cursory and nuanced in his recollection and evaluation.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"48 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arthur Prior’s nom de plume writings in Tomorrow and the Otago Daily Times 1935-1937","authors":"Mike Grimshaw","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7832","url":null,"abstract":"Because of the constraints upon him as a philosophy and theology student in a small city (Dunedin) and small society (New Zealand), A.N. Prior wrote a series of letters and articles on religious and political matters for Tomorrow magazine and the Otago Daily Times under three nom de plumes: Richard Bramley, Independent Labour and (including, at least twice with Clare Prior) as John Everdean. This article discusses the content and context of these writings which enable us to gain a deeper and fuller insight into Prior’s religious and political thought at this time of change in his life.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"37 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135413348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Modal Translational Semantics in Prior’s “Symbolism and Analogy”","authors":"Jeremiah Joven Joaquin","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7852","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores a modal semantics Arthur Prior developed in his 1957 lecture, “Symbolism and Analogy.” Prior’s semantics employs a translational scheme where certain modal axioms are translated as sentences in an easily understood language. Using Prior’s semantics, we show that one can distinguish between modal logics like D, M, T, S4, and S5 without recourse to possible worlds. Finally, given the current conception of what a semantics ought to be, we consider whether Prior’s modal semantics is indeed a semantics.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"31 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A. N. Prior’s journey to ‘real’ freedom","authors":"David Jakobsen","doi":"10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v5i1.7830","url":null,"abstract":"Arthur Norman Prior (1914–1969) discovered a way to formalise the tenses into the system now known as ‘tense-logic’. His discovery made it possible for him to defend two strong beliefs of his: tensed realism and real freedom. His analysis and work on the philosophical and theological problems related to these two beliefs constitutes what is perhaps his greatest legacy in analytic philosophy. Recent research in Prior’s nachlass has revealed that he already pondered and wrote on the two issues from his years at Wairarapa High School in New Zealand. With these recent discoveries, it is possible to draw a clearer picture than has hitherto been drawn with regard to Prior’s journey to what he termed ‘real freedom’. The view of freedom he ended up defending as ‘real freedom’ comes close to William James’ view of free will, which Prior termed ‘modern Arminianism’ in 1931 and, during his crisis of faith from 1941 to 1943, viewed as the actual state of affairs. This conclusion is substantiated using Prior’s two models of future contingency as a framework for comparing his own early description of William James’ view of ‘real freedom’ as being grounded in the difference between the past and the future. Prior’s early adherence to James’ view of ‘real freedom’ provides us with an explanation for why he, in 1945 rejected, the theory of middle knowledge; this explains why, even though he knew of an Ockhamist model of the true future, he did not include it in Past, Present and Future (1967) but instead opted for an Ockhamist model in which the contingent future is branch relative.","PeriodicalId":471511,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Philosophy of Time","volume":"39 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135414291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}