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Journal of Regulatory Economics最新文献

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Correction to: What can deregulators deregulate? The case of electricity 更正：什么可以解除管制？电力的情况
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-05-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09404-1
Tin Cheuk Leung, K. Tsang, K. Tsui
{"title":"Correction to: What can deregulators deregulate? The case of electricity","authors":"Tin Cheuk Leung, K. Tsang, K. Tsui","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09404-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09404-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"277"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09404-1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46482268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Loyalty taxes in retail electricity markets: not as they seem? 电力零售市场的忠诚度税：不是看起来的那样？
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-05-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09418-9
Bruce Mountain, K. Burns
{"title":"Loyalty taxes in retail electricity markets: not as they seem?","authors":"Bruce Mountain, K. Burns","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09418-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09418-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"1 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09418-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48321998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Optimal risk regulation of monopolists with subjective risk assessment 基于主观风险评估的垄断者最优风险调节
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-04-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09429-0
Daiki Kishishita, Susumu Sato
{"title":"Optimal risk regulation of monopolists with subjective risk assessment","authors":"Daiki Kishishita, Susumu Sato","doi":"10.1007/s11149-021-09429-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09429-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"251 - 279"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-021-09429-0","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46243427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Command-and-control regulation, incentive for pollution abatement, and market structure 指令控制型监管、减少污染的激励机制和市场结构
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09403-2
Ping Lin, Yu Pang
{"title":"Command-and-control regulation, incentive for pollution abatement, and market structure","authors":"Ping Lin, Yu Pang","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09403-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09403-2","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the effect of command-and-control regulation on firms’ incentives for pollution abatement, market structure, and social welfare. We consider a regulation under which firms are not allowed to produce if they were found in noncompliance with the preset emissions standard during the government’s imperfect inspection. In the case of the <i>ex ante</i> monopoly, a loose standard coupled with an intensive inspection effectively induces perfect compliance. In the case of the <i>ex ante</i> duopoly, the intensified inspection directly creates market entry barriers, but it also induces firms to increase abatement investments for better environmental compliance, which indirectly promotes market competition. Moreover, a firm invests more in pollution abatement if it is initially cleaner or more production-efficient than its rival, or if it has fewer potential rival. We also find that regulatory tightening may harm social welfare by reducing the probability of entry, and social welfare may be higher under monopoly than under duopoly when government inspection is sufficiently intensive.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"145 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140883334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options 不确定情况下的光纤投资和接入：长期合同、风险溢价和接入选择
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09402-3
Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig, Ingo Vogelsang
{"title":"Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options","authors":"Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig, Ingo Vogelsang","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09402-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09402-3","url":null,"abstract":"Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140883261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of regulatory review time on incremental and radical innovation: evidence from the high-risk medical device market 监管审查时间对渐进式创新和激进式创新的影响：来自高风险医疗器械市场的证据
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09401-4
Ilke Onur, Magnus Söderberg
{"title":"The impact of regulatory review time on incremental and radical innovation: evidence from the high-risk medical device market","authors":"Ilke Onur, Magnus Söderberg","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09401-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09401-4","url":null,"abstract":"We theoretically and empirically study the effect of variation in regulatory review time on firms’ choices between radical and incremental innovations. We differentiate between entry into new segments (the extensive margin) and increasing the number of innovations in a given sector (the intensive margin). Our theoretical investigation indicates additional entry into medical device segments as a result of shorter application review times. It also predicts firm-level substitution effect, suggesting firms shift their R&amp;D to innovation applications with relatively shorter review times. To test the theoretical predictions, we utilize a unique data set from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that contains all product market approvals in the high-risk medical device market for the 1978–2007 period. The empirical results generally support our theoretical predictions. However, the results also show that firms are more responsive to changes in the review time for incremental applications compared to radical ones.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140886661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Restoring vision to consumers and competition to the marketplace: analyzing the effects of required prescription release 恢复消费者的视力和市场的竞争:分析所需处方释放的影响
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09399-9
Conor Norris, E. Timmons
{"title":"Restoring vision to consumers and competition to the marketplace: analyzing the effects of required prescription release","authors":"Conor Norris, E. Timmons","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09399-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09399-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"1 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09399-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42658964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Compliance and competition with heterogeneous service providers: the federal Lifeline program 与异构服务提供商的合规性和竞争：联邦生命线计划
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09400-5
Thomas S. Conkling
{"title":"Compliance and competition with heterogeneous service providers: the federal Lifeline program","authors":"Thomas S. Conkling","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09400-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09400-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"74 - 104"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09400-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48466468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cost efficiency and endogenous regulatory choices: evidence from the transport industry in France 成本效率和内生监管选择：来自法国运输业的证据
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3556386
Joanna Piechucka
{"title":"Cost efficiency and endogenous regulatory choices: evidence from the transport industry in France","authors":"Joanna Piechucka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3556386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3556386","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of different regulatory designs on the cost efficiency of operators providing a public service, exploiting data from the French transport industry. The distinctive feature of the study is that it considers regulatory regimes as endogenously determined choices, explained by economic, political, and institutional variables. Our approach leans on a positive analysis to study the determinants of regulatory contract choices, which, in turn, affect the costs of operating urban public transport. Our results show that given similar network characteristics, networks operated under fixed-price contracts exert lower costs than those regulated under cost-plus contracts. This finding is in line with the theoretical prediction of new regulatory economics that fixed-price contracts provide more incentives for efficiency. Importantly, ignoring the endogeneity of contractual choices would lead to significantly underestimating the impact of contract type on cost efficiency. Our findings provide useful policy implications suggesting that the move toward more high-powered incentive schemes is indeed associated with significant cost efficiencies. Moreover, they highlight the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of regulatory contract choices.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-22"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47935806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The effect of environmental enforcement on labor: environmental workers and production workers 环境执法对劳工的影响:环境工人和生产工人
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-01-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5
Zach Raff, Dietrich H. Earnhart
{"title":"The effect of environmental enforcement on labor: environmental workers and production workers","authors":"Zach Raff, Dietrich H. Earnhart","doi":"10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"118 - 133"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52938022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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