Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-03-12 DOI:10.1007/s11149-020-09402-3

Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig, Ingo Vogelsang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.

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不确定情况下的光纤投资和接入：长期合同、风险溢价和接入选择

受监管的接入方案决定了下一代网络的投资和进入动机。与标准接入定价相比，我们研究了在一般双头垄断背景下，风险溢价、接入选择权或长期合同是否以及如何改善这些激励机制。前两种方法都能做到这一点：风险溢价保证了最高的覆盖率，同时扭曲了零售定价。接入选择权保障了不扭曲的零售竞争，但在成本最高的地区效果不佳。另一方面，长期合同由于加剧了零售竞争，在提高覆盖率方面作用不大。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Regulatory Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Recent legislative and policy reforms have changed the nature of regulation. Partial deregulation has created a new dimension to regulatory problems, as the debate is extended to include diversification and new forms of regulation. The introduction of incentive-based rate schedules and ratemaking procedures, the integration of demand-side programs with planning for capitol expansion, and other developments, raise a host of theoretical and empirical questions. The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing the rigorous economics foundations of regulation. Both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research, are encouraged. Research in all aspects of regulation is of interest including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation. The JRE provides researchers, policy-makers, and institutions with current perspectives on the theory and practice of economics of regulation. While there are a number of journals and magazines that include the study of regulation, the JRE is unique in that it fills a gap in the market for a high quality journal dealing solely with the economics of regulation.Officially cited as: J Regul Econ