Journal of Regulatory Economics最新文献

Rules for the rulemakers: asymmetric information and the political economy of benefit-cost analysis 规则制定者的规则：信息不对称与效益成本分析的政治经济学

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09483-4

David Besanko, Avner A. Kreps, Clair Yang

引用次数: 0

Military spouse licensing: a case study of registered nurses near military bases 军人配偶许可：军事基地附近注册护士的案例研究

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09480-7

Shishir Shakya, Alicia Plemmons, Conor Norris

引用次数: 0

Competitive effects of implicit auction on interconnectors: evidence from Japan 互联线路隐性拍卖的竞争效应：来自日本的证据

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09476-3

Kota Sugimoto

{"title":"Competitive effects of implicit auction on interconnectors: evidence from Japan","authors":"Kota Sugimoto","doi":"10.1007/s11149-024-09476-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-09476-3","url":null,"abstract":"Interconnectors play a crucial role in electric power systems. They contribute to balancing demand and supply in real-time, guaranteeing efficient dispatch in wide geographic regions, and increasing competition by creating large markets. However, interconnector capacity is a scarce resource because vertically integrated utilities were required to have generating capacity enough to supply most customers within their operating region under a regulated monopoly. Hence, identifying the efficient allocation method is essential, particularly after recent electricity market restructuring. This study evaluates the competitive effect of the implicit auction on the interconnector transmission capacity. The implicit auction allocates all the interconnector capacity simultaneously with electric energy in the day-ahead market. This method prevents market participants from strategically withholding the physical interconnector capacity ex ante to exercise market power, as allowed under the first come, first served rule. This study empirically shows how the capacity was withheld from the day-ahead market under the first come, first served rule using detailed reservation data. Next, I show that the implicit auction increases interconnector capacity available at the day-ahead market and trade volume. I use machine-learning methods, such as random forest and deep neural networks, to predict the counterfactual market outcomes without implicit auction. I find that the gain from trade under the implicit auction is more than US$55 million per year in Japan, which is more than 100 times the implementation cost of the implicit auction.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141173472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Natural monopoly revisited 重温自然垄断

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09479-0

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

引用次数: 0

Privacy regulation in asymmetric environments 不对称环境下的隐私监管

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09478-1

Shuaicheng Liu

引用次数: 0

Cooperation in green R &D and environmental policies: tax or standard 绿色研发和环境政策方面的合作：税收还是标准

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09475-4

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin, Natacha Raffin

引用次数: 0

Cost benefit analysis and the FDA: measuring the costs and benefits of drug approval under the PDUFA I-II, 1998–2005 成本效益分析与 FDA：1998-2005 年根据 PDUFA I-II 衡量药物审批的成本和效益

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09477-2

Samuel DeCanio

{"title":"Cost benefit analysis and the FDA: measuring the costs and benefits of drug approval under the PDUFA I-II, 1998–2005","authors":"Samuel DeCanio","doi":"10.1007/s11149-024-09477-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-09477-2","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of drug safety. In one of the most sophisticated cost-benefit analyses to date, (Cost-benefit analysis of the FDA: The case of the prescription drug user fee acts, The Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1306–1325.) argue that between 1998 and 2005 the FDA’s drug submission process under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) increased social surplus by $14–31 billion. However, this conclusion is based upon inappropriate data that underestimate the welfare costs of drugs that were withdrawn from the market due to their harmful side effects. Once appropriate epidemiological data are used to calculate the welfare costs of a single drug, Vioxx, which was withdrawn from the market after it was found to cause heart attacks, PDUFA I-II are found to have caused a net reduction in social welfare of between $1-201 billion. This indicates that statistically infrequent regulatory mistakes may have large social welfare implications that can counteract the benefits of years of accurate regulatory decisions. Thanks to Sarah Bernhardt, Romit Bhattacharya, Stephen DeCanio, Marco Giani, Colin Jennings, John Meadowcroft, and Tariq Thachil for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to the helpful comments offered by two anonymous referees.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140625752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Changing prices after the reform of local public services: remunicipalization versus privatization 地方公共服务改革后的价格变化：再市政化与私有化

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09472-7

Daniel Albalate, Germà Bel, Francisco González-Gómez, José C. Hernández-Gutiérrez, Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo

{"title":"Changing prices after the reform of local public services: remunicipalization versus privatization","authors":"Daniel Albalate, Germà Bel, Francisco González-Gómez, José C. Hernández-Gutiérrez, Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo","doi":"10.1007/s11149-024-09472-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-09472-7","url":null,"abstract":"Privatization and remunicipalization have been used as alternative options to reform the delivery of local public services; in both cases, mainly because of disappointment with the service performance, although ideological preferences might also play a role. The drivers and effects of water privatization have been widely studied, whereas little empirical evidence is available for remunicipalization, particularly regarding its effects. Using a sample of Spanish municipalities, this paper assesses the change in the price of urban water following remunicipalization as compared to privatization. The main finding is that remunicipalization leads to smaller increases in price; this outcome is, however, due to a few atypical municipalities with abnormally low prices before the policy reform. Once these influential observations are controlled for, whether the reform consists of remunicipalization or privatization makes no difference regarding price changes. It is also found that remunicipalization is much more likely in cities governed by extreme left-wing parties.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140322365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Performance based regulation in electricity and cost benchmarking: theoretical underpinnings and application 基于绩效的电力监管和成本基准：理论基础和应用

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09474-5

Agustin J. Ros, Sai Shetty, Timothy Tardiff

{"title":"Performance based regulation in electricity and cost benchmarking: theoretical underpinnings and application","authors":"Agustin J. Ros, Sai Shetty, Timothy Tardiff","doi":"10.1007/s11149-024-09474-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-09474-5","url":null,"abstract":"Performance based regulation (“PBR”) directly regulates public utilities’ prices or revenues with the goal to provide greater incentives for achieving efficiencies and other cost savings than cost-of-service (profit) regulation provides. PBR plans typically include a formula capping the allowed prices or revenues with the cap calculated to reflect what we would expect to observe in competitive markets in the long run: prices are set to equal input prices minus productivity “I–X”, where I represents inflation and X represents industry-wide productivity. The PBR formula may also include a consumer stretch factor (“stretch factor”)—sometimes referred to as a consumer productivity dividend. Some regulators view the stretch factor as a one-time component meant to share between the company and customers the immediate expected increase in productivity growth as the regulated firm transitions from cost of service to PBR regulation. Other regulators view it more as a permanent component of PBR meant to incentivize the regulated firm beyond the initial switch to PBR by benchmarking its costs to a comparable group of companies and rewarding (penalizing) it for superior (inferior) cost performance. This paper focuses on economic aspects of utilizing the stretch factor as a permanent feature of PBR, and importantly, on the theoretical underpinnings of utilizing cost benchmarking to determine the stretch factor in a PBR plan. We provide a review of the academic literature on econometric cost benchmarking and assess that literature with respect to the stretch factor. We provide an econometric cost benchmarking analysis, using data on U.S. electricity transmission.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140172756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market 投资的不可分割性和容量市场的作用

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09473-6

引用次数: 0