{"title":"Cost benefit analysis and the FDA: measuring the costs and benefits of drug approval under the PDUFA I-II, 1998–2005","authors":"Samuel DeCanio","doi":"10.1007/s11149-024-09477-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of drug safety. In one of the most sophisticated cost-benefit analyses to date, (Cost-benefit analysis of the FDA: The case of the prescription drug user fee acts, <i>The Journal of Public Economics</i>, <i>92</i>, 1306–1325.) argue that between 1998 and 2005 the FDA’s drug submission process under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) increased social surplus by $14–31 billion. However, this conclusion is based upon inappropriate data that underestimate the welfare costs of drugs that were withdrawn from the market due to their harmful side effects. Once appropriate epidemiological data are used to calculate the welfare costs of a single drug, Vioxx, which was withdrawn from the market after it was found to cause heart attacks, PDUFA I-II are found to have caused a net reduction in social welfare of between $1-201 billion. This indicates that statistically infrequent regulatory mistakes may have large social welfare implications that can counteract the benefits of years of accurate regulatory decisions. Thanks to Sarah Bernhardt, Romit Bhattacharya, Stephen DeCanio, Marco Giani, Colin Jennings, John Meadowcroft, and Tariq Thachil for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to the helpful comments offered by two anonymous referees.</p>","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-09477-2","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of drug safety. In one of the most sophisticated cost-benefit analyses to date, (Cost-benefit analysis of the FDA: The case of the prescription drug user fee acts, The Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1306–1325.) argue that between 1998 and 2005 the FDA’s drug submission process under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) increased social surplus by $14–31 billion. However, this conclusion is based upon inappropriate data that underestimate the welfare costs of drugs that were withdrawn from the market due to their harmful side effects. Once appropriate epidemiological data are used to calculate the welfare costs of a single drug, Vioxx, which was withdrawn from the market after it was found to cause heart attacks, PDUFA I-II are found to have caused a net reduction in social welfare of between $1-201 billion. This indicates that statistically infrequent regulatory mistakes may have large social welfare implications that can counteract the benefits of years of accurate regulatory decisions. Thanks to Sarah Bernhardt, Romit Bhattacharya, Stephen DeCanio, Marco Giani, Colin Jennings, John Meadowcroft, and Tariq Thachil for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to the helpful comments offered by two anonymous referees.
本文探讨了美国食品和药物管理局对药品安全的监管。在迄今为止最复杂的成本效益分析中,《美国食品与药物管理局的成本效益分析》(Cost-benefit analysis of the FDA:The Case of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, The Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1306-1325.)认为,在 1998 年至 2005 年期间,食品与药物管理局根据《处方药用户费法》(PDUFA)制定的药品申报程序使社会盈余增加了 140 亿至 310 亿美元。然而,这一结论是基于不恰当的数据得出的,这些数据低估了因药物的有害副作用而退出市场的药物的福利成本。一旦使用适当的流行病学数据来计算单一药物 Vioxx 的福利成本,就会发现 PDUFA I-II 造成的社会福利净减少在 10-201 亿美元之间。这表明,在统计上并不常见的监管失误可能会对社会福利产生巨大影响,从而抵消多年来准确监管决策所带来的好处。感谢 Sarah Bernhardt、Romit Bhattacharya、Stephen DeCanio、Marco Giani、Colin Jennings、John Meadowcroft 和 Tariq Thachil 的有益评论和建议。特别感谢两位匿名审稿人提出的有益意见。
期刊介绍:
Recent legislative and policy reforms have changed the nature of regulation. Partial deregulation has created a new dimension to regulatory problems, as the debate is extended to include diversification and new forms of regulation. The introduction of incentive-based rate schedules and ratemaking procedures, the integration of demand-side programs with planning for capitol expansion, and other developments, raise a host of theoretical and empirical questions. The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing the rigorous economics foundations of regulation. Both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research, are encouraged. Research in all aspects of regulation is of interest including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation. The JRE provides researchers, policy-makers, and institutions with current perspectives on the theory and practice of economics of regulation. While there are a number of journals and magazines that include the study of regulation, the JRE is unique in that it fills a gap in the market for a high quality journal dealing solely with the economics of regulation.Officially cited as: J Regul Econ