Rules for the rulemakers: asymmetric information and the political economy of benefit-cost analysis

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI:10.1007/s11149-024-09483-4

David Besanko, Avner A. Kreps, Clair Yang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper presents a model of an executive administration that decides whether to mandate benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of newly proposed regulations. A regulator has private information about the social benefit of a new rule but may differ from the executive’s preferences for regulation. BCA, which provides a noisy signal of the rule’s social benefit, is most valuable when the executive is regulation neutral. Extremely regulation-averse administrations may be harmed by BCA unless they can bias it. Our results are consistent with use of BCA by U.S. presidential administrations since Reagan.

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规则制定者的规则：信息不对称与效益成本分析的政治经济学

本文提出了一个行政管理模型，该模型决定是否强制要求对新提出的法规进行收益-成本分析（BCA）。监管者拥有关于新法规社会效益的私人信息，但可能与行政部门的监管偏好不同。效益成本分析提供了规则的社会效益的噪声信号，在行政部门对监管持中立态度时，效益成本分析最有价值。极度厌恶监管的行政部门可能会受到 BCA 的损害，除非他们能够偏向 BCA。我们的研究结果与里根以来美国总统政府使用 BCA 的情况一致。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Regulatory Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Recent legislative and policy reforms have changed the nature of regulation. Partial deregulation has created a new dimension to regulatory problems, as the debate is extended to include diversification and new forms of regulation. The introduction of incentive-based rate schedules and ratemaking procedures, the integration of demand-side programs with planning for capitol expansion, and other developments, raise a host of theoretical and empirical questions. The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing the rigorous economics foundations of regulation. Both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research, are encouraged. Research in all aspects of regulation is of interest including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation. The JRE provides researchers, policy-makers, and institutions with current perspectives on the theory and practice of economics of regulation. While there are a number of journals and magazines that include the study of regulation, the JRE is unique in that it fills a gap in the market for a high quality journal dealing solely with the economics of regulation.Officially cited as: J Regul Econ