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Journal of Regulatory Economics最新文献

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Compliance and competition with heterogeneous service providers: the federal Lifeline program 与异构服务提供商的合规性和竞争：联邦生命线计划
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09400-5
Thomas S. Conkling
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引用次数: 0
Cost efficiency and endogenous regulatory choices: evidence from the transport industry in France 成本效率和内生监管选择：来自法国运输业的证据
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3556386
Joanna Piechucka
{"title":"Cost efficiency and endogenous regulatory choices: evidence from the transport industry in France","authors":"Joanna Piechucka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3556386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3556386","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of different regulatory designs on the cost efficiency of operators providing a public service, exploiting data from the French transport industry. The distinctive feature of the study is that it considers regulatory regimes as endogenously determined choices, explained by economic, political, and institutional variables. Our approach leans on a positive analysis to study the determinants of regulatory contract choices, which, in turn, affect the costs of operating urban public transport. Our results show that given similar network characteristics, networks operated under fixed-price contracts exert lower costs than those regulated under cost-plus contracts. This finding is in line with the theoretical prediction of new regulatory economics that fixed-price contracts provide more incentives for efficiency. Importantly, ignoring the endogeneity of contractual choices would lead to significantly underestimating the impact of contract type on cost efficiency. Our findings provide useful policy implications suggesting that the move toward more high-powered incentive schemes is indeed associated with significant cost efficiencies. Moreover, they highlight the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of regulatory contract choices.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47935806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The effect of environmental enforcement on labor: environmental workers and production workers 环境执法对劳工的影响:环境工人和生产工人
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-01-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5
Zach Raff, Dietrich H. Earnhart
{"title":"The effect of environmental enforcement on labor: environmental workers and production workers","authors":"Zach Raff, Dietrich H. Earnhart","doi":"10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-019-09398-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52938022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
PV adoption: the role of distribution tariffs under net metering 光伏发电的采用：净计量下配电电价的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-12-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09397-6
Axel Gautier, Julien Jacqmin
{"title":"PV adoption: the role of distribution tariffs under net metering","authors":"Axel Gautier, Julien Jacqmin","doi":"10.1007/s11149-019-09397-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-019-09397-6","url":null,"abstract":"The deployment of decentralized productions units (DPU) like rooftop solar panels is a major challenge for a transition towards greener energy sources. Under a net metering system where the meter runs backward when there is excessive PV production, the electricity produced by a solar panel is valued at the retail price. Higher retail prices thus encourage the deployment of DPU. To identify this relationship, we use data from Wallonia where tariffs are paid on a mostly volumetric base and where there are 13 different tariff zones. Using various specifications, our results suggest that in a municipality where the distribution tariff is one eurocent per kWh higher, the investment in solar PV is, all else equal, around 8% higher.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140886644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Compliance and competition with heterogeneous service providers: the federal Lifeline program 与异质服务提供者的合规性和竞争:联邦生命线计划
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-12-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2719310
Thomas S. Conkling
{"title":"Compliance and competition with heterogeneous service providers: the federal Lifeline program","authors":"Thomas S. Conkling","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2719310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2719310","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how compliance behavior varies across competing service providers in the Lifeline phone subsidy program and assesses whether enlarging the set of providers improves program outcomes. In markets where firms compete to provide government benefits or services directly to individuals, the most productive firms—in terms of service quality or operating costs—survive and serve the market. However, imperfect enforcement of program rules may weaken competitive pressures through non-compliance, allowing less productive firms to maintain market share. I exploit institutional features of the Lifeline program, state-level variation in regulatory environments and a one-time reform, to empirically document the importance of provider heterogeneity following a 2008 expansion of Lifeline. The presence of low-compliance providers in particular markets drives the largest state-level differences in wasteful or inefficient program spending. Qualitatively, these providers appear to select into state markets with looser enforcement of program rules. In counterfactual simulations, excluding low-compliance providers prevents 500,000 ineligible enrollments, while only reducing eligible enrollments by 100,000. Further restrictions come at a higher cost, reflecting the trade-off of compliance and competition.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42554276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Extraterritoriality of swaps regulation and regulatory arbitrage 掉期监管的治外法权与监管套利
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-11-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09395-8
Carmela D’Avino
{"title":"Extraterritoriality of swaps regulation and regulatory arbitrage","authors":"Carmela D’Avino","doi":"10.1007/s11149-019-09395-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-019-09395-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-019-09395-8","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45983944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Risk of window dressing: quarter-end spikes in the Japanese yen Libor-OIS spread 粉饰风险：日元伦敦银行同业拆借利率OIS利差季度末飙升
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-11-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09393-w
Mayu Kikuchi, A. Wong, Jiayue Zhang
{"title":"Risk of window dressing: quarter-end spikes in the Japanese yen Libor-OIS spread","authors":"Mayu Kikuchi, A. Wong, Jiayue Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s11149-019-09393-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-019-09393-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-019-09393-w","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48711309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The power of regulatory regimes reexamined 监管制度的权力得到了重新审视
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-10-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09392-x
Dennis L. Weisman
{"title":"The power of regulatory regimes reexamined","authors":"Dennis L. Weisman","doi":"10.1007/s11149-019-09392-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-019-09392-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-019-09392-x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42858696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Voluntary climate action and credible regulatory threat: evidence from the carbon disclosure project 自愿气候行动和可信的监管威胁：来自碳披露项目的证据
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09390-z
Lily Hsueh
{"title":"Voluntary climate action and credible regulatory threat: evidence from the carbon disclosure project","authors":"Lily Hsueh","doi":"10.1007/s11149-019-09390-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-019-09390-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-019-09390-z","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48199259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Self-Sabotage 自我破坏
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-004-5342-8
D. Sappington, Dennis L. Weisman
{"title":"Self-Sabotage","authors":"D. Sappington, Dennis L. Weisman","doi":"10.1007/s11149-004-5342-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-004-5342-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-004-5342-8","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47706127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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