Journal of Regulatory Economics最新文献_第4页

Does capital-based regulation affect bank pricing policy? 基于资本的监管是否影响银行定价政策?

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-022-09448-5

Dominika Ehrenbergerová, Martin Hodula, Zuzana Gric

引用次数: 3

Optimal WACC in tariff regulation under uncertainty 不确定性条件下关税管制中的最优WACC

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-03-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-022-09447-6

Ward Romeijnders, M. Mulder

引用次数: 1

Correction to: Input price discrimination and horizontal shareholding 修正:投入价格歧视与横向持股

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-03-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-022-09445-8

Youping Li,Jie Shuai

引用次数: 0

Access price structure and entrant build-or-buy incentives in mobile markets 手机市场的准入价格结构和进入者“建造或购买”激励机制

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09442-3

Malin Arve, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind

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引用次数: 0

Input price discrimination and horizontal shareholding 投入品价格歧视与横向持股

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09444-1

Youping Li, Jie Shuai

引用次数: 1

Investment in quality upgrade and regulation of the internet 投资质量提升和互联网监管

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09441-4

E. Baranes, Cuong Hung Vuong

引用次数: 4

Regulatory independence and thermal power plant performance: evidence from India 监管独立性与火力发电厂绩效:来自印度的证据

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09443-2

Abhinav Jindal, Rahul Nilakantan

{"title":"Regulatory independence and thermal power plant performance: evidence from India","authors":"Abhinav Jindal, Rahul Nilakantan","doi":"10.1007/s11149-021-09443-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09443-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the role of regulatory independence on electricity generation performance in India. Electricity generation in India is exposed to several regulatory jurisdictions with varying levels of regulatory independence. Based on the level of regulatory independence, we classify Indian coal fired power plants into two groups, and evaluate their performance over the period 2005–14 using the non-radial directional distance function model in a meta-frontier framework. We find that plants under relatively less independent state regulators are more inefficient than plants under the largely independent central regulator. Differences in independence between state and central regulators account for nearly half of the inefficiency of plants under the state regulation. Regression analysis reveals that the channels of causation of regulatory independence on plant performance are through its effects on coal consumption and electricity generation. Our results suggest the need for two policy interventions: (1) providing greater independence to state regulators for bridging the performance gaps between plants subject to different regulators, and (2) a more forward-looking norm setting process through the use of benchmarking techniques by identifying best practices and performance among plants.</p>","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"65 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138514555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Differences in NPI strategies against COVID-19. 针对 COVID-19 的 NPI 策略差异。

IF 1.4 4区经济学

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-08-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-022-09452-9

Margarete Redlin