{"title":"Input price discrimination and horizontal shareholding","authors":"Youping Li, Jie Shuai","doi":"10.1007/s11149-021-09444-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Antitrust laws in many countries prohibit the setting of differential prices across buyers who compete against each other. In this paper, we consider a setting in which a downstream manufacturer has non-controlling interest in its rival and both buy input from an upstream monopolist. Under price discrimination, a lower price is charged to the manufacturer that holds the rival’s shares, which mitigates the anticompetitive effect of horizontal shareholding. When the ownership structure is endogenized, we find that, relative to uniform pricing, price discrimination discourages the formation of horizontal shareholding which is also socially desirable. The analysis is extended to the case of cross shareholding in which each manufacturer holds shares of its rival and to downstream price competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"145 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09444-1","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Antitrust laws in many countries prohibit the setting of differential prices across buyers who compete against each other. In this paper, we consider a setting in which a downstream manufacturer has non-controlling interest in its rival and both buy input from an upstream monopolist. Under price discrimination, a lower price is charged to the manufacturer that holds the rival’s shares, which mitigates the anticompetitive effect of horizontal shareholding. When the ownership structure is endogenized, we find that, relative to uniform pricing, price discrimination discourages the formation of horizontal shareholding which is also socially desirable. The analysis is extended to the case of cross shareholding in which each manufacturer holds shares of its rival and to downstream price competition.
期刊介绍：
Recent legislative and policy reforms have changed the nature of regulation. Partial deregulation has created a new dimension to regulatory problems, as the debate is extended to include diversification and new forms of regulation. The introduction of incentive-based rate schedules and ratemaking procedures, the integration of demand-side programs with planning for capitol expansion, and other developments, raise a host of theoretical and empirical questions. The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing the rigorous economics foundations of regulation. Both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research, are encouraged. Research in all aspects of regulation is of interest including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation. The JRE provides researchers, policy-makers, and institutions with current perspectives on the theory and practice of economics of regulation. While there are a number of journals and magazines that include the study of regulation, the JRE is unique in that it fills a gap in the market for a high quality journal dealing solely with the economics of regulation.Officially cited as: J Regul Econ
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
