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Elite and Liberal Democracy: A New Equilibrium? 精英与自由民主:一种新的均衡?
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-021-09762-1
Antonio Campati
{"title":"Elite and Liberal Democracy: A New <i>Equilibrium</i>?","authors":"Antonio Campati","doi":"10.1007/s11245-021-09762-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09762-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In contemporary democracies, the balance between the <i>minority principle</i> and <i>democratic principles</i>, one of the components underlying the relationship between liberalism and democracy, is being broken. This paper offers a reflection on this theme - crucial for the future of representative government - in relation to the importance of the theory of elites. The article is divided into three parts: the first part briefly traces the main phases of the theory of elites from the late nineteenth century to the present, indicating, for each, the salient features; the second part focuses on the elements characterizing the alliance between the minority principle and democratic principles, which forms the basis of liberal representative democracy, with specific consideration paid to the geometric architecture of democracy, comprising a horizontal dimension and a vertical dimension; finally, the third part argues the need for strengthening the <i>logic of distance</i> to consolidate the connection between the theory of elites and liberal representative democracy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"15-22"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8503395/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39525126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Celebrity Politics and Democratic Elitism. 名人政治与民主精英主义。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-021-09763-0
Alfred Archer, Amanda Cawston
{"title":"Celebrity Politics and Democratic Elitism.","authors":"Alfred Archer,&nbsp;Amanda Cawston","doi":"10.1007/s11245-021-09763-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09763-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Is there good reason to worry about celebrity involvement in democratic politics? The rise of celebrity politicians such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Zelensky has led political theorists and commentators to worry that the role of expertise in democratic politics has been undermined. According to one recent critique (Archer et al. 2020), celebrities possess a significant degree of epistemic power (the power to influence what people believe) that is unconnected to appropriate expertise. This presents a problem both for deliberative and epistemic theories of democratic legitimacy, which ignore this form of power, and for real existing democracies attempting to meet the standards of legitimacy set out by these theories. But do these critiques apply to democratic elitism? In this paper, we argue that recognition of celebrity epistemic power in fact represents a valuable resource for supporting the legitimacy and practice of democratic elitism, though these benefits do come with certain risks to which elite theories are particularly vulnerable.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"33-43"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8503715/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39525128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability. 情感破坏性的认知价值。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-021-09788-5
Imke von Maur
{"title":"The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability.","authors":"Imke von Maur","doi":"10.1007/s11245-021-09788-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09788-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions - i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things <i>differently</i>. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 5","pages":"859-869"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669631/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10379799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism. 分歧，确定性，相对主义。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 Epub Date: 2018-06-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-018-9567-z
Martin Kusch
{"title":"Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism.","authors":"Martin Kusch","doi":"10.1007/s11245-018-9567-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9567-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper seeks to widen the dialogue between the \"epistemology of peer disagreement\" and the epistemology informed by Wittgenstein's last notebooks, later edited as On Certainty. The paper defends the following theses: (i) not all certainties are groundless; many of them are beliefs; and they do not have a common essence. (ii) An epistemic peer need not share all of my certainties. (iii) Which response (steadfast, conciliationist etc.) to a disagreement over a certainty is called for, depends on the type of certainty in question. Sometimes a form of relativism is the right response. (iv) Reasonable, mutually recognized peer disagreement over a certainty is possible.-The paper thus addresses both interpretative and systematic issues. It uses Wittgenstein as a resource for thinking about peer disagreement over certainties.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"40 5","pages":"1097-1105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11245-018-9567-z","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39702857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Adversarial Argument, Belief Change, and Vulnerability. 对抗性的争论，信念的改变和脆弱性。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-10-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-021-09769-8
Moira Howes, Catherine Hundleby
{"title":"Adversarial Argument, Belief Change, and Vulnerability.","authors":"Moira Howes,&nbsp;Catherine Hundleby","doi":"10.1007/s11245-021-09769-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09769-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>When people argue, they are vulnerable to unwanted and costly changes in their beliefs. This vulnerability motivates the position that belief involuntarism makes argument inherently adversarial (Casey, Informal Log 40:77-108, 2020), as well as the development of alternatives to adversarial argumentation such as \"invitational rhetoric\" (Foss and Griffin, Commun Monogr 62:2-18, 1995). The emphasis on involuntary belief change in such accounts, in our perspective, neglects three dimensions of arguing: the diversity of arguer intentions, audience agency, and the benefits of belief change. The complex impact of arguments on both audiences and arguers involves vulnerabilities related to various forces of argument, not just the intellectual force of premise-conclusion complexes. Shifting emphasis from adversariality to vulnerability, we propose a more holistic understanding of argument, in which vulnerability reveals various sources of strength and opportunity in addition to risk.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"40 5","pages":"859-872"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8520342/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39554678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Introduction: Introducing Philosophy of the City. 导论:介绍城市哲学。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-021-09739-0
Jules Simon
{"title":"Introduction: Introducing <i>Philosophy of the City</i>.","authors":"Jules Simon","doi":"10.1007/s11245-021-09739-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09739-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"40 2","pages":"387-398"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11245-021-09739-0","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25500419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Who's Afraid of Adversariality? Conflict and Cooperation in Argumentation. 谁害怕对抗?论证中的冲突与合作。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 Epub Date: 2020-12-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-020-09736-9
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
{"title":"Who's Afraid of Adversariality? Conflict and Cooperation in Argumentation.","authors":"Catarina Dutilh Novaes","doi":"10.1007/s11245-020-09736-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09736-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should (ideally at least) <i>never</i> be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is <i>always</i> adversarial, given that adversariality (when suitably conceptualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are (and should be) adversarial or cooperative <i>to different</i> degrees. What determines whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three <i>teloi</i> that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic <i>telos</i>, the consensus-building <i>telos</i>, and the conflict management <i>telos</i>. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three <i>teloi</i> of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"40 5","pages":"873-886"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11245-020-09736-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39702856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games. 团队推理与博弈中收益优势结果的理性选择。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-01-01 Epub Date: 2018-07-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-018-9575-z
Natalie Gold, Andrew M Colman
{"title":"Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games.","authors":"Natalie Gold,&nbsp;Andrew M Colman","doi":"10.1007/s11245-018-9575-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9575-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large-probably insuperable-problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"39 2","pages":"305-316"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11245-018-9575-z","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37782720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Emergence, Reduction and the Identity and Individuation of Powers. 权力的产生、减少、同一性和个体化。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-01-01 Epub Date: 2018-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-018-9621-x
Alexander Daniel Carruth
{"title":"Emergence, Reduction and the Identity and Individuation of Powers.","authors":"Alexander Daniel Carruth","doi":"10.1007/s11245-018-9621-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9621-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>One recently popular way to characterise strong emergence is to say that emergent entities possess <i>novel causal powers</i>. However, there is little agreement concerning the nature of powers. One controversy involves whether powers are single- or multi-track; that is, whether each power has only one manifestation type, or whether a single power can be directed towards a number of distinct manifestations. Another concerns <i>how</i> powers operate: whether a lone power manifests when triggered by the presence of a suitable stimulus, or whether powers operate mutually such that several powers must 'work together' to bring about a particular manifestation. This paper examines how these distinctions-which can be cross-combined to frame four distinct accounts of the nature of powers-bear on the debate between emergentists and reductionists.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"39 5","pages":"1021-1030"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11245-018-9621-x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38629322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle. 道德生物强化、自由、价值和平等原则。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-04-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-017-9482-8
Jonathan Pugh
{"title":"Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle.","authors":"Jonathan Pugh","doi":"10.1007/s11245-017-9482-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11245-017-9482-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements (NCMBEs) is that they would compromise the recipient's 'freedom to fall'. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson and Savulescu's 'God-Machine' criticism; however, I suggest that the objection still faces the problem of explaining why the value of moral conformity is insufficient to outweigh the value of the freedom to fall itself. I also question whether the objection is compatible with Neil Levy's parity principle. Accordingly, I go on to consider an alternative relational freedom-based objection to NCMBEs that aims to explain the fundamental moral importance of the freedom that NCMBEs would violate. I argue that although this strategy might allow the critic of NCMBEs to bypass a powerful criticism of Harris' objection, it also weakens the freedom-based objection's compatibility with the parity principle.</p>","PeriodicalId":47039,"journal":{"name":"TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"38 1","pages":"73-86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6428794/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37129332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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