Joan Calzada , Begoña García-Mariñoso , David Suárez
{"title":"Do telecommunications prices depend on consumer engagement?","authors":"Joan Calzada , Begoña García-Mariñoso , David Suárez","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes how customers’ heterogeneous search and switching habits affect the prices paid for telecommunication services in a context in which operators use price discrimination strategies to retain their customers and attract those of their rivals. Drawing on a representative sample of Spanish households (N=3,113), we show that engaged consumers pay 9.4% less than completely unengaged consumers for their telecommunication services, after controlling for the characteristics of the bundle of services contracted. We also find that highly engaged consumers (i.e. those that have called their operator to obtain a better deal and who have switched to a different operator at least once) pay 13.6% less for their services than unengaged consumers, that consumers who have switched operator at least once pay 8.4% less, and that consumers who call their operator to request better conditions for their contracts pay 5.8% less. Finally, we show that the excess price paid by unengaged consumers increases as they contract more sophisticated services, such as premium television content and additional mobile lines.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101018"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49189296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of taxation in the telecommunications industry","authors":"Raúl Katz , Juan Jung","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article we study the impact of taxation in the performance of the telecommunications sector. To do so, we develop a model that considers the taxes and fees imposed directly or indirectly along the telecommunications value chain. Overall, we find strong evidence of a negative impact on investment from an increase in regulatory fees, profit taxes, and excise taxes. In addition, telecommunication service prices are affected by the fiscal regime, both directly -through taxation over services- and indirectly, through obligations imposed on operators that can ultimately have an impact on service prices. We also find some evidence of the effect of custom duties for equipment and smartphones on the decrease of investment on broadband network deployment and service adoption, respectively. On this basis, we simulate a fiscal-reform scenario, consisting in removing sector-specific contributions to eliminate inter-sectoral asymmetries, with results suggesting significant gains in investment, coverage, and adoption. Considering these findings, and the potential socioeconomic gains from increasing broadband adoption, we believe that governments pursuing the development of digital agendas should consider potential fiscal reforms to accelerate the development of the digital economy. That being said, considering the potential loses in tax collection, a careful trade-off analysis should be performed before determining the nature and the scope of the fiscal reforms to be introduced.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101016"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49767449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prioritization between asymmetric content providers","authors":"Jeong-Yoo Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101019","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101019","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Gautier and Somogyi (2020) showed that the monopolistic Internet service provider (ISP) can extract more surplus from consumers by giving priority to the weaker content to restore symmetry between content providers (CPs). In this study, we reexamine the issue and argue that their result depends critically on the shape of the delay cost function. We first show that under a linear delay cost, if the delay cost of contents from each CP increases with its own traffic amount, the opposite is true, that is, the ISP prefers to give priority to a strong CP, whereas it prefers to give priority to a weak CP if the delay cost of contents from an unprioritized CP decreases with its traffic amount. We confirm our insight in two specific models; the M/M/1 queuing model and the bandwidth subdivision model. We also discuss some implications of the ISP’s prioritization choice for social welfare.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101019"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43237598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the internet help the unemployed find jobs?","authors":"Eleanor Jawon Choi","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the effect of internet job search (IJS) on job-finding rates among unemployed job seekers during the rapid expansion of the internet from the mid-1990s to the early 2010s. To address endogenous selection into IJS, I use an instrumental variables (IV) strategy exploiting the rise of IJS within occupations over time, which varied across occupations depending on pre-internet exposure to computers at work. The analysis sample includes unemployed workers from the December 1998, August 2000, September 2001, October 2003, and July 2011 Current Population Survey (CPS) Computer and Internet Use Supplements and the September 1992 Basic Monthly CPS, longitudinally matched with their employment outcomes from the subsequent monthly CPS files. The IV estimates indicate that IJS increased the 15-month job-finding rate by 12.9 percentage points (25.1% relative to the mean). Results from placebo exercises and various specification checks support a causal interpretation of the estimated effects. Additionally, the effectiveness of IJS remained stable over time throughout the analysis period.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101017"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49752652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithmic selection and supply of political news on Facebook","authors":"Marcel Garz , Ferenc Szucs","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101020","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101020","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Facebook has been criticized for exposing its users to low-quality and harmful information, including fake news, hate speech, and politically one-sided content. In December 2013 and again in August 2014, the platform updated its news feed algorithm to increase user exposure to quality content of news publishers, while curbing the proliferation of non-informative posts. This paper uses a sample of German newspapers to investigate the conjecture that these modifications raised the incentives to publish quality news stories on the platform, focusing on the number and diversity of news story posts about substantive political issues. Using the newspapers’ print editions as a counterfactual, our results indicate an increase in the amount of substantive political news on Facebook by approximately 30%. This expansion occurred in a politically balanced way, except that the outlets disproportionately increased their Facebook coverage of the formerly underrepresented Linke (Left Party). Consequently, the within-outlet concentration of political viewpoints decreased by about one half of the standard deviation of our concentration indices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101020"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45811936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Privacy Regulation on Web Traffic: Evidence From the GDPR.","authors":"Raffaele Congiu , Lorien Sabatino , Geza Sapi","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use traffic data from around 5,000 web domains in Europe and United States to investigate the effect of the European Unions General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on website visits and user engagement. We document an overall traffic reduction of approximately 15% in the long-run and find a measurable reduction in engagement with websites. Traffic from both paid and unpaid channels dropped significantly. We observe an inverted U-shaped relationship between website size and change in visits due to privacy regulation: the smallest and largest websites lost visitors, while medium-sized ones were less affected. Enforcement matters as well: The effects were amplified considerably in the long-run, following the first significant fine issued eight months after the entry into force of the GDPR. Exploring potential mechanisms, both a reduction in advertising effectiveness and a higher user awareness of privacy issues can explain our results.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"61 ","pages":"Article 101003"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137269502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effects of vertical integration on internet service providers’ zero-rating choice","authors":"Fuyuki Saruta","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study presents investigation of the effects of vertical integration between an internet service provider (ISP) and a content provider (CP) on the ISP’s zero-rating choice and social welfare. We develop a simple model in which a monopolistic ISP delivers content from two CPs to a representative consumer. The ISP can offer zero-rating contracts to one or two CPs, thereby allowing the consumer to use zero-rated content without consuming monthly data usage. We investigate how integration between the ISP and a CP affects the ISP’s zero-rating choice and social welfare. Our findings are the following. First, the vertically integrated ISP might zero-rate the unaffiliated CP exclusively when the CPs’ profitability is not so low. Second, the integration increases the total surplus and the independent CP’s profit. Our results indicate that vertical integration is welfare enhancing and beneficial to the independent CP.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"61 ","pages":"Article 101005"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43449029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multidimensional media slant: Complementarities in news reporting by US newspapers","authors":"Sandra García-Uribe","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies front-page choices made by editors of major US newspapers. I document that newspaper front pages are biased to certain combinations of news after controlling for the newspaper bias and the overall market coverage of such news. I also provide a reader-maximization model for front-page decisions that I use to interpret the empirical biases as preferences of the newspaper population of target readers. Through the lens of my model, my estimates recover maps of complementarities among pairs of topics for each newspaper and I find that these contribute to the probability that news on a topic appears on the front page.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"61 ","pages":"Article 101006"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137269504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impact of digitalization and environmental regulation on total factor productivity","authors":"Huwei Wen , Changyong Wen , Chien-Chiang Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Clean production and digitalization are the main directions of global manufacturing development under the new industrial revolution. Based on the application of digital technologies in enterprises caused by the smart city construction in China, this study adopts the difference-in-difference method to investigate the impact of digitalization and environmental regulation on total factor productivity. Using panel data on Chinese manufacturing listed enterprises from 2008 to 2019, this study finds that digitalization and environmental regulation can significantly improve the total factor productivity. It also shows that digitalization improves the total factor productivity of manufacturing enterprises by reducing transaction costs, facilitating servitization, and stimulating innovation investment. In addition, environmental regulation can force manufacturing enterprises to transform and improve their total factor productivity. However, the interaction between environmental regulation and digitalization has a significant negative impact on total factor productivity, implying that the paths of clean transformation and digitalization transformation is not coordinated. Our findings have implications for enacting effective policies to help manufacturing enterprises achieve digital transformation and clean production.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"61 ","pages":"Article 101007"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46760814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Behavior-based price discrimination in a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly with switching costs","authors":"Masashi Umezawa","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) in an asymmetric duopoly with switching costs and including both vertical and horizontal differentiation. We demonstrate that there are two configurations of market share in equilibrium. In the first configuration, where both firms poach their rival’s consumers, the equilibria arise when switching costs are low and the firms are relatively symmetric. In the second configuration, where only the firm with more supporting services poaches the rival’s consumers, the resulting equilibria reverse. We reveal the impact of switching costs on firm profits under BBPD as well as under uniform pricing and show that with either high switching costs or sufficiently large firm asymmetries, BBPD may benefit both firms. Moreover, we find that in the second market configuration, social welfare can be higher with BBPD than with uniform pricing under high switching costs and large firm asymmetries. We also reach the same conclusion regarding social welfare when consumers are myopic in the first market configuration.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"61 ","pages":"Article 101004"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47988156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}