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STRATEGIC PLANNING AT THE CROSSROADS: OLD CHALLENGES AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES 十字路口的战略规划:旧的挑战和新的机遇
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_39_59
M. Dmitriev, Valery Krapil
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引用次数: 0
Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals 交换条件:竞争对手之间友好的信息交换
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4643
A. Blume, In-Uck Park
{"title":"Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals","authors":"A. Blume, In-Uck Park","doi":"10.3982/te4643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4643","url":null,"abstract":"We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated—the quid pro quo motive—or from the possibility of learning from the rival's failure to act in response to a disclosure—the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and the number of disclosure rounds grows without bound if the agents' initial information becomes sufficiently diffuse; in that sense, the less informed agents are, the more they talk. Patient individuals can achieve efficiency by means of continuous alternating disclosures of limited amounts of information. This provides a rationale for protracted dialogues.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73473299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
FOREIGN ECONOMISTS AND CHINESE REFORMS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE BASHAN CONFERENCE (1985) TO SHAPING THE STRATEGY OF TRANSFORMATION 外国经济学家与中国改革:巴山会议(1985)对形成转型战略的贡献
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_93_109
O. Borokh
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引用次数: 0
Persuasion with unknown beliefs 带有未知信念的说服
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4742
Svetlana Kosterina
{"title":"Persuasion with unknown beliefs","authors":"Svetlana Kosterina","doi":"10.3982/te4742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4742","url":null,"abstract":"A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this environment. I show that there exists an optimal signal with two realizations, characterize the support of the signal realization recommending approval,, and show that the optimal signal is a hyperbola. The lack of knowledge of the receiver's prior causes the sender to hedge her bets: the optimal signal induces the high action in more states than in the standard model, albeit with a lower probability. Increasing the sender's ignorance can hurt both the sender and the receiver.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79032956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27
THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS OF DIFFERENT NATURE 俄罗斯社会的社会资本面临着不同性质的外部冲击
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_134_148
A. Karavay
{"title":"THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS OF DIFFERENT NATURE","authors":"A. Karavay","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_134_148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_134_148","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82629076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
EMBEDDEDNESS CONCEPT IN THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 嵌入性概念的理论与实证研究
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_25_45
V. Tambovtsev
{"title":"EMBEDDEDNESS CONCEPT IN THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH","authors":"V. Tambovtsev","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_25_45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_25_45","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83186032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
AGRARIAN REFORMS IN RUSSIA IN THE XIX - EARLY XX CENTURIES: POLITICAL CONTEXT AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IMPLEMENTATION (Part 2. The Second Stage of Agrarian Reform: Witte and Stolypin) 十九世纪至二十世纪初俄国的土地改革:政治背景和实施技术(第二部分)。土地改革的第二阶段:维特与斯托雷平
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_149_163
S. Vasiliev
{"title":"AGRARIAN REFORMS IN RUSSIA IN THE XIX - EARLY XX CENTURIES: POLITICAL CONTEXT AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IMPLEMENTATION (Part 2. The Second Stage of Agrarian Reform: Witte and Stolypin)","authors":"S. Vasiliev","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_149_163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_149_163","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90308695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation 一个共同的价值拍卖与国家依赖的参与
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te3733
S. Lauermann, A. Wolinsky
{"title":"A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation","authors":"S. Lauermann, A. Wolinsky","doi":"10.3982/te3733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te3733","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes a common‐value, first‐price auction with state‐dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a “pooling” type—with high probability, the winning bid is the same across states and is below the ex ante expected value—or of a “partially revealing” type—with no significant atoms in the winning bid distribution and an expected winning bid increasing in the true value. Which of these forms will arise is determined by the likelihood ratio at the top of the signal distribution and the participation across states. We fully characterize this relation and show how the participation pattern determines the extent of information aggregation by the price.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90092354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
THE FIRST PLENUM: ON THE QUESTION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COUNCIL UNDER THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSAR OF HEAVY INDUSTRY OF THE USSR IN MAY 1935 1935年5月第一次全体会议:关于苏联重工业人民委员会议的意义问题
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_128_138
M. Feldman
{"title":"THE FIRST PLENUM: ON THE QUESTION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COUNCIL UNDER THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSAR OF HEAVY INDUSTRY OF THE USSR IN MAY 1935","authors":"M. Feldman","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_128_138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_128_138","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81643998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information aggregation in Poisson elections 泊松选举中的信息聚合
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te3849
Mehmet Ekmekci,Stephan Lauermann
{"title":"Information aggregation in Poisson elections","authors":"Mehmet Ekmekci,Stephan Lauermann","doi":"10.3982/te3849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te3849","url":null,"abstract":"The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"65 11","pages":"1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138509414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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