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SHORT - AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM IRAN AND YUGOSLAVIA 制裁的短期和长期影响:来自伊朗和南斯拉夫的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_77_98
D. Sitkevich, I. Starodubrovskaya
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引用次数: 0
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers 在没有转移的情况下，对成本不确定的垄断者进行监管
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4691
M. Amador, K. Bagwell
{"title":"Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers","authors":"M. Amador, K. Bagwell","doi":"10.3982/te4691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4691","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the Baron and Myerson (1982) model of regulation under the restriction that transfers are infeasible. Extending techniques from the delegation literature to incorporate an ex post participation constraint, we report sufficient conditions under which optimal regulation takes the form of price‐cap regulation. We establish conditions under which the optimal price cap is set at a level such that no types are excluded and show that exclusion of higher cost types can be optimal when these conditions fail. We also provide conditions for the optimality of price‐cap regulation when an ex post participation constraint is present and exclusion is infeasible.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85009043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors 独白，对话和共同的先验
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4508
A. Di Tillio, E. Lehrer, D. Samet
{"title":"Monologues, dialogues, and common priors","authors":"A. Di Tillio, E. Lehrer, D. Samet","doi":"10.3982/te4508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4508","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In each stage of the dialogue, the agents tell each other the probability they ascribe to a fixed event and update their beliefs about the event. To characterize dialogues consistent with a common prior, we first study monologues, which are sequences of probabilities assigned by a single agent to a given event in an exogenous learning process. A dialogue is consistent with a common prior if and only if each selection sequence from the two monologues comprising the dialogue is itself a monologue.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85788581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
THE VIEWS OF MODERN RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE LATE USSR 现代俄国科学家对苏联后期经济问题的看法
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_139_154
Arseniy Ermolov
{"title":"THE VIEWS OF MODERN RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE LATE USSR","authors":"Arseniy Ermolov","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_139_154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_139_154","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84132993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS IN A SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT: ANALYSIS OF DYNAMICS USING THE DEA METHOD 社会经济背景下执法系统绩效的跨国比较:使用dea方法的动态分析
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_146_162
T.M. Bazhenova
{"title":"CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS IN A SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT: ANALYSIS OF DYNAMICS USING THE DEA METHOD","authors":"T.M. Bazhenova","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_146_162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_146_162","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"636 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78119461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle 文明丛林中的平衡
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4886
A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz
{"title":"Equilibrium in a civilized jungle","authors":"A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz","doi":"10.3982/te4886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4886","url":null,"abstract":"The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be justified within this group. We present (i) conditions under which the equilibrium in a civilized jungle is identical to the jungle equilibrium, (ii) a connection between the power relation and the language that is essentially necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Pareto efficient civilized equilibrium, and (iii) an analogue to the second welfare theorem.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78171147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Monotone contracts 单调的合同
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4842
Daniel Bird, A. Frug
{"title":"Monotone contracts","authors":"Daniel Bird, A. Frug","doi":"10.3982/te4842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4842","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a framework for deriving dynamic monotonicity results in long‐term stochastic contracting problems with symmetric information. Specifically, we construct a notion of concave separable activity that encompasses many prevalent contractual components (e.g., wage, effort, level of production, etc.). We then provide a tight condition under which such activities manifest a form of seniority in every contracting problem in which they are present: any change that occurs in the level of the activity over time favors the agent. Our work unifies and significantly generalizes many existing results and can also be used to establish monotonicity results in other settings of interest.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81287857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
HUMAN FACTOR IN GOVERNANCE DURING TRANSIT TIMES IN A VIEW OF NEW INSTITUTIONALISM CONCEPTS 从新制度主义概念看过境时期治理中的人为因素
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_126_145
A. Obolonsky
{"title":"HUMAN FACTOR IN GOVERNANCE DURING TRANSIT TIMES IN A VIEW OF NEW INSTITUTIONALISM CONCEPTS","authors":"A. Obolonsky","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_126_145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_126_145","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76261403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
STRATEGIC PLANNING AT THE CROSSROADS: OLD CHALLENGES AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES 十字路口的战略规划:旧的挑战和新的机遇
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_39_59
M. Dmitriev, Valery Krapil
{"title":"STRATEGIC PLANNING AT THE CROSSROADS: OLD CHALLENGES AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES","authors":"M. Dmitriev, Valery Krapil","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_39_59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_39_59","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78816939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals 交换条件:竞争对手之间友好的信息交换
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4643
A. Blume, In-Uck Park
{"title":"Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals","authors":"A. Blume, In-Uck Park","doi":"10.3982/te4643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4643","url":null,"abstract":"We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated—the quid pro quo motive—or from the possibility of learning from the rival's failure to act in response to a disclosure—the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and the number of disclosure rounds grows without bound if the agents' initial information becomes sufficiently diffuse; in that sense, the less informed agents are, the more they talk. Patient individuals can achieve efficiency by means of continuous alternating disclosures of limited amounts of information. This provides a rationale for protracted dialogues.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73473299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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