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SHORT - AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM IRAN AND YUGOSLAVIA 制裁的短期和长期影响:来自伊朗和南斯拉夫的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_77_98
D. Sitkevich, I. Starodubrovskaya
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引用次数: 0
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers 在没有转移的情况下，对成本不确定的垄断者进行监管
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4691
M. Amador, K. Bagwell
{"title":"Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers","authors":"M. Amador, K. Bagwell","doi":"10.3982/te4691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4691","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the Baron and Myerson (1982) model of regulation under the restriction that transfers are infeasible. Extending techniques from the delegation literature to incorporate an ex post participation constraint, we report sufficient conditions under which optimal regulation takes the form of price‐cap regulation. We establish conditions under which the optimal price cap is set at a level such that no types are excluded and show that exclusion of higher cost types can be optimal when these conditions fail. We also provide conditions for the optimality of price‐cap regulation when an ex post participation constraint is present and exclusion is infeasible.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85009043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors 独白，对话和共同的先验
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4508
A. Di Tillio, E. Lehrer, D. Samet
{"title":"Monologues, dialogues, and common priors","authors":"A. Di Tillio, E. Lehrer, D. Samet","doi":"10.3982/te4508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4508","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In each stage of the dialogue, the agents tell each other the probability they ascribe to a fixed event and update their beliefs about the event. To characterize dialogues consistent with a common prior, we first study monologues, which are sequences of probabilities assigned by a single agent to a given event in an exogenous learning process. A dialogue is consistent with a common prior if and only if each selection sequence from the two monologues comprising the dialogue is itself a monologue.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85788581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
THE VIEWS OF MODERN RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE LATE USSR 现代俄国科学家对苏联后期经济问题的看法
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_139_154
Arseniy Ermolov
{"title":"THE VIEWS OF MODERN RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE LATE USSR","authors":"Arseniy Ermolov","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_139_154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_139_154","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84132993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS IN A SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT: ANALYSIS OF DYNAMICS USING THE DEA METHOD 社会经济背景下执法系统绩效的跨国比较:使用dea方法的动态分析
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_146_162
T.M. Bazhenova
{"title":"CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS IN A SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT: ANALYSIS OF DYNAMICS USING THE DEA METHOD","authors":"T.M. Bazhenova","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_146_162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_146_162","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"636 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78119461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle 文明丛林中的平衡
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4886
A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz
{"title":"Equilibrium in a civilized jungle","authors":"A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz","doi":"10.3982/te4886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4886","url":null,"abstract":"The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be justified within this group. We present (i) conditions under which the equilibrium in a civilized jungle is identical to the jungle equilibrium, (ii) a connection between the power relation and the language that is essentially necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Pareto efficient civilized equilibrium, and (iii) an analogue to the second welfare theorem.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78171147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Monotone contracts 单调的合同
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4842
Daniel Bird, A. Frug
{"title":"Monotone contracts","authors":"Daniel Bird, A. Frug","doi":"10.3982/te4842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4842","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a framework for deriving dynamic monotonicity results in long‐term stochastic contracting problems with symmetric information. Specifically, we construct a notion of concave separable activity that encompasses many prevalent contractual components (e.g., wage, effort, level of production, etc.). We then provide a tight condition under which such activities manifest a form of seniority in every contracting problem in which they are present: any change that occurs in the level of the activity over time favors the agent. Our work unifies and significantly generalizes many existing results and can also be used to establish monotonicity results in other settings of interest.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81287857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Incomplete‐information games in large populations with anonymity 匿名大群体中的不完全信息博弈
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4066
Martin F. Hellwig
{"title":"Incomplete‐information games in large populations with anonymity","authors":"Martin F. Hellwig","doi":"10.3982/te4066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4066","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides theoretical foundations for models of strategic interdependence under uncertainty that have a continuum of agents and a decomposition of uncertainty into a macro component and an agent‐specific micro component, with a law of large numbers for the latter. This macro–micro decomposition of uncertainty is implied by a condition of exchangeability of agents' types, which holds at the level of the prior if and only if it also holds at the level of agents' beliefs, i.e., posteriors. Under an additional condition of anonymity in payoffs, agents' behaviors are fully determined by their beliefs about the cross‐section distribution of types and other macro variables, and by their beliefs about the cross‐section distribution of other agents' strategies. Any probability distribution over cross‐section distributions of types and other macro variables is compatible with a fully specified belief system, but not every function from types to such probability distributions is compatible with a common prior. The paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for compatibility of such a function with a common prior.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"65 2","pages":"461-506"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138509422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
EUROPEAN UNION AFTER BREXIT: RESULTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE INTEGRATION PROJECT 英国脱欧后的欧盟:一体化项目的结果与前景
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_110_133
Andrei N. Medushevskiy
{"title":"EUROPEAN UNION AFTER BREXIT: RESULTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE INTEGRATION PROJECT","authors":"Andrei N. Medushevskiy","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_110_133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_110_133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87993043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
HUMAN FACTOR IN GOVERNANCE DURING TRANSIT TIMES IN A VIEW OF NEW INSTITUTIONALISM CONCEPTS 从新制度主义概念看过境时期治理中的人为因素
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_126_145
A. Obolonsky
{"title":"HUMAN FACTOR IN GOVERNANCE DURING TRANSIT TIMES IN A VIEW OF NEW INSTITUTIONALISM CONCEPTS","authors":"A. Obolonsky","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_126_145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_126_145","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76261403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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