文明丛林中的平衡

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz
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引用次数: 4

摘要

通过添加语言来丰富具有相等数量的代理和对象的丛林模型,该语言是代理集合上的一组排序。如果在一组代理中存在一个最适合该代理的排序,则该代理对对象的分配在一组代理中是合理的。文明的均衡是这样一种分配:在由他自己和那些希望被分配到目标的人组成的群体中,每个行为者都是最强大的,并且在这个群体中可以被证明是合理的。我们提出(i)文明丛林中的均衡与丛林均衡相同的条件,(ii)权力关系和语言之间的联系是帕累托有效文明均衡存在的必要和充分条件,以及(iii)第二福利定理的类比。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be justified within this group. We present (i) conditions under which the equilibrium in a civilized jungle is identical to the jungle equilibrium, (ii) a connection between the power relation and the language that is essentially necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Pareto efficient civilized equilibrium, and (iii) an analogue to the second welfare theorem.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
35
审稿时长
52 weeks
期刊介绍: Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index
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