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WHY IS THE WEST ROTTING? (About the Book by Daniil Kotsyubinsky “New Totalitarianism” of the XXI Century. Will the Fashion for Security and Prohibitions Go Away, Will the Fashion for Freedom and Law Return?) 为什么西方正在腐烂?(作者:daniel Kotsyubinsky)《二十一世纪的新极权主义》安全与禁令的时尚会消失吗?自由与法律的时尚会回归吗?
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_173_179
A. Zaostrovtsev
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引用次数: 0
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions 串谋执法在重复的首价拍卖
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4640
Wenzhang Zhang
{"title":"Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions","authors":"Wenzhang Zhang","doi":"10.3982/te4640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4640","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of repeated first‐price auctions, we explore how a bid‐rigging cartel can simultaneously overcome the difficulty of soliciting truthful private information about valuations and the difficulty of enforcing its internal mechanism. Focusing on the class of trigger‐strategy collusive agreements, we explicitly characterize the optimal collusive agreement for any given discount factor. Making use of the characterization, we also explore how a long‐run seller can use a reserve price to fight the cartel.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73898602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES IN RUSSIA: FINISH OR RESTART? 俄罗斯地区发展机构:结束还是重启?
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_47_61
E. Balatsky, N. Ekimova
{"title":"REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES IN RUSSIA: FINISH OR RESTART?","authors":"E. Balatsky, N. Ekimova","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_47_61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_47_61","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82943518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
WHAT CAN INSTITUTIONS DO? METAPHORS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 机构能做些什么?组织制度主义的隐喻
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_22_38
V. Tambovtsev
{"title":"WHAT CAN INSTITUTIONS DO? METAPHORS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM","authors":"V. Tambovtsev","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_22_38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_22_38","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85500687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test 你在想什么?决策理论作为连贯性测试
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4707
I. Gilboa, L. Samuelson
{"title":"What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test","authors":"I. Gilboa, L. Samuelson","doi":"10.3982/te4707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4707","url":null,"abstract":"Decision theory can be used to test the logic of decision making—one may ask whether a given set of decisions can be justified by a decision‐theoretic model. Indeed, in principal–agent settings, such justifications may be required—a manager of an investment fund may be asked what beliefs she used when valuing assets and a government may be asked whether a portfolio of rules and regulations is coherent. In this paper we ask which collections of uncertain‐act evaluations can be simultaneously justified under the maxmin expected utility criterion by a single set of probabilities. We draw connections to the fundamental theorem of finance (for the special case of a Bayesian agent) and revealed‐preference results.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85832594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability 有限责任下无先验动态分配
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4575
Sylvain Chassang, Samuel Kapon
{"title":"Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability","authors":"Sylvain Chassang, Samuel Kapon","doi":"10.3982/te4575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4575","url":null,"abstract":"A principal seeks to efficiently allocate a productive public resource to a number of possible users. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a detail‐free way to do so provided users have deep pockets. In practice however, users may have limited resources. We study a dynamic allocation problem in which participants have limited liability: transfers are made ex post, and only if the productive efforts of participants are successful. We show that it is possible to approximate the performance of the pivot VCG mechanism using limited liability detail‐free mechanisms that selectively ignore reports from participants who cannot make their promised payments. A complementary use of cautiousness and forgiveness achieves approximate renegotiation‐proofness. We emphasize the use of prior‐free online optimization techniques to approximate aggregate incentive properties of the pivot mechanism.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75160330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
THE STATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF MEGAPROJECTS AS A MODEL FOR RESTORING SOVEREIGNTY 大型项目的国家管理体制是恢复主权的典范
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_3_62_76
A. Gusev, M. Yurevich
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引用次数: 1
UNIVERSALISM OR TARGETING IN SOCIAL POLICY: THE CASE OF HEALTHCARE 社会政策的普遍性或针对性:以医疗保健为例
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_77_92
T. Chubarova
{"title":"UNIVERSALISM OR TARGETING IN SOCIAL POLICY: THE CASE OF HEALTHCARE","authors":"T. Chubarova","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_77_92","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_77_92","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87651792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
TRACK AND PENDULUM: IMPACT OF THE PAST DEPENDENCE PROBLEM ON THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 轨迹与钟摆:过去依赖问题对制度变迁动态的影响
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_24_47
A. Auzan, Yaroslav Lepetikov, D. Sitkevich
{"title":"TRACK AND PENDULUM: IMPACT OF THE PAST DEPENDENCE PROBLEM ON THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE","authors":"A. Auzan, Yaroslav Lepetikov, D. Sitkevich","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_24_47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_24_47","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87985510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sufficientarianism Sufficientarianism
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-s112-1
J. Alcantud, M. Mariotti, Roberto Veneziani
{"title":"Sufficientarianism","authors":"J. Alcantud, M. Mariotti, Roberto Veneziani","doi":"10.4324/9780415249126-s112-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-s112-1","url":null,"abstract":"Sufficientarianism is a prominent approach to distributive justice in political philosophy and in policy analyses. However, it is virtually absent from the formal normative economics literature. We analyze sufficientarianism axiomatically in the context of the allocation of 0–1 normalized well‐being in society. We present three characterizations of the core sufficientarian criterion, which counts the number of agents who attain a “good enough” level of well‐being. The main characterization captures the “hybrid” nature of the criterion, which embodies at the same time a threshold around which the worst off in society is prioritized, and an indifference to equality in other regions. The other two characterizations relate sufficientarianism, respectively, to a liberal principle of noninterference and to a classic neutrality property.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88098797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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