Advances in Accounting最新文献_第2页

CEO political ideology and asymmetric cost behavior 首席执行官的政治意识形态与不对称成本行为

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100755

Adam Esplin, Yun Ke, Kari Joseph Olsen, Jiwoo Seo

引用次数: 0

The effect of corporate reputation on accounting conservatism 企业声誉对会计保守主义的影响

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100732

Kourosh Amirkhani, Jenny Brown, Jeffrey Gramlich

引用次数: 0

Financial reporting timeliness and its determinants in UK charities 英国慈善机构财务报告的及时性及其决定因素

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100733

Arung Gihna Mayapada , Pallab Kumar Biswas, Helen Roberts

{"title":"Financial reporting timeliness and its determinants in UK charities","authors":"Arung Gihna Mayapada , Pallab Kumar Biswas, Helen Roberts","doi":"10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100733","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study empirically examines the timeliness of financial reporting as an important qualitative characteristic of useful financial information within the context of United Kingdom (UK) charities. Using 8490 UK charitable companies (67,014 observations) during 2007–2018, we find that charities relying more on donation income take a shorter time to file accounts. Moreover, we observe that charities operating in more competitive donation markets are more inclined to provide timely financial disclosures. Similar to for-profit organizations, charities tend to delay their financial statements filings when reporting deficit, negative equity, low liquidity, and high leverage. In addition, our analysis shows that charities with higher accruals quality, unqualified audit opinions, and subject to audits by industry-specialized auditors publish their annual accounts earlier. Our findings have important implications for charities, donors as critical stakeholders, regulators, and scholars.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46906,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S088261102400004X/pdfft?md5=85232e16b241abb464eb523ed836fbee&pid=1-s2.0-S088261102400004X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139733200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Managerial accounting practices, HR metrics, and firm performance 管理会计实务、人力资源指标和公司业绩

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-02-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100730

Rene Arseneault , Jacqueline Gagnon

{"title":"Managerial accounting practices, HR metrics, and firm performance","authors":"Rene Arseneault , Jacqueline Gagnon","doi":"10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100730","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This research explores how accounting and HR employees perceive the value of managerial accounting and HR practices in their organizations. Our study was restricted to participants employed in publicly listed organizations allowing us to explore how their perceptions equate with objectively measured firm performance. In total, 186 employees completed a series of measures exploring their perceptions of managerial accounting practices and the value of using HR as a measurement tool. Further, we regressed our accounting and HR measures on financial, non-financial, and market-based aspects of corporate performance. Our findings reveal that compared to accounting employees, HR employees place a higher value on using HR metrics and diagnostic styles of managerial accounting systems. Further, internal accounting and HR systems impact firm performance and corporate information environment. Our research has practical implications for strategic policy makers within publicly listed corporations that influence accounting and HR organizational cultures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46906,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0882611024000014/pdfft?md5=1de320d1bbf66b4114666b71b976115b&pid=1-s2.0-S0882611024000014-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139709566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The interactive effects of performance evaluation leniency and performance measurement precision on employee effort and performance 绩效评估宽松度和绩效衡量精确度对员工努力程度和绩效的交互影响

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100731

Yelin Li , Bernhard E. Reichert , Alex Woods

{"title":"The interactive effects of performance evaluation leniency and performance measurement precision on employee effort and performance","authors":"Yelin Li , Bernhard E. Reichert , Alex Woods","doi":"10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100731","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.adiac.2024.100731","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Research shows that in practice, supervisors without any constraints to their compensation setting behavior often tend to provide lenient performance evaluations to employees. Economic theory criticizes this outcome because leniency is thought to provide lower motivation to exert effort for low and medium as well as high performers. To provide incentives for employees to exert effort, economic theory calls for a distributed compensation approach that ensures employee performance differences lead to compensation differences. This call ignores insights from psychology and specifically from social determination theory (SDT). Using a real-effort experiment, we find that lenient evaluations lead to lower performance than distributed evaluations when performance is measured precisely. However, lenient evaluations lead to higher effort and performance than distributed evaluations when employee performance is measured imprecisely. We show, using a process model, that the positive effect of leniency for imprecise performance measurement on employee performance results from higher levels of task enjoyment, consistent with SDT. Our findings suggest that organizations need to consider the leniency of compensation as well as performance measurement precision jointly to achieve optimal employee effort and performance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46906,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139647990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do analysts provide information about other comprehensive income in book value forecasts for financial firms? 分析师是否在金融公司账面价值预测中提供其他综合收益的信息？

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100726

Dirk Black , Thaddeus Neururer

引用次数: 0

Privileged information access, analyst consensus building, and stock return volatility: Evidence from the JOBS Act 特权信息获取、分析师共识建立和股票回报波动：来自 JOBS 法案的证据

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100729

Shunyao Jin , Michael D. Kimbrough , Isabel Yanyan Wang

{"title":"Privileged information access, analyst consensus building, and stock return volatility: Evidence from the JOBS Act","authors":"Shunyao Jin , Michael D. Kimbrough , Isabel Yanyan Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100729","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This study examines whether allowing select analysts private access to management before an IPO affects analyst consensus building and subsequently post-IPO stock return volatility. The 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act creates many exemptions to reduce the cost of going public for smaller issuers that qualify as an Emerging Growth Company (EGC). One set of provisions allows analysts affiliated with an EGC's underwriters to communicate privately with management and potential investors before the IPO. Using a sample of IPOs during 2001–2022, we find that the dispersion in affiliated analysts' initiation forecasts is significantly higher for EGCs than similar IPOs in the pre-JOBS period. A </span>path analysis reveals that the JOBS Act indirectly contributes to the heightened post-IPO stock return volatility through the mediating role of forecast dispersion among affiliated analysts. Our exploratory analyses suggest that more significant variations in affiliated analysts' social connections and their workload tend to be associated with higher forecast dispersion. Overall, our findings indicate that having privileged access to management could reduce consensus among analysts, which can increase post-IPO stock return volatility in EGCs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46906,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139406434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Discussion of “Impact of Audit Committee Social Capital on the Adoption of COSO 2013” 讨论 "审计委员会社会资本对采用 COSO 2013 的影响"

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100724

Kathleen Rupley

引用次数: 0

Clients' strategic change and auditor behavior: Evidence from audit adjustments and audit fees 客户的战略变化与审计师的行为：来自审计调整和审计费用的证据

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100721

Bin Wu , Anqi Li , Wen Zhang

{"title":"Clients' strategic change and auditor behavior: Evidence from audit adjustments and audit fees","authors":"Bin Wu , Anqi Li , Wen Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100721","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using data on audit adjustments, this study examines the relation between Chinese listed companies' strategic change and their auditor's behavior. We find that levels of audit clients' strategic change are positively associated with the magnitude of audit adjustments and audit fees, suggesting that auditors exert greater effort, and propose larger audit adjustments, on these audits. We argue that during a client’ strategic change, auditors rely less on prior experience with the client, and increase their perceived risk of the audit. Further results show a positive correlation between clients' strategic change and the experience level of auditors assigned to the client by the audit firm. We also find evidence that levels of strategic change are negatively associated with pre-audit financial reporting quality, indicating that auditors' perceived risk for clients undergoing strategic change is consistent with clients' real financial reporting risk. Evidence on regulatory sanctions suggests that audit adjustments mitigate the positive association between clients' strategic change and the likelihood of those clients' being sanctioned. Taken together, these results suggest that auditors incorporate clients' strategic change into their assessment of client risk and implement appropriate responses to that risk, and that audit adjustments help companies avoid regulatory sanction.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46906,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139099869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Financial analysts' information discovery: A study of manager-analyst interactions in conference calls 金融分析师的信息发现：电话会议中经理与分析师互动研究

IF 1.6

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100727

Chuong Do

引用次数: 0