METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-05-08DOI: 10.1111/meta.12682
Avi I. Mintz
{"title":"Philosophy of education: Thinking and learning through history and practice By John Ryder. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022. Pp. x + 275","authors":"Avi I. Mintz","doi":"10.1111/meta.12682","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12682","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 3","pages":"502-506"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140926148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-15DOI: 10.1111/meta.12678
James Tartaglia
{"title":"Ethnophilosophy as a global development goal","authors":"James Tartaglia","doi":"10.1111/meta.12678","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12678","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The ethnophilosophy debate in African philosophy has been primarily concerned with the nature and future direction of African philosophy, but this paper approaches the debate in search of lessons about philosophy in general. The paper shows how this ongoing debate has been obscured by varying understandings of “ethnophilosophy” and that a de facto victory has long since transpired, since “ethnophilosophy,” in the sense recommended here, is flourishing. The paper argues that the political arguments with which Hountondji and Wiredu initiated the debate in the 1970s supervene on the metaphilosophical view that ethnophilosophy, if philosophy at all, is of a poor standard. Showing that ethnophilosophy must indeed be philosophy, it argues that the critics' low opinions of it depend on unrealistic assumptions about how philosophy makes progress. The paper concludes that Africa is lucky to have ethnophilosophies and that the rest of the world should hope to develop some.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"147-161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140564650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-09DOI: 10.1111/meta.12679
Joël Dolbeault
{"title":"Libertarianism without alternative possibilities","authors":"Joël Dolbeault","doi":"10.1111/meta.12679","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12679","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the contemporary debate on free will, most philosophers assume that the defense of libertarianism implies the defense of the notion of alternative possibilities. This article discusses this presupposition by showing that it is possible to build a libertarianism <i>without</i> alternative possibilities, apparently more robust than libertarianism <i>with</i> alternative possibilities. Inspired by Bergson, this nonclassical libertarianism challenges the idea that all causation implies the actualization of a predetermined possibility (an idea shared by determinism and classical libertarianism). Moreover, it challenges the idea that free will is a mere choice between prefixed possibilities: for this libertarianism, free will is the result of a creative process of the mind—an entirely causal process whose outcome is not, however, predetermined. This nonclassical libertarianism describes the process of forming a will in a more realistic way than classical libertarianism does. Furthermore, it is not threatened by the problem of chance.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"101-114"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140564661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-08DOI: 10.1111/meta.12680
Matthew Sharpe
{"title":"Good reasons to philosophize: On Hadot, Cooper, and ancient philosophical protreptic","authors":"Matthew Sharpe","doi":"10.1111/meta.12680","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12680","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper reassesses the Cooper-Hadot debate surrounding how students are converted to philosophy as a way of life (section 1) through engagement with philosophical protreptics. In section 2, the paper identifies the core “argument from finality” in philosophical protreptics seeking to convert non-philosophers to philosophy, starting from the universal human interest in securing eudaimonia. In line with Cooper, this argument seeks to persuade prospective students on rational grounds, so that their choice to philosophise would be rationally motivated. In section 3.1, the paper illustrates how in Plato's <i>Euthydemus</i> (a) the choice to undertake philosophy is rationally justified by Socrates, using the eudaimonistic argument from finality. In section 3.2, by recourse to Aristotle's <i>Protrepticus</i>, the paper shows how the protreptic texts also compared philosophy to other intellectual pursuits, notably rhetoric, so as to recommend philosophy specifically for delivering a directive wisdom concerning how to live.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"231-248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12680","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140596820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-08DOI: 10.1111/meta.12677
Rasmus Jaksland
{"title":"Naturalized metaphysics in the image of Roy Wood Sellars and not Willard Van Orman Quine","authors":"Rasmus Jaksland","doi":"10.1111/meta.12677","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12677","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The naturalized metaphysics promoted by Ladyman and Ross, among others, is often described as (neo)-Quinean metaphysics. This association with Quine's naturalism can, however, give a misleading impression of the aims and commitments of this kind of naturalized metaphysics. Contrary to Quine, these naturalized metaphysicians endorse metaphysical realism and offer wholesale arguments in favor of the epistemic standing of science-based metaphysics. Accordingly, this naturalized metaphysics comes closer to Roy Wood Sellars's evolutionary naturalism, especially since the theory of evolution is central to the criticism that naturalized metaphysics levels at nonnaturalized metaphysics. The paper argues that Sellars's naturalism is furthermore helpful (1) for explicating the naturalism of naturalized metaphysics, (2) for theorizing a more general naturalist basis for naturalized metaphysics, and (3) for suggesting where naturalized metaphysics is perhaps not naturalist enough, especially when it comes to considering the implications of the theory of evolution for its positive program.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"214-230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12677","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140564653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1111/meta.12674
Guido Melchior
{"title":"Meta-regresses and the limits of persuasive argumentation","authors":"Guido Melchior","doi":"10.1111/meta.12674","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12674","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta-regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"196-213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12674","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140596587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1111/meta.12681
Nevia Dolcini
{"title":"Philosophy as dia-philosophy: Hector-Neri Castañeda's theoretical defense of pluralism","authors":"Nevia Dolcini","doi":"10.1111/meta.12681","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12681","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper focuses on Hector-Neri Castañeda's significant contributions to metaphilosophy. In his 1980 work, <i>On Philosophical Method</i>, Castañeda articulates a unique perspective, characterizing philosophy as fundamentally a dia-philosophical activity. By asserting the supremacy of synthesis over analysis within the metaphilosophical hierarchy, his account provides a purely theoretical defense of philosophical pluralism devoid of any relativistic inclinations. Despite Castañeda's enduring influence and profound impact on ongoing discussions in ontology, logic, and the philosophy of language, his metaphilosophical insights have largely been neglected. In the context of today's increasingly diverse philosophical landscape, this paper posits that Castañeda's pluralist metaphilosophy retains substantial theoretical relevance.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"115-130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12681","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140596899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-02DOI: 10.1111/meta.12676
Kefu Zhu
{"title":"Toward a deeper appreciation of correlative thinking: A comparative analysis of Zhuangzi's Fish Parable and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of body","authors":"Kefu Zhu","doi":"10.1111/meta.12676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12676","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper argues that correlative thinking, a fundamental aspect of Chinese thought often distinguished from rational thinking, is rooted in our situated bodily experiences, constituting a unique mode of sensemaking. It performs a comparative analysis between Zhuangzi's Fish Parable and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodied perception, focusing on the self-attunement in our embodied experience and <i>Dao</i>, which remains invisible but gradually reveals its presence as the parable unfolds. The paper illuminates the embodied nature of correlative thinking by exposing the intricate interplay between the self and others, as well as the self and its lived environment. This analysis underscores the reciprocal relationship between <i>Dao</i> and correlative thinking: <i>Dao</i> acts as the origin of correlative thinking, while correlative thinking, in turn, unveils the presence of <i>Dao</i>. This analysis could enrich our understanding of the interplay between the self, others, and the world they inhabit.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"249-263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141069102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.1111/meta.12675
Ingrid Malm Lindberg
{"title":"The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual-process virtue","authors":"Ingrid Malm Lindberg","doi":"10.1111/meta.12675","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual-process virtue, consisting of imagination<sub>1</sub> (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination<sub>2</sub> (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual-process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual-process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"162-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140596829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
METAPHILOSOPHYPub Date : 2024-03-30DOI: 10.1111/meta.12673
Andrew Aberdein, Kenneth R. Pike
{"title":"Queue-jumping arguments","authors":"Andrew Aberdein, Kenneth R. Pike","doi":"10.1111/meta.12673","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meta.12673","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A queue-jumping argument concludes that some course of action is impermissible by likening it to the presumptively impermissible act of jumping a queue. Arguments of this sort may be found in a disparate range of contexts and in support of policies favoured by both left and right. Examples include arguments against private education and private health care but also arguments against accommodations for learning disabilities, refugee resettlement, and birthright citizenship. We infer that, although queue-jumping arguments are strictly analogies, they constitute a sufficiently distinct class of arguments to justify their separate treatment. The paper proposes an argumentation scheme for queue-jumping arguments and demonstrates its applicability to some existing arguments of this type.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"175-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140361562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}