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Recklessness, Agent-Relative Prerogatives, and Latent Obligations: Does Belief-Relativity Trump Fact-Relativity with Respect to Our Rights? 鲁莽、代理人相对特权和潜在义务：就我们的权利而言，信念相对性是否压倒了事实相对性？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00701-5
Larry Alexander
{"title":"Recklessness, Agent-Relative Prerogatives, and Latent Obligations: Does Belief-Relativity Trump Fact-Relativity with Respect to Our Rights?","authors":"Larry Alexander","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00701-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00701-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Are our rights—to our bodily integrity, to our possessions, to the goods and services promised us, and so on—matters of fact, or are our rights functions of others’ beliefs about how their acts will affect our rights? The conventional view states that subjective oughts—based on what we believe—determine culpability, whereas objective oughts—based on the facts—determine permissibility. After all, the idea that our beliefs about how our acts would affect others’ rights might affect the contours of those rights themselves appears deeply paradoxical. For how can others’ rights be based on our beliefs when those beliefs have as their objects not themselves but others’ rights? Nonetheless, paradoxical as that position may appear, a strong case can be mounted in its defense, not by focusing on the rights themselves, but by focusing on the acts that imperil those rights. It is the burden of this essay to make a case for the belief-relativity rather than the fact-relativity of rights.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138628391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conceptual Knowing-How-Based Theoretical Wisdom 基于概念的 "知道-如何 "理论智慧
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00707-z
Yuanfan Huang
{"title":"Conceptual Knowing-How-Based Theoretical Wisdom","authors":"Yuanfan Huang","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00707-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00707-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138980731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vaccines and the Case for the Enhancement of Human Judgment 疫苗与提高人类判断力的理由
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00705-1
Ken Daley
{"title":"Vaccines and the Case for the Enhancement of Human Judgment","authors":"Ken Daley","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00705-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00705-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many have argued that human enhancement, in particular bioenhancement via genetic engineering, brain-interventions or preimplantation embryo selection, is problematic even if it can be safely implemented. Various arguments have been put forward focusing on issues such as the undermining of autonomy, uneven distribution and unfairness, and the alteration of one’s identity, amongst others. Nevertheless, few, if any, of these thinkers oppose vaccines. In what follows, I argue for the permissibility of a limited set of cognitive enhancements – in particular, the enhancement of evaluative judgment and self-control – by analogy with the permissibility of vaccines. As a result, it follows that if one accepts the permissibility of vaccines one will also, other things being equal, be committed to the permissibility of these enhancements. I then consider and respond to a number of possible objections in order to defend and clarify my position.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"250 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138572025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Musical Emotions and Timbre: from Expressiveness to Atmospheres 音乐情感与音调：从表现力到氛围
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00700-6
Nicola Di Stefano
{"title":"Musical Emotions and Timbre: from Expressiveness to Atmospheres","authors":"Nicola Di Stefano","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00700-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00700-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"14 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138589361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Logical Evidence Could not be 逻辑证据不可能是什么
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00695-0
Matteo Baggio
{"title":"What Logical Evidence Could not be","authors":"Matteo Baggio","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00695-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00695-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>By playing a crucial role in settling open issues in the philosophical debate about logical consequence, logical evidence has become the holy grail of inquirers investigating the domain of logic. However, despite its indispensable role in this endeavor, logical evidence has retained an aura of mystery. Indeed, there seems to be a great disharmony in conceiving the correct nature and scope of logical evidence among philosophers. In this paper, I examine four widespread conceptions of logical evidence to argue that all should be reconsidered. First, I argue that logical apriorists are more tolerant of logical evidence than empiricists. Second, I argue that evidence for logic should not be read out of natural language. Third, I argue that if logical intuitions are to count as logical evidence, then their evidential content must not be propositional. Finally, I argue that the empiricist proposal of treating experts' judgments as evidence suffers from the same problems as the rationalist conception.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"194 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138547951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Understanding as Usability and Context-Sensitivity to Interests 理解为可用性和对兴趣背景的敏感性
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00699-w
Andreas Søndergaard
{"title":"Understanding as Usability and Context-Sensitivity to Interests","authors":"Andreas Søndergaard","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00699-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00699-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Is understanding subject to a factivity constraint? That is, must the agent’s representation of some subject matter be accurate in order for her to understand that subject matter? ‘No’, I argue in this paper. As an alternative, I formulate a novel manipulationist account of understanding. Rather than correctly representing, understanding, on this account, is a matter of being able to manipulate a representation of the world to satisfy contextually salient interests. This account of understanding is preferable to factivism, I argue, mainly for simplicity reasons. While it explains the intuitive data about understanding as successfully as factivist accounts, it is simpler by virtue of reducing the value truth bestows on understanding to that of usability.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138548021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Be Careful What You Grant 谨慎拨款
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00702-4
Lydia McGrew
{"title":"Be Careful What You Grant","authors":"Lydia McGrew","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00702-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00702-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine the concept of granting for the sake of the argument in the context of explanatory reasoning. I discuss a situation where S wishes to argue for H1 as a true explanation of evidence E and also decides to grant, for the sake of the argument, that H2 is an explanation of E. S must then argue that H1 and H2 jointly explain E. When H1 and H2 compete for the force of E, it is usually a bad idea for S to grant H2 for the sake of the argument. If H1 and H2 are not positively dependent otherwise, there is a key argumentative move that he will have to make anyway in order to retain a place at the table for H1 at all—namely, arguing that the probability of E given H2 alone is low. Some philosophers of religion have suggested that S can grant that science has successfully provided natural explanations for entities previously ascribed to God, while not admitting that theism has lost any probability. This move involves saying that the scientific explanations themselves are dependent on God. I argue that this “granting” move is not an obvious success and that the theist who grants these scientific successes may have to grant that theism has lost probability.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138548029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Representationalism Offer a Reply to the Knowledge Argument? 表征主义是对知识论的回应吗?
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00703-3
Frank Jackson
{"title":"Does Representationalism Offer a Reply to the Knowledge Argument?","authors":"Frank Jackson","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00703-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00703-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I agree with Torin Alter that physicalists should be a priori physicalists. I argue against his rejection of the representationalist response to the knowledge argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Towards a Pluralistic Account of Thought Experiments 走向思想实验的多元叙述
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00704-2
Mélanie Frappier
{"title":"Towards a Pluralistic Account of Thought Experiments","authors":"Mélanie Frappier","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00704-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00704-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In light of our knowledge about neurodiversity, I argue that the cognitive science framework Miščević uses in <i>Thought Experiments</i> must be broaden to create a pluralistic account of thought experimentation, one able to account for the many ways thought experiments are replicated using not only visual models, but also arguments, conceptual analyses, and images as some of the many instruments used in the laboratory of our mind.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"60 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation 罗素物理主义、现象概念与启示
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00697-y
Christopher Devlin Brown
{"title":"Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation","authors":"Christopher Devlin Brown","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00697-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00697-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper responds to an argument from Botin which claims that Russellian physicalism is committed to the view that either (i) our phenomenal concepts do not reveal anything essential about phenomenal properties (following Goff, Botin calls this the ‘opaque’ account of phenomenal concepts), or that (ii) phenomenal concepts are capable of revealing at least some of the essence of phenomenal properties—making phenomenal concepts ‘translucent’ if some-but-not-all-revealing or ‘transparent’ if all-revealing—but this entails that phenomenal properties are fundamental, which violates physicalism. I argue that Botin is wrong that Russellian physicalists are committed to the view that physical and phenomenal concepts must have similarly qualitative/phenomenal modes of presentation or contents, since Russellian physicalists assume that we do not possess concepts which specifically refer to non-phenomenal categorical properties. If we were to acquire concepts for non-phenomenal categorical properties, they would need to have categorical contents and modes of presentation, but need not have qualitative/phenomenal contents and modes of presentation. Given this, Russellian physicalists can embrace a translucent account of phenomenal concepts, and hold that our phenomenal concepts more-or-less accurately tell us about certain sorts of non-fundamental properties which are both physical and categorical.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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