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Editorial Letter for Volume 52 (2024) 第 52 卷（2024 年）编辑信
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00723-7
Mitchell Green
{"title":"Editorial Letter for Volume 52 (2024)","authors":"Mitchell Green","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00723-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00723-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140431094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Williamson’s Epistemicism and Properties Accounts of Predicates 威廉姆森的认识论与谓词的属性说明
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00716-6
Paul Teller
{"title":"Williamson’s Epistemicism and Properties Accounts of Predicates","authors":"Paul Teller","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00716-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00716-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If the semantic values of predicates are, as Williamson assumes (<i>Philsophical Perspectives,</i> <i>13</i>, 505–517, 1999, 509) properties in the intensional sense, then epistemicism is immediate. Epistemicism fails, so also this properties account of predicates. I deploy examination of Williamson’s account as a foil against properties as semantic values, showing that his two positive arguments for bivalence fail, as do his efforts to rescue epistemicism from obvious problems. In Part II I argue that, despite the properties account’s problems, it has an important role to play in compositional semantics. We may separate the problem of how smallest parts of language get attached to the world from the problem of how those parts compose to form complex semantic values. For the latter problem we idealize and treat the smallest semantic values as properties (and referents). So doing functions to put to one side how the smallest parts get worldly attachment, a problem that would just get in the way of understanding composition. Attachment to the world must be studied separately, and I review some of the options. As a bonus we see why the requirement of higher order vagueness is an artifact of taking properties as semantic values literally instead of as a simplifying idealization.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140010475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Philosophy as a Science and as a Humanity? 哲学是科学还是人性？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00720-w
Michael Strevens
{"title":"Philosophy as a Science and as a Humanity?","authors":"Michael Strevens","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00720-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00720-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This commentary on Philip Kitcher’s book <i>What’s the Use of Philosophy?</i> addresses two questions. First, must philosophers be methodologically self-conscious to do good work? Second, is there value in the questions pursued in the traditional areas of analytic philosophy?</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139954966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Analysis and Reexamination of Functionalism from the Perspective of Artificial Intelligence 从人工智能的角度分析和重新审视功能主义
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00719-3
Strahinja Đorđević, Goran Ružić
{"title":"The Analysis and Reexamination of Functionalism from the Perspective of Artificial Intelligence","authors":"Strahinja Đorđević, Goran Ružić","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00719-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00719-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the role of machine functionalism, as one of the most popular positions within the philosophy of mind, in the context of the development of artificial intelligence. Our analysis starts from the idea that machine functionalism is a theory that is largely consistent with the principles behind the strong AI thesis. However, we will see that there is a convincing counter-argument against such claims, and we will problematize this issue. Also, by testing ChatGPT, as the most popular publicly available AI tool, we will make an effort to figure out whether the strong AI thesis could currently even be considered a potentially sustainable principle. Since ChatGPT fails the Turing test our conclusion is that the strong AI thesis cannot be upheld even in principle, implying that the current state of this AI tool does not yet provide strong enough arguments in favor of machine functionalism.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139677652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Read How to Do Things with Words: On Sbisà’s Proof by Contradiction 如何阅读《如何用文字做事》：论斯比萨的矛盾证明
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00714-8
Jeremy Wanderer, Leo Townsend
{"title":"How to Read How to Do Things with Words: On Sbisà’s Proof by Contradiction","authors":"Jeremy Wanderer, Leo Townsend","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00714-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00714-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Midway through <i>How to Do Things With Words</i>, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative form of a proof by contradiction, such that the initial framework plays an instrumental role as part of a proof in favour of the subsequent one. Despite agreeing with Sbisà’s broad instrumentalist approach, we argue that her regimentation of Austin’s narrative into a proof by contradiction ultimately fails - both as a proof and as an interpretation of Austin. Instead, we suggest that a better way of interpreting the peculiar structure of <i>How to Do Things With Words</i> is as a pedagogical exercise whose point is to bring a concealed alternative into view in a manner that also explains its initial concealment, and that this approach provides richer resources for supporting Sbisà’s own conventionalist understanding of illocution than that afforded by reading the text as a proof by contradiction.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139551720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Normative Error Theory and No Self-Defeat: A Reply to Case 规范错误理论与不自毁：对案例的答复
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-01-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00718-4
Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz
{"title":"Normative Error Theory and No Self-Defeat: A Reply to Case","authors":"Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00718-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00718-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many philosophers have claimed that normative error theorists are committed to the claim ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which to some appears paradoxical. Case (2019) has claimed that the normative error theorist cannot avoid this paradox. In this paper, we argue that there is no paradox in the first place, that is once we clear up the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’, both on the error theorist’s side and those that claim that there is a self-defeat problem. Upon clarification, we also raise scepticism to what exactly the nature of self-defeat is meant to be.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139515594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Counts as Cheating? Deducibility, Imagination, and the Mary Case 什么算作弊？可推导性、想象力和玛丽案例
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00717-5
Amy Kind
{"title":"What Counts as Cheating? Deducibility, Imagination, and the Mary Case","authors":"Amy Kind","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00717-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00717-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <i>The Matter of Consciousness</i>, in the course of his extended discussion and defense of Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Torin Alter dismisses some objections on the grounds that they are cases of cheating. Though some opponents of the knowledge argument offer various scenarios in which Mary might come to know what seeing red is like while still in the room, Alter argues that the proposed scenarios are irrelevant. In his view, the Mary case is offered to defend the claim that phenomenal facts cannot be <i>a priori</i> deduced from physical facts. Thus, a proposed scenario constitutes an objection to the knowledge argument only if it presents a case in which Mary’s learning inside the room comes about via <i>a priori</i> deduction from physical facts. Call this <i>the deducibility standard</i>. In what follows, I’ll explore a series of relevant cases in an effort to clarify this standard. Doing so enables us to better understand how cheating should be assessed in this context and thereby also to get clearer on the argumentative dialectic surrounding the Mary case.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139515784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Replies to Vendrell Ferran, Piercey, Schechtman, and Collins 对 Vendrell Ferran、Piercey、Schechtman 和 Collins 的答复
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-01-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00713-9
Jukka Mikkonen
{"title":"Replies to Vendrell Ferran, Piercey, Schechtman, and Collins","authors":"Jukka Mikkonen","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00713-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00713-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139616211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selves, Persons, and the Neo-Lucretian Symmetry Problem 自我、人格与新卢克莱修对称问题
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00710-4
Patrick Stokes
{"title":"Selves, Persons, and the Neo-Lucretian Symmetry Problem","authors":"Patrick Stokes","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00710-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00710-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The heavily discussed (neo-)Lucretian symmetry argument holds that as we are indifferent to nonexistence before birth, we should also be indifferent to nonexistence after death. An important response to this argument insists that prenatal nonexistence differs from posthumous nonexistence because we could not have been born earlier and been the same ‘thick’ psychological self. As a consequence, we can’t properly ask whether it would be better for us to have had radically different lives either. Against this, it’s been claimed we can form preferences as to which ‘thick’ (psychological) self our ‘thin’ (metaphysical) self would be better off ‘associated’ with. I argue that these discussions draw the right distinction, but do so in the wrong place: understanding the ‘thin’ self phenomenally instead of metaphysically allows us to understand how we can rationally form preferences to have been somebody else.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139499068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heterophenomenology: A Limited Critique 异现象学：有限的批判
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-01-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00711-x
{"title":"Heterophenomenology: A Limited Critique","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00711-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00711-x","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Dennett (<em>Synthese,</em> <em>53</em>(2), 159–180, <span>1982</span>, <span>1991</span>, <em>Journal of Consciousness Studies,</em> <em>10</em>(9–10), 19–30, <span>2003</span>, <em>Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,</em> <em>6</em>, 247–270, <span>2007</span>) proposes and defends a method called <em>heterophenomenology</em>. Heterophenomenology is a method to study consciousness <em>from a third-person objective point of view</em> as opposed to a first-person subjective point of view or (auto)-phenomenology. The method of heterophenomenology serves a necessary role in Dennett’s schema of bridging the gap between the manifest and the scientific image of the world. In this paper, I attempt to present a limited critique of the method of heterophenomenology. The objection raised in this paper is limited to one of the steps involved in the method, i.e., the interpretation of the heterophenomenological text as analogous to novelist fiction. I attempt to show that the assumptions made by Dennett about the interpretation of fiction are contradictory in nature and therefore the same cannot be applied to the interpretation of a heterophenomenological text. The assumptions fail in justifying the interpretation of fiction itself and hence exporting them by analogy to interpret a heterophenomenological text is a mistake.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139468915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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