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Precis of Nenad Miscevic, Thought Experiments (Springer, 2022) 内纳德-米斯切维奇《思想实验》（施普林格出版社，2022 年）摘要
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00774-w
Nenad Miscevic
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引用次数: 0
Conditional Obligation, Permissibility, and the All or Nothing Problem 有条件的义务、允许性和全有或全无问题
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00771-z
Xueshi Wang
{"title":"Conditional Obligation, Permissibility, and the All or Nothing Problem","authors":"Xueshi Wang","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00771-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00771-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, the agent has three options: a permissible act that saves no one, a wrongful act that saves only one child, or a supererogatory act that saves two children. Some may argue that if the agent is not going to save two children, she should save none rather than just one. However, this conclusion is counterintuitive. Although there are many proposed solutions to this problem, none of them provides a fully satisfactory answer. In this article, I argue that it is plausible to accept the Individualist Obligation Principle according to which, the agent is morally permitted to fulfill a <i>prima facie</i> obligation to save an individual in grave peril, provided that doing so demonstrates a substantial engagement with the individualized obligations to each individual involved.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142227771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Cognitive and Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness – Editor’s Introduction 自然性的认知和本体论维度--编者的话
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-09-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00775-9
Sebastian Scholz, Gottfried Vosgerau
{"title":"The Cognitive and Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness – Editor’s Introduction","authors":"Sebastian Scholz, Gottfried Vosgerau","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00775-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00775-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue ‘The Cognitive Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness’, including brief introductions of the individual contributions.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"315 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comment on Logins – On the Connection between Normative Explanatory Reasons and Normative Reasoning Reasons 关于登录的评论--论规范性解释理由与规范性推理理由之间的联系
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-09-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00777-7
Eva Schmidt
{"title":"Comment on Logins – On the Connection between Normative Explanatory Reasons and Normative Reasoning Reasons","authors":"Eva Schmidt","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00777-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00777-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The comment starts with a brief exposition of the Eroteric View put forth by Artūrs Logins. I then provide one friendly comment on the exact form of the normative question which is central to the view, and suggest that in addition to the question, ‘Why ought <i>S</i> to <i>φ</i> ?’, Logins should take the question, ‘Why is <i>S</i> permitted to <i>φ</i>?’ as definitive of normative reasons. In a more critical comment, I reflect on how normative explanatory reasons and normative reasoning reasons relate, calling into question Logins’s claim that the two kinds of reasons are fundamentally distinct. First, I argue that being a normative explanatory reason near enough guarantees being a normative reasoning reason; second, I argue that normative explanatory reasons as well as normative reasoning reasons can be weighed, and that they can be weighed against each other. But this causes trouble for the Eroteric View.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A View from the Periphery Commentary on Philip Kitcher’s What’s the Use of Philosophy 从外围看哲学 菲利普-基切的《哲学有什么用》评注
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00756-y
Rahel Jaeggi
{"title":"A View from the Periphery Commentary on Philip Kitcher’s What’s the Use of Philosophy","authors":"Rahel Jaeggi","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00756-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00756-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Comment on Philip Kitchers “What is the Use of Philosophy”, arguing that while Kitcher is right to insist on the practical relevance of philosophy one should be careful to distinguish this view from an instrumental understanding of philosophy. Maybe philosophy is of no use but still has an impact.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Induction With and Without Natural Properties: a New Approach to the New Riddle of Induction 有自然属性和无自然属性的归纳法：破解归纳法新谜题的新方法
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00768-8
Paul D. Thorn, Gerhard Schurz
{"title":"Induction With and Without Natural Properties: a New Approach to the New Riddle of Induction","authors":"Paul D. Thorn, Gerhard Schurz","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00768-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00768-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Drawing on past work, we introduce a new approach to the New Riddle of Induction, showing that the inductive projection of gruesome properties is unreliable under particular ideal conditions that are sufficient for the reliable inductive projection of non-gruesome properties. As an auxiliary to our account, we introduce rules for resolving conflicts between background information and the conclusions of otherwise reliable inductive inferences. Our approach to the New Riddle of Induction is quite permissive in the range of properties it recognizes as suitable for inductive projection, allowing for the inductive projection of highly gerrymandered non-natural properties. However, as an addendum to our discussion of the New Riddle, we show that natural properties do form a more reliable basis for inductive projection in cases where one’s sample is small.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reply to Commentators 回复评论员
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00770-0
Philip Kitcher
{"title":"Reply to Commentators","authors":"Philip Kitcher","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00770-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00770-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Anyone who raises questions about a well-entrenched practice can expect at least some of the practitioners to offer rebuttals. I am grateful to those who view my critique of current analytic philosophy as flawed for taking time to endeavor to correct me. They will surely not be surprised to find me recalcitrant. But I hope they will conclude, as I do, that the present airing of disagreements is profitable.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Should Polygamous Marriage Be Legal? 一夫多妻制婚姻是否合法？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00752-2
Wanpat Youngmevittaya
{"title":"Should Polygamous Marriage Be Legal?","authors":"Wanpat Youngmevittaya","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00752-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00752-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper argues that polygamous marriage should be decriminalized only if certain conditions are met: (1) every party involved is able to enter and exit the marriage at all times, (2) governments promote social norms that respect equality of every sex, and (3) children’s well-being is protected. Four objections against the legalization of polygamy are examined and criticized. First, the structural inequality objection – polygamy should be illegal because the structure of polygamous marriage is inherently inegalitarian. Second, the bargaining inequality objection – polygamy should be illegal because, in inegalitarian liberal societies, it is more likely that those who choose to be the peripheral spouse in polygamous marriage would decide from unequal bargaining positions. Third, the male-dominated norms objection – polygamy should be illegal because, in social contexts where polygyny is much more popular than polyandry, legalizing polygamy would boost inequality between males and females. Fourth, the children’s well-being objection – polygamy should be illegal because it would likely inflict harm on children. I argue that these four objections fail to justify the criminalization of polygamy. Instead, polygamy should be legal under certain conditions that are not as demanding as polygamy’s critics propose.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Reasons Are Explanations 为什么原因就是解释
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00767-9
Stephen Finlay
{"title":"Why Reasons Are Explanations","authors":"Stephen Finlay","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00767-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00767-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his book <i>Normative Reasons</i> (Logins A in Normative reasons: between reasoning and explanation. Cambridge University Press, 2022), Artürs Logins accepts that a normative reason to do A is always an answer to a ‘Why A?’ question, but rejects the unifying explanationist theory which identifies reasons always as explanations. On his Erotetic Theory, ‘Why A?’ questions sometimes seek an explanation (in No-Challenge contexts) but sometimes seek rather an argument (in Challenge contexts). This article defends a unifying, end-relational explanationist theory by interpreting ‘Why A?’ as being elliptical for different questions, with different explananda. I also respond inter alia to Logins’ claim that end-relational explanationism is extensionally inadequate because it fails to account for normative reasons for attitudes. Finally, I consider the objection that explanationism fails to account for normative reasons’ characteristic functional role of settling deliberation, introducing a “chicken or egg” dilemma over the order of discovery of reasons and options, resolved by suggesting that in open-ended deliberation reasons guide us to options without being represented under the guise of “reasons”.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141935187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Committal Question: A Reply to Hodgson 提交问题：答复霍奇森
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-08-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00766-w
Faraz Ghalbi
{"title":"Committal Question: A Reply to Hodgson","authors":"Faraz Ghalbi","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00766-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00766-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I will counter Hodgson’s critique of Hanks’ assertion that neutral predication is incoherent, which is premised on the belief that asking is a neutral act. My defense of Hanks will be two-pronged. Firstly, I will provide textual proof that Hanks is, or should be, of the opinion that asking is not neutral, but rather a committal act. Secondly, I will illustrate how Hanks’ model can accommodate the committal aspect of asking.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141935007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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