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Are Reasons Answers to Questions? 原因是问题的答案吗？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00760-2
Davide Fassio
{"title":"Are Reasons Answers to Questions?","authors":"Davide Fassio","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00760-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00760-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (2022), Arturs Logins provides a novel reductivist account of normative reasons, what he calls the Erotetic View of Reasons. In this paper, I provide three challenges to this view. The first two concern the extensional adequacy of the Erotetic View. The view may fail to count as normative reasons all and only considerations that are such. In particular, the view seems to both overgenerate and undergenerate reasons. My third concern is that the view may fail to capture the essential, practice-independent nature of reasons, as well as reasons’ constitutive and grounding role with respect to other normative properties.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141785692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rational Optimism 理性乐观主义
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00758-w
Matthew F. Wilson, Tyler J. VanderWeele
{"title":"Rational Optimism","authors":"Matthew F. Wilson, Tyler J. VanderWeele","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00758-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00758-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Optimistic beliefs have been criticized by philosophers as being irrational or epistemically deficient. This paper argues for the possibility of a rational optimism. We propose a novel four-fold taxonomy of optimistic beliefs and argue that people may hold optimistic beliefs rationally for at least two of the four types (resourced optimism and agentive optimism). These forms of rational optimism are grounded in facts about one’s resources and agency and may be epistemically justified under certain conditions. We argue that the fourth type of optimism in our taxonomy (perspectival optimism) is not subject to epistemic scrutiny in the same way. It is better evaluated on practical and moral grounds. This paper advances the discussion of optimism within both the philosophical and psychological literatures by providing a compelling and philosophically rich taxonomy of optimism that clarifies the sometimes-competing forms of optimism identified by psychologists. This advances the field by putting forward cases of epistemically justified optimism, in contrast with unrealistic optimism, that is sometimes justified for its instrumental or adaptive characteristics, and also by highlighting a form of optimism, perspectival optimism, that is not being considered in the mainstream optimism literature in psychology. The paper concludes by suggesting several avenues for future empirical and philosophical research.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141778828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction? 概念空间：古德曼 "新归纳之谜 "的解决方案？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00744-2
Sebastian Scholz
{"title":"Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction?","authors":"Sebastian Scholz","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00744-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00744-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspired by Quine’s 1969 paper on Natural Kinds, Peter Gärdenfors proposes a cognitive criterion based on his theory of Conceptual Spaces (CS). He argues the good predicates are those referring to natural concepts, and that we can capture naturalness in terms of similarity. In contrast to Quine, he does not primarily rely on logic, but geometry. He frames his account as a descriptive project, however, and it is not obvious how it addresses the normative dimension of Goodman’s Riddle. This paper develops a charitable reconstruction of his argument, based on the idea that the instrumental success of our projectible concepts is grounded in their cognitive-pragmatic naturalness. It then explores three lines of reasoning against the argument: Evolutionarily motivated skepticism, the miracles argument, and the relation between instrumental and pragmatic success. I conclude that in its current form, the CS account fails to provide any justification of reasoning beyond appealing to its instrumental success, and that a metaphysically robust notion of naturalness helps to achieve the desired goal.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141778827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ultra-Thin Objects across Domains: A Generalized Approach to Reference and Existence 跨领域的超薄对象：参照与存在的通用方法
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00763-z
Tolgahan Toy
{"title":"Ultra-Thin Objects across Domains: A Generalized Approach to Reference and Existence","authors":"Tolgahan Toy","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00763-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00763-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores a unified approach to linguistic reference and the nature of objects, addressing both abstract and concrete entities. We propose a method of redefining ultra-thin objects through a modified abstraction principle, which involves two distinct computations: subsemantic computation processes direct physical input, while semantic computation derives the semantic values of a sentence from the meanings of its constituents. These computations take different inputs—one physical and one semantic—but yield identical outputs. Among these, the subsemantic computation is more accessible. This approach facilitates a consistent treatment across various types of objects, including mathematical, concrete, social, and mental entities, thereby eliminating the need for domain-specific justifications. We advocate for this innovative perspective and address potential objections related to idealism and the utility of introducing objects. Our proposal advances the discourse of the nature of objects and linguistic reference, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding the existence and reference of objects across diverse discourse domains.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141743596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Domain of Morality 道德领域
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00750-4
Massimo Reichlin
{"title":"The Domain of Morality","authors":"Massimo Reichlin","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00750-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00750-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Taking stock of standard philosophical analyses of the concept, it is proposed that the domain of morality be defined by reference to seven characteristics: normativity, informality, importance, universality, categoricalness, overridingness, and a reference to beneficence and justice as the basic contents of its rules. These features establish a rather sharp distinction between moral and conventional rules. Recent literature in evolutionary morality and moral psychology, however, challenged the existence of a neat distinction between the moral and the conventional domains. The paper discusses three prominent objections to the proposed analysis that can be found in the empirical literature on morality: one centering on the relevance of moral sentiments, one based on the phenomenon of “harmless wrongdoing”, and one on the rejection of the universality and independence from authority of the moral domain. It is shown that the proposed analysis can be defended in light of the empirical findings.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141743594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking Issue with Le Poidevin’s New Agnosticism 质疑勒-波伊德万的新不可知论
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00762-0
Carl-Johan Palmqvist
{"title":"Taking Issue with Le Poidevin’s New Agnosticism","authors":"Carl-Johan Palmqvist","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00762-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00762-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Le Poidevin’s ‘new agnosticism’ concerns partaking in religious life while being uncertain whether religious discourse is fictional or not. Le Poidevin has offered two distinct versions of the new agnosticism, ‘semantic agnosticism’ and ‘meta-linguistic agnosticism’. I suggest that the first, ‘semantic agnosticism’, should be rejected, mainly because it involves a highly questionable view of truth and fails to properly distinguish fictional existence from real existence. The second, ‘meta-linguistic agnosticism’ seems acceptable as a view of religious discourse but not as a foundation for a religious life. A meta-linguistic agnostic will not be able to take the proper attitude towards religious propositions, since what is the proper attitude varies greatly between realism and fictionalism. Even more importantly, she will not know when it is rationally permissible to perform religious actions, because she will not know whether real-life concerns should take precedence or not. Le Poidevin’s meta-linguistic agnostic is also a truth-agnostic, and I conclude that adding meta-linguistic agnosticism to truth-agnosticism only complicates matters without offering any benefits.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141743593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Heaviest Metal 最重的金属
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00761-1
Michel-Antoine Xhignesse
{"title":"The Heaviest Metal","authors":"Michel-Antoine Xhignesse","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00761-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00761-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It has recently been argued that metal’s ‘heaviness’ is conceptually inarticulable. I argue, on the contrary, that ‘heaviness’ is a matter of inaccessibility—the ‘something more’ that makes metal ‘heavy’ is actually something <i>less</i>: less auditory processing fluency. Like profound literature, metal resists, but also invites and rewards, interpretation. I argue that understanding ‘heaviness’ in terms of auditory processing fluency allows us to make sense of a number of otherwise puzzling features of the music, and to articulate a unifying <i>gestalt</i> for the genre.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141611939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Varieties of Natural Concepts 自然概念的多样性
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00759-9
James A. Hampton
{"title":"Varieties of Natural Concepts","authors":"James A. Hampton","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00759-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00759-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The concepts to be considered in this chapter are those that occur in everyday common human thought and language – the “natural history” of concepts in use. While many may appear to be constituted by similarity relations, which make them suitable for modelling in conceptual spaces for example, other concepts in everyday use may be differently constituted. These concepts include abstract concepts, essentialist kinds, natural kinds, and logical or mathematical concepts. I discuss the different sources, uses and epistemological bases of these different forms of concept, and propose a three-level hierarchy of concepts based on their sources of validation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141586123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Epistemic Condition for Character Responsibility 人格责任的认识论条件
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00757-x
Marcella Linn
{"title":"The Epistemic Condition for Character Responsibility","authors":"Marcella Linn","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00757-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00757-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If responsibility for character requires (among other things) having knowledge of the quality of one’s character, and this knowledge requires having at least some good aspects of character, we seem to come to startling conclusions. First, as Neil Levy argues, the worse one is morally speaking, the less one is responsible for being morally bad. Second, the truly bad are excused for their bad characters. I present several arguments against Levy’s view. First, I argue that the initial conclusion does not follow. It is not the case that the worse a person is, the less responsible she is for her character. A person may still have other aspects of character that enable her to fulfill this part of the epistemic condition. Further, both Aristotle and empirical research on character indicate that most people have such aspects. Second, I consider the truly morally bad. I show that most people voluntarily develop their characters and so – aside from rare cases of abuse, neglect, or congenital disorders – the vicious become so voluntarily. In this vein, I thirdly show that partial moral understanding is sufficient to meet the epistemic condition for character responsibility and most people have this.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141571067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Moral Agent: A Critical Rationalist Perspective 道德代理人：批判理性主义视角
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00747-z
Alireza Mansouri
{"title":"The Moral Agent: A Critical Rationalist Perspective","authors":"Alireza Mansouri","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00747-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00747-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite the moral underpinnings of Karl Popper’s philosophy, he has not presented a well-established moral theory for critical rationalism (CR). This paper addresses the ontological status of <i>moral agents</i> as part of a research program for developing a moral theory for CR. It argues that moral agents are <i>selves</i> who have achieved the cognitive capacity of <i>personhood</i> through an evolutionary scenario and interaction with the environment. This proposal draws on Popper’s theory of the self and his theory of three worlds, which offer both epistemological and ontological insights into the emergence and evolution of <i>moral agents</i>. The paper also discusses some of the consequences of this proposal for the <i>objectivity</i> and <i>criticizability</i> of moral judgments and the moral agency of artificial intelligence. It concludes by suggesting some directions for future research on the epistemological and ontological problems of ethics in CR.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141551270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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