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How One Cannot Participatively Imagine What One Could Cognitively Imagine 一个人如何无法参与想象一个人可以认知想象的事物
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1
Alberto Voltolini, Carola Barbero
{"title":"How One Cannot Participatively Imagine What One Could Cognitively Imagine","authors":"Alberto Voltolini, Carola Barbero","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we want to maintain that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is basically a pragmatic issue due to the failure of participative imagination, as involving a pre-semantic level relating to a wide context (the overall situation of discourse). Since the linguistic meanings of the relevant fiction-involving sentences violate some of our basic norms, what such sentences (fictionally) say cannot be participatively imagined. That failure leads one to refrain from ascribing such sentences the fictional truth-conditions they would have in narrow fictional contexts (sets of fixed parameters) as determined by those meanings in those contexts. Yet one could still make that ascription, for one can cognitively imagine what such sentences would say in those contexts. As is proved by the fact that if one either adopts an alternative view on such norms or, for some reason, brackets them, one can again perform that ascription.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"365 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141551271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Gap in the Knowledge Argument 知识差距论证
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00732-6
Barbara Montero
{"title":"The Gap in the Knowledge Argument","authors":"Barbara Montero","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00732-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00732-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Alter (The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, GB: Oxford University Pres, 2023) argues for something surprising: despite being widely rejected by philosophers, including Frank Jackson himself, Jackson’s knowledge argument succeeds. Alter’s defense of Jackson’s argument is not only surprising; it’s also exciting: the knowledge argument, if it’s sound, underscores the power of armchair philosophy, the power of pure thought to arrive at substantial conclusions about the world. In contrast, I aim to make a case for something unsurprising and unexciting: that the knowledge argument does not succeed, or, even less far-reaching, that Alter’s defense of it is not persuasive. Mine is a classic file-drawer thesis, but what it has going for it is that it’s true, or so I think, and hope to illustrate why you should too.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141256644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Uniformity in the Dynamics of Fiction-making 小说创作动态中的统一性
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00749-x
Iago Mello Batistela
{"title":"Uniformity in the Dynamics of Fiction-making","authors":"Iago Mello Batistela","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00749-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00749-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper I defend the claim that the act of writing a work of fiction consists in the performance of a <i>sui generis</i> speech act, and propose a dynamic treatment for acts of fiction-making. Recently, speech act theories of fiction have become targets of the uniformity argument. According to it, in order to account for the myriad of speech acts present in works of fiction, speech act theories of fiction need to propose a similar amount of fiction-related illocutionary forces. When uttered in the same context, these illocutionary forces give rise to the same relations raised by their non-fictional counterparts. While not a knock-down argument, this warrants an explanation. In order to defend speech act theories of fiction, I argue that the claim that speech act theories of fiction need more than one fiction-related <i>sui generis</i> illocutionary force is misguided and rests on an erroneous account of the content of an act of fiction-making. I take that the content of an act of fiction-making is more akin to a speech report than to a regular assertion. Following, I propose a dynamic treatment to the speech act of fiction-making. Concluding, I explore some related topics in order to distinguish my proposal from pretenseapproaches to fictional discourse.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141194021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Précis of What’s the use of Philosophy? 哲学有什么用？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00754-0
Philip Kitcher
{"title":"Précis of What’s the use of Philosophy?","authors":"Philip Kitcher","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00754-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00754-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This précis provides a summary of the book, <i>What’s the Use of Philosophy?</i></p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141194022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ecological Empiricism 生态经验主义
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00740-6
Gottfried Vosgerau
{"title":"Ecological Empiricism","authors":"Gottfried Vosgerau","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00740-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00740-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Both metaphysics and cognitive science raise the question of what natural concepts or properties are. A link between the two is notoriously hard to establish. I propose to take natural concepts or properties to be those that are revealed in interaction. The concept of affordances is refined and naturalized to spell out how interacting with objects grounds concepts. I will call this account “Ecological Empiricism”. I argue that the notion of naturalness within this framework turns out to be a gradable – there are more or less natural properties – and dependent on the perspective taken – metaphysically natural properties are different from cognitive natural properties. From a metaphysical point of view, perfect correlations between actions and sensory input are relevant, which are best approximated by scientific measurement. For cognition, simple or basic actions are relevant. Although metaphysical and cognitive naturalness does not coincide according to Ecological Empiricism, it presents a common framework with a uniform conception of naturalness.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141193861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Uses of Philosophy 论哲学的用途
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00739-z
William G. Lycan
{"title":"On the Uses of Philosophy","authors":"William G. Lycan","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00739-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00739-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper agrees with the premises of Philip Kitcher’s argument, but rejects the inference to his conclusion about what we philosophers ought to be doing instead of philosophizing in the traditional way. It argues that two topics Kitcher himself mentions, consciousness and moral realism, can be and are usefully pursued and are both of some interest and value to the general intelligent public.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141167571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reclamation and Authorization: Cepollaro and Lopez de Sa on in-group Restriction 开垦与授权：塞波拉罗和洛佩兹-德-萨关于组内限制
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00742-4
Pasi Valtonen
{"title":"Reclamation and Authorization: Cepollaro and Lopez de Sa on in-group Restriction","authors":"Pasi Valtonen","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00742-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00742-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is generally thought that the reclamation of slurs is restricted to the in-group. Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Lopez de Sa challenge this assumption by presenting cases in which slurs are successfully reclaimed by members of out-groups. I agree with the idea that the out-groups often participate in reclamation. In this paper, I present a view which accommodates the fact that sometimes out-groups successfully reclaim slurs. At the same time, the view preserves the central role of the in-group in reclamation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141167564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Charge of Rule Worship Against Rule-Consequentialism Restated 重述规则崇拜对规则后果论的指控
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00743-3
Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion
{"title":"The Charge of Rule Worship Against Rule-Consequentialism Restated","authors":"Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00743-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00743-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to rule-consequentialism’s moral criterion, a given action is morally right if and only if it complies with an ideal code of rules, regardless of the consequences of that action. Rules are to be assessed by their consequences, not actions. This being so, one of the many accusations that have been made against rule-consequentialism is that it can turn suboptimal decisions into morally right decisions and optimal decisions into morally wrong decisions. After all, in certain circumstances, a rule that has the best consequences overall can require an action that does less good or forbid an action that does more good. This is the core of the original rule-worship objection. However, recently, different versions of rule-consequentialism have been developed in order to address that challenge. This paper focuses on three of them, those offered by Brad Hooker, Susan Wolf, and David Copp. My claim is that their arguments, however ingenious, are unsuccessful, because they are innocuous if the charge is reformulated as it should be.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"2011 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141062812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Natural Concepts and the Economics of Cognition and Communication 自然概念与认知和交流经济学
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00734-4
Peter Gärdenfors
{"title":"Natural Concepts and the Economics of Cognition and Communication","authors":"Peter Gärdenfors","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00734-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00734-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article takes a cognitive approach to natural concepts. The aim is to introduce criteria that are evaluated with respect to how they support the cognitive economy of humans when using concepts in reasoning and communicating with them. I first present the theory of conceptual spaces as a tool for expressing the criteria. Then I introduce the central idea that natural concepts correspond to <i>convex</i> regions of a conceptual space. I argue that this criterion has far-reaching consequences as regards natural concepts. Partly following earlier work, I present some other criteria that further delimit the class of natural concepts. One of these is coherence, which does not seem to have been discussed previously. Finally, I show that convexity and other criteria make it possible to ensure that people mean the same thing when they communicate using concepts. Apart from its philosophical interest, the analysis presented in the article will be relevant for tasks of conceptual engineering in artificial systems that work with concepts.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140929776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can Democratic Equality Justify Capitalism? 民主平等能为资本主义辩护吗？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00735-3
Cade Franken
{"title":"Can Democratic Equality Justify Capitalism?","authors":"Cade Franken","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00735-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00735-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Jeppe von Platz has recently argued that welfare-state capitalism can be justified by a theory of democratic equality, challenging John Rawls’s critique of capitalism. Von Platz develops his argument by introducing a social democratic interpretation of democratic equality as an alternative to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Unlike justice as fairness, in which there is only one possible principle of reciprocity (the difference principle), social democracy includes four possible principles in an eligible set that could be chosen as a principle of reciprocity. However, I argue that von Platz’s conception of reciprocity still fails to justify welfare-state capitalism. Of the four principles of reciprocity in social democracy’s eligible set, one of them, the principle of utility, does not express a notion of reciprocity and thus does not belong. The other three – the principle of equality, the difference principle, and the principle of equity – are not compatible with welfare-state capitalism. Thus, since capitalism cannot satisfy a principle of reciprocity in the (revised) eligible set, it is incompatible with the social democratic interpretation of democratic equality.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140885212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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