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The Epistemic Condition for Character Responsibility 人格责任的认识论条件
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00757-x
Marcella Linn
{"title":"The Epistemic Condition for Character Responsibility","authors":"Marcella Linn","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00757-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00757-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If responsibility for character requires (among other things) having knowledge of the quality of one’s character, and this knowledge requires having at least some good aspects of character, we seem to come to startling conclusions. First, as Neil Levy argues, the worse one is morally speaking, the less one is responsible for being morally bad. Second, the truly bad are excused for their bad characters. I present several arguments against Levy’s view. First, I argue that the initial conclusion does not follow. It is not the case that the worse a person is, the less responsible she is for her character. A person may still have other aspects of character that enable her to fulfill this part of the epistemic condition. Further, both Aristotle and empirical research on character indicate that most people have such aspects. Second, I consider the truly morally bad. I show that most people voluntarily develop their characters and so – aside from rare cases of abuse, neglect, or congenital disorders – the vicious become so voluntarily. In this vein, I thirdly show that partial moral understanding is sufficient to meet the epistemic condition for character responsibility and most people have this.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141571067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Moral Agent: A Critical Rationalist Perspective 道德代理人：批判理性主义视角
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00747-z
Alireza Mansouri
{"title":"The Moral Agent: A Critical Rationalist Perspective","authors":"Alireza Mansouri","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00747-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00747-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite the moral underpinnings of Karl Popper’s philosophy, he has not presented a well-established moral theory for critical rationalism (CR). This paper addresses the ontological status of <i>moral agents</i> as part of a research program for developing a moral theory for CR. It argues that moral agents are <i>selves</i> who have achieved the cognitive capacity of <i>personhood</i> through an evolutionary scenario and interaction with the environment. This proposal draws on Popper’s theory of the self and his theory of three worlds, which offer both epistemological and ontological insights into the emergence and evolution of <i>moral agents</i>. The paper also discusses some of the consequences of this proposal for the <i>objectivity</i> and <i>criticizability</i> of moral judgments and the moral agency of artificial intelligence. It concludes by suggesting some directions for future research on the epistemological and ontological problems of ethics in CR.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141551270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How One Cannot Participatively Imagine What One Could Cognitively Imagine 一个人如何无法参与想象一个人可以认知想象的事物
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1
Alberto Voltolini, Carola Barbero
{"title":"How One Cannot Participatively Imagine What One Could Cognitively Imagine","authors":"Alberto Voltolini, Carola Barbero","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we want to maintain that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is basically a pragmatic issue due to the failure of participative imagination, as involving a pre-semantic level relating to a wide context (the overall situation of discourse). Since the linguistic meanings of the relevant fiction-involving sentences violate some of our basic norms, what such sentences (fictionally) say cannot be participatively imagined. That failure leads one to refrain from ascribing such sentences the fictional truth-conditions they would have in narrow fictional contexts (sets of fixed parameters) as determined by those meanings in those contexts. Yet one could still make that ascription, for one can cognitively imagine what such sentences would say in those contexts. As is proved by the fact that if one either adopts an alternative view on such norms or, for some reason, brackets them, one can again perform that ascription.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141551271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naturalness in the Making: Classifying, Operationalizing, and Naturalizing Naturalness in Plant Morphology 自然性的形成：植物形态学中的自然性分类、操作化和自然化
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00751-3
Catherine Kendig
{"title":"Naturalness in the Making: Classifying, Operationalizing, and Naturalizing Naturalness in Plant Morphology","authors":"Catherine Kendig","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00751-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00751-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141343219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introspection, Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 内省、意识和心身问题
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00748-y
Robert J. Howell
{"title":"Introspection, Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem","authors":"Robert J. Howell","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00748-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00748-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141380564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Gap in the Knowledge Argument 知识差距论证
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00732-6
Barbara Montero
{"title":"The Gap in the Knowledge Argument","authors":"Barbara Montero","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00732-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00732-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Alter (The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, GB: Oxford University Pres, 2023) argues for something surprising: despite being widely rejected by philosophers, including Frank Jackson himself, Jackson’s knowledge argument succeeds. Alter’s defense of Jackson’s argument is not only surprising; it’s also exciting: the knowledge argument, if it’s sound, underscores the power of armchair philosophy, the power of pure thought to arrive at substantial conclusions about the world. In contrast, I aim to make a case for something unsurprising and unexciting: that the knowledge argument does not succeed, or, even less far-reaching, that Alter’s defense of it is not persuasive. Mine is a classic file-drawer thesis, but what it has going for it is that it’s true, or so I think, and hope to illustrate why you should too.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141256644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Uniformity in the Dynamics of Fiction-making 小说创作动态中的统一性
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00749-x
Iago Mello Batistela
{"title":"Uniformity in the Dynamics of Fiction-making","authors":"Iago Mello Batistela","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00749-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00749-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper I defend the claim that the act of writing a work of fiction consists in the performance of a <i>sui generis</i> speech act, and propose a dynamic treatment for acts of fiction-making. Recently, speech act theories of fiction have become targets of the uniformity argument. According to it, in order to account for the myriad of speech acts present in works of fiction, speech act theories of fiction need to propose a similar amount of fiction-related illocutionary forces. When uttered in the same context, these illocutionary forces give rise to the same relations raised by their non-fictional counterparts. While not a knock-down argument, this warrants an explanation. In order to defend speech act theories of fiction, I argue that the claim that speech act theories of fiction need more than one fiction-related <i>sui generis</i> illocutionary force is misguided and rests on an erroneous account of the content of an act of fiction-making. I take that the content of an act of fiction-making is more akin to a speech report than to a regular assertion. Following, I propose a dynamic treatment to the speech act of fiction-making. Concluding, I explore some related topics in order to distinguish my proposal from pretenseapproaches to fictional discourse.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141194021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Précis of What’s the use of Philosophy? 哲学有什么用？
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00754-0
Philip Kitcher
{"title":"Précis of What’s the use of Philosophy?","authors":"Philip Kitcher","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00754-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00754-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This précis provides a summary of the book, <i>What’s the Use of Philosophy?</i></p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141194022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ecological Empiricism 生态经验主义
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00740-6
Gottfried Vosgerau
{"title":"Ecological Empiricism","authors":"Gottfried Vosgerau","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00740-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00740-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Both metaphysics and cognitive science raise the question of what natural concepts or properties are. A link between the two is notoriously hard to establish. I propose to take natural concepts or properties to be those that are revealed in interaction. The concept of affordances is refined and naturalized to spell out how interacting with objects grounds concepts. I will call this account “Ecological Empiricism”. I argue that the notion of naturalness within this framework turns out to be a gradable – there are more or less natural properties – and dependent on the perspective taken – metaphysically natural properties are different from cognitive natural properties. From a metaphysical point of view, perfect correlations between actions and sensory input are relevant, which are best approximated by scientific measurement. For cognition, simple or basic actions are relevant. Although metaphysical and cognitive naturalness does not coincide according to Ecological Empiricism, it presents a common framework with a uniform conception of naturalness.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141193861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Uses of Philosophy 论哲学的用途
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00739-z
William G. Lycan
{"title":"On the Uses of Philosophy","authors":"William G. Lycan","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00739-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00739-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper agrees with the premises of Philip Kitcher’s argument, but rejects the inference to his conclusion about what we philosophers ought to be doing instead of philosophizing in the traditional way. It argues that two topics Kitcher himself mentions, consciousness and moral realism, can be and are usefully pursued and are both of some interest and value to the general intelligent public.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141167571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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