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The Inconsistent Reduction: An Internal Methodological Critique of Revisionist Just War Theory 不一致的还原：修正主义正义战争理论的内部方法论批判
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00733-5
Regina Sibylle Surber
{"title":"The Inconsistent Reduction: An Internal Methodological Critique of Revisionist Just War Theory","authors":"Regina Sibylle Surber","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00733-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00733-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article argues that the reduction of the morality of killing in war to the morality of killing in self-defense by ‘reductive-individualist’ revisionist just war theories is inconsistent, because when those theories apply the moral notion of self-defense to the morality of killing in war, they do not preserve the two conceptions of the “individual” inherent in this notion. The article demonstrates this inconsistency in two steps: First, it disentangles the two conceptions of the individual inherent to the notion of self-defense, namely (1) that the individual is an “entity” potentially bearing a right to self-defense (unlike, e.g., groups) and (2) that the individual is a “particular,” where “particular” signifies that every human is different from every other human. The conception of the individual as a “particular” is tied to the idea that a justification grounded in a rule of self-defense is necessarily “concrete,” in the sense of referring to individually given and specific perceptions or cases, as opposed to “abstract,” in the sense of being detached from specific perceptions or cases. The article then demonstrates that reductive individualism reflects the first notion of the individual, but not the second. Due to the “loss” of the individual as a “particular”, the reductive-individualist reduction of the morality of killing in war to the morality of killing in self-defense is inconsistent, and hence its justification of killing in war grounded in self-defense is not concrete. Since such a justification must be concrete, reductive individualism cannot offer a justification for belligerent killing.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140884933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism 怀疑论解决方案的事实主义解释与语义原始主义
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-04-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00731-7
Michał Wieczorkowski
{"title":"The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism","authors":"Michał Wieczorkowski","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00731-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00731-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to the factualist interpretation, the skeptical solution to the skeptic’s problem hinges on rejecting inflationary accounts of semantic facts, advocating instead for the adoption of minimal factualism. However, according to Alexander Miller, this account is unsound. Miller argues that minimal factualism represents a form of semantic primitivism, a position expressly rejected by Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Furthermore, Miller states that minimal factualism presupposes the conformity of meaning ascriptions with rules of discipline and syntax. However, he contends that this maneuver is also undermined by Kripke’s skepticism. In this paper, I demonstrate that Miller’s arguments against minimal factualism are unsound. To achieve this goal, I argue that the minimalist account of semantic facts should not be equated with semantic primitivism. Moreover, I argue that statements regarding the conformity of meaning ascriptions are either beside the criticism of Kripke’s skeptic or should be interpreted from the perspective of the account on assertibility offered by the skeptical solution. On this basis, I conclude that the factualist interpretation provides a conducive environment for solving the problem posed by Kripke’s skeptic.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140615832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Puzzle of Dion and Theon Solved 迪翁和席恩之谜解开了
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-04-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00708-y
H. E. Baber
{"title":"The Puzzle of Dion and Theon Solved","authors":"H. E. Baber","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00708-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00708-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Dion is a human person, Lefty is his left foot, and Theon is Lefty-Complement, a proper part of Dion. Lefty is annihilated and Dion survives left-footless. After Lefty’s annihilation Theon, if he survives, occupies the same region as Dion. I suggest that this scenario be understood as a fusion case in which Dion and Theon, initially overlapping but distinct, are identical after Lefty’s annihilation and propose an account of proper names that allows us to say that Dion and Theon have ‘become identical’ without commitment to occasional identity or other controversial metaphysical doctrines. The proposed solution employs the semantics developed by Wolfgang Schwarz to address the ‘paradox of occasional identity’, posed by puzzle cases of fission, to deal with the problem of Dion and Theon, a body-minus puzzle.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140597769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Précis of The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism 意识的问题》摘要：从知识论到罗素一元论
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-04-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00730-8
Torin Alter
{"title":"Précis of The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism","authors":"Torin Alter","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00730-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00730-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <i>The Matter of Consciousness</i> (TMOC), I defend Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986, 1995) knowledge argument, which poses a significant challenge to physicalism. I also argue that the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140597912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Situational Crime Prevention, Advice Giving, and Victim-Blaming 情境犯罪预防、提供建议和羞辱受害者
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00729-1
Sebastian Jon Holmen
{"title":"Situational Crime Prevention, Advice Giving, and Victim-Blaming","authors":"Sebastian Jon Holmen","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00729-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00729-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Situational crime prevention (SCP) measures attempt to prevent crime by reducing the opportunities for crime to occur. One of the ways in which some SCP measures reduce such opportunities is by providing victims with advice about how to avoid being victimised, for instance through public awareness campaigns or safety apps. Some scholars claim that this approach to preventing crime often or always promotes victim-blaming and that it is therefore morally wrong to pursue such strategies. Others have made sweeping rejections of this claim. However, in this paper, I suggest that neither view is correct. Specifically, I demonstrate that there are at least three distinct ways of interpreting what I term the victim-blaming argument against advice-giving SCP measures – i.e. as an argument based on a concern for direct victim-blaming, indirect victim-blaming, or self-blame – and that both SCP opponents and supporters have legitimate grounds for their position, depending on how the argument is spelled out.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140597776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nonattributive and Nonreferential Uses of Definite Descriptions 定语描述的非归属和非指代用法
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-04-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00727-3
Maria Matuszkiewicz
{"title":"Nonattributive and Nonreferential Uses of Definite Descriptions","authors":"Maria Matuszkiewicz","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00727-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00727-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper revisits Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and argues that it is not exhaustive. Donnellan characterizes the distinction in terms of two criteria: the speaker’s intentions and the type of content the speaker aims to express. I argue that contrary to the common view, these two criteria are independent and that the distinctive features may be coinstantiated in more than two ways. This leaves room for nonattributive and nonreferential uses of definite descriptions. Kripke’s notions of general and specific intentions provide a framework that accommodates such cases. Additionally, it proves useful for the analysis of the use of proper names with specific nonsingular intentions. The paper also discusses how the interpretation of the use of definite descriptions as attributive or referential (or neither) is sensitive to which theory of singular thoughts one adopts.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140885018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Consequence Argument and the Possibility of the Laws of Nature Being Violated 后果论证与违反自然法则的可能性
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00726-4
Pedro Merlussi
{"title":"The Consequence Argument and the Possibility of the Laws of Nature Being Violated","authors":"Pedro Merlussi","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00726-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00726-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a recent paper, Brian Cutter objected to the consequence argument due to its dependence on the principle that miracle workers are metaphysically impossible. A miracle worker is someone who has the ability to act in a way such that the laws of nature would be violated. While there is something to the thought that agents like us do not have this ability, Cutter claims that there is no compelling reason to regard miracle workers as metaphysically impossible. However, the paper contends that miracle workers are indeed impossible according to well-known theories concerning the laws of nature. This result highlights the reliance of the consequence argument on a plausible premise, which is widely accepted by proponents of non-Humean views of laws. The paper also provides a way to explain away the intuition that miracle workers are possible, but this has the upshot that a recent, two-dimensional formulation of the consequence argument is unsound.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140325273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction 进化论驳斥与民间/理论之分
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00725-5
M. Scarfone
{"title":"Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction","authors":"M. Scarfone","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00725-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00725-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In metaethics, evolutionary debunking arguments combine empirical and epistemological premises to purportedly show that our moral judgments are unjustified. One objection to these arguments has been to distinguish between those judgments that evolutionary influence might undermine versus those that it does not. This response is powerful but not well understood. In this paper I flesh out the response by drawing upon a familiar distinction in the natural sciences, where it is common to distinguish folk judgments from theoretical judgments. I argue that this in turn illuminates the proper scope of the evolutionary debunking argument, but not in an obvious way: it is a very specific type of undermining argument that targets those theories where theoretical judgments are inferred merely from folk judgments. One upshot of this conclusion is that it reveals a verboten methodology in metaethics. The evolutionary debunking argument is therefore much less powerful than its proponents have supposed, but it nevertheless rules out what is perhaps a common way of attempting to justify moral judgments.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140146384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Hyperintensional Variant of Kaplan’s Paradox 卡普兰悖论的超维度变体
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-03-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00722-8
Giorgio Lenta
{"title":"The Hyperintensional Variant of Kaplan’s Paradox","authors":"Giorgio Lenta","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00722-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00722-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>David Kaplan famously argued that mainstream semantics for modal logic, which identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, is affected by a cardinality paradox. Takashi Yagisawa showed that a variant of the same paradox arises when standard possible worlds semantics is extended with impossible worlds to deliver a hyperintensional account of propositions. After introducing the problem, we discuss two general approaches to a possible solution: giving up on sets and giving up on worlds, either in the background semantic framework or in the corresponding conception of propositions. As a result, we conclude that abandoning worlds by embracing a truthmaker-based approach offers a promising way to account for hyperintensional propositions without facing the paradoxical outcome.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Williamson’s Epistemicism and Properties Accounts of Predicates 威廉姆森的认识论与谓词的属性说明
IF 0.5 4区 哲学
PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00716-6
Paul Teller
{"title":"Williamson’s Epistemicism and Properties Accounts of Predicates","authors":"Paul Teller","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00716-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00716-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If the semantic values of predicates are, as Williamson assumes (<i>Philsophical Perspectives,</i> <i>13</i>, 505–517, 1999, 509) properties in the intensional sense, then epistemicism is immediate. Epistemicism fails, so also this properties account of predicates. I deploy examination of Williamson’s account as a foil against properties as semantic values, showing that his two positive arguments for bivalence fail, as do his efforts to rescue epistemicism from obvious problems. In Part II I argue that, despite the properties account’s problems, it has an important role to play in compositional semantics. We may separate the problem of how smallest parts of language get attached to the world from the problem of how those parts compose to form complex semantic values. For the latter problem we idealize and treat the smallest semantic values as properties (and referents). So doing functions to put to one side how the smallest parts get worldly attachment, a problem that would just get in the way of understanding composition. Attachment to the world must be studied separately, and I review some of the options. As a bonus we see why the requirement of higher order vagueness is an artifact of taking properties as semantic values literally instead of as a simplifying idealization.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140010475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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