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引用次数: 0
摘要
在《意识的问题》(The Matter of Consciousness, TMOC)一书中,我为弗兰克-杰克逊(Frank Jackson, 1982, 1986, 1995)的知识论进行了辩护。我还认为,知识论会导致罗素一元论。
Précis of The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism
In The Matter of Consciousness (TMOC), I defend Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986, 1995) knowledge argument, which poses a significant challenge to physicalism. I also argue that the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism.
期刊介绍:
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