Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics最新文献_第8页

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees 企业游说:资源寻求还是寻租?来自审计费用的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100341

Steven Yik-Pui Low , Yee-Boon Foo , Ferdinand A Gul

引用次数: 0

The unintended consequence of collateral-based financing: Evidence from corporate cost behavior 基于抵押品的融资的意外后果:来自企业成本行为的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100338

Tongxia Li , Chun Lu , Zhihua Chen

引用次数: 0

Corporate transparency and firm value: Does market competition play an external governance role? 公司透明度与企业价值:市场竞争是否起外部治理作用?

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100334

Chengcheng Liu , Qing Li , Yu-En Lin

{"title":"Corporate transparency and firm value: Does market competition play an external governance role?","authors":"Chengcheng Liu , Qing Li , Yu-En Lin","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100334","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We investigate whether market competition affects the relationship between corporate transparency and firm value in the United States using a sample of 12,665 firm-year observations, representing 1,644 individual firms for the period 1996–2018. The results show that stronger transparency enhances firm value, and market competition has a significantly positive effect on that relationship. More importantly, we use hierarchical linear models<span> further to explore the cross-level interaction impact of market competition, and we find evidence suggesting that the industry-level competition has a significant cross-level moderating effect. Additionally, consistent with the substitute perspective, we also find that the disciplinary power of competition on the relationship between transparency and value is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, our evidence supports the “bright side” of the competition view and highlights the active external governance role that competition plays in the value promotion effect of corporate transparency at both the individual and the </span></span>industry levels.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100334"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Goodwill or “No-will”: Hubris in the tone at the top 善意还是“不愿”:高层的语气中弥漫着傲慢

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100331

Emmeli Runesson, Niuosha Samani

{"title":"Goodwill or “No-will”: Hubris in the tone at the top","authors":"Emmeli Runesson, Niuosha Samani","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100331","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this study, we examine the effect of hubris in the “tone at the top” on goodwill accounting, specifically the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill following a business combination, and subsequent decisions to write down goodwill. Using a sample of CEO letters to shareholders from firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, we carry out textual analysis of CEO letters to identify hubristic language markers. Regression analyses show that hubristic tone is positively and significantly associated with the purchase price allocation to goodwill. Furthermore, we predict that hubristic managers are more likely to overestimate future cash inflows related to goodwill and are less likely to perceive the need for a potential write-down. Consistent with this prediction, we find that hubristic tone in the CEO letters is associated with less timely goodwill write-downs. This study contributes to the literature on goodwill accounting, the role of CEO attributes on corporate decision making, and to research on CEO-speak, by providing evidence that a hubristic tone at the top can explain strategic choices by management and accounting outcomes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100331"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Perpetual securities and stock prices: Korean evidence 永续证券与股价:韩国的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100340

Young Jun Kim , Sera Choi , Eugenia Y. Lee , Su Jeong Lee

引用次数: 0

Institutional investors’ site visits and corporate employment decision-making 机构投资者实地考察与企业用人决策

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100332

Shaojie Lai , Xiaorong Li , Shiang Liu , Qing Sophie Wang

引用次数: 6

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China 机构投资者与控股股东承诺相关的盈余管理:来自中国股权分置改革的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100330

Mark Wilson, Kun Tracy Wang, Yue Wu, Archie Lau

{"title":"Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China","authors":"Mark Wilson, Kun Tracy Wang, Yue Wu, Archie Lau","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100330","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100330","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant </span>wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"18 3","pages":"Article 100330"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115723830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Aggressive CEOs and bank mergers and acquisitions 激进的ceo和银行并购

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100318

Mingming Ji, Liangliang Jiang

引用次数: 0

Organizational form and access to capital: The role of regulatory interventions 组织形式与资本获取:监管干预的作用

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100335

Debarati Basu , Kaustav Sen

引用次数: 0

Financial distress and the accrual anomaly 财务困境和应计异常