机构投资者与控股股东承诺相关的盈余管理:来自中国股权分置改革的证据

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Mark Wilson, Kun Tracy Wang, Yue Wu, Archie Lau
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引用次数: 8

摘要

我们检验了机构投资者在约束由强契约激励引起的激进盈余管理方面的有效性。为此,我们将重点关注中国股权分制改革期间企业控股股东和中小股东之间达成的与收益相关的承诺(契约)的后果,其中未能实现利润基准有可能将大量财富从控股股东转移到中小股东手中。我们的初步分析提供的证据表明,平均而言,利润承诺的公司年度与增加收入的盈余管理相关联,并且这种关联在以下情况下更强:(i)满足利润承诺的公司年度,以及(ii)未管理盈余水平的代理表明需要盈余管理来满足承诺的公司年度。然而,对于机构持股水平较高的公司来说,这种优于基准的行为较弱。进一步分析表明,机构股东的退出威胁可以约束与利润承诺相关的盈余管理。我们还表明,机构股东在减少与利润承诺相关的盈余管理方面的影响对国内共同基金和私营控股公司更大。有趣的是,我们的证据表明,只有当机构投资者的激励与其他少数股东的激励强烈一致时,机构投资者才会对盈余管理发挥有效的监督作用。在其他情况下,我们的证据表明,这些投资者可能会加剧盈余管理水平。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.

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CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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