JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science by Andrea Strazzoni (review)","authors":"Aaron Spink","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas’s view that the commanded act is material “strongly suggests, counter to what Brock maintains, that the commanded act is not a human act in a secondary sense, but rather an essential part of the human act just as the form is” (132). Significantly, Löwe does not cite the article in which Brock shows that “use makes it possible for acts of powers besides the will also to be voluntary, moral human acts” (“What Is the Use of Usus in Aquinas’ Philosophy of Action?,” in Moral and Political Philosophies of the Middle Ages, ed. B. Carlos Bazán, Eduardo Andujár, and Léonard G. Sbrocchi [Ottawa: Legas, 1995], 2:661). In general, Löwe does not consider Brock’s explanation of how a complete human act consists of other acts, and the way in which parts of the act are formal or material. Löwe’s presentation could have benefited from engagement with more of the scholarship on the interior and exterior acts, and from a careful consideration of such central texts on the issue as the Prima Secundae, qq. 19–20, and the De Malo, q. 2, art. 2–4. Moreover, he mentions that choice is in some way virtually present in the act of command, but he does not address the plentiful scholarship and texts on the virtual ordering of human acts, which include acts that are themselves commanded by other acts, as when an act of charity commands almsgiving, or an act of adultery commands theft. In chapter 7, Löwe argues that use, since it is an immanent act that is complete in an instant, is not in time in the way that the commanded act is, but nevertheless can be in time per accidens. Here he seems to be applying to the problem of use and the commanded act Thomas’s well-known thesis that human thinking, willing, and sensing are in time per accidens. In chapter 8, Löwe gives a less controversial reading of the way that the will uses the intellect in mental acts. He considers memory but avoids the more difficult issues of whether and how intellectual acts such as command might also be subject to use, or how the will can use itself. Chapter 9 provides a brief sketch of how, if this interpretation of Thomas is correct, it might help to clarify issues addressed by philosophers such as Donald Davidson and Jennifer Hornsby. This book provides highly idiosyncratic and to this reviewer’s mind unconvincing readings of many of the relevant texts and scholarly works on Thomas’s account of human action. Moreover, it neglects some of the more significant primary texts and scholarly works. However, it provokes thought, and the account of mental acts such as memory furthers scholarly discussion. T h o m a s M . O s b o r n e J r . University of St. Thomas (Houston, TX)","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"154 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48442815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Untrue Concepts in Hegel's Logic","authors":"M. Alznauer","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0004","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In the following, I argue that Hegel took concepts—not propositions, judgments, or spatiotemporal objects—as the primary truth-bearer in his logic and attempt to offer a defensible interpretation of what it means for an individual concept (or \"thought-determination\") to be assessed as true or untrue. Along the way, I consider the shortcomings of several alternative interpretations of truth in Hegelian logic, paying particular attention to the now-common contention that a commitment to something like Frege's context principle prevents Hegel from assessing concepts independently of the role that they play in judgments.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"103 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46509954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The World According to Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism by Anja Jauernig (review)","authors":"Patricia Kitcher","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0008","url":null,"abstract":"together. This overlooks the growing importance that Macaulay’s political framework, suitably recast in contemporary secular terms, has in republican discourse today. Green says little in the book about modern republicanism, other than to distance her reading of Macaulay from the current republican ideal of “non-domination” (223–24). What this omission obscures, however, is the increasing awareness by present-day republicans that women contributed in significant numbers to the history of this tradition, challenging many of the male-dominated assumptions that have beset it (see Alan Coffee, “Women and Republicanism,” Australasian Philosophical Review 3/4 [2020]: 361–69). Particularly through her influence on Wollstonecraft, but also on her own account, Macaulay is at the forefront of this reappraisal. This is, in my view, a missed opportunity. In her conclusion, for example, Green includes a subsection on “Macaulay on the Tradition of Liberal Feminism,” but she is silent on republican feminism. One final observation about Green’s focus on the particular substantive principles in Macaulay, rather than on her framework, is that it also sometimes leads Green to take a narrower view than she might of some of the principles she identifies. On the question of liberty, Green twice says that Macaulay “clearly” uses a positive notion as understood through Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction (220–21). However, while it cannot be denied that in some sense Macaulay does invoke a positive notion, Berlin’s sharp dichotomy is not helpful when thinking in terms of a framework of ideas in which Macaulay makes use of both positive and negative elements within her broader system. These methodological differences aside, Green has produced a magnificent intellectual biography that will be indispensable for scholars interested in Macaulay specifically or in late eighteenth-century politics in general. As Bridget Hill ushered in a new era of Macaulay studies a generation ago with The Republican Virago (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), Green too has likely produced the definitive guide for the generation to come. A l a n C o f f e e King’s College London","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"160 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48180525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Metaphysics of Appearance in Republic X (596a5–598d7)","authors":"Lee Franklin","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0000","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Plato's Republic X attack on imitative poetry is based in the metaphysics of appearance, since appearances are the objects and products of imitation. I offer a new reading, showing that Plato's account coherently introduces appearances as a new type of item, distinct from Forms and sensible particulars, and applies beyond imitation to a broad range of appearances. Focusing on the importance of perspective to Plato's reasoning, I argue that an appearance is a relation that comes about between a material particular and an apprehending subject. Ordinarily, appearances are transparent: they confer determinate awareness on the subject, but are not the objects of our awareness insofar as we are appeared to. This reading resolves longstanding obscurities, grounds an improved account of imitation, and shows that Plato here presents the cornerstone of a general theory of appearance.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"1 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47448584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment by Karen Green (review)","authors":"Alan M. S. J. Coffee","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0012","url":null,"abstract":"and Locke; furthermore, it is foundational, both to Buffier’s “psychologie rationnelle” and to Buffier’s notion of common sense (32–42). If the first foundational principle of truth is “sens intime” or “sentiment intérieur,” then “sens commun” is the second (47). Because of the inevitable limits of logic and speculative reason, and because of our intimate sense of ourselves as a union of soul and body, Buffier maintains that an intersubjective common sense “se fonde sans cesse sur le témoignage des autres” (60). Rouquayrol develops his treatment of Buffier’s notion of common sense with a useful comparison of Buffier and Thomas Reid drawn from his own close readings of the two, as much as from the important study by Louise Marcil-Lacoste, Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers ([Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982], 52–57). Like so many early modern philosophers and érudits of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century studied by Richard Popkin in The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and more recently, Anton Matytsin in The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), the common sense of Buffier proceeded from a species of “practical reason” or “mitigated skepticism,” not as a means of deducing a metaphysical system, but as principles of acting in the world on the basis of practical moral certitude (60). Beyond its instructive front matter and scholarly bibliography, the Rouquayrol edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités also includes the less well-known appendix to the 1732 edition of the Traité (291–306); Buffier’s earlier and separately published remarks on the metaphysical principles of Descartes (307–17); his remarks on the metaphysics of John Locke published in response to Pierre Coste’s first translation of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1700 (318–30); and his “Observations sur la métaphysique du Père Malebranche” published in the latter’s 1712 work, De la recherche de la verité (331–35). As if that were not enough, Rouquayrol publishes Buffier’s observations on the metaphysics of LeClerc (336), the logic of de Crousaz (337–43), and the logic of Pierre Sylvain Régis (344–46). Having all of these scattered reflections by the famed Jesuit philosopher and longtime editor of Mémoires de Trévoux published in one place will undoubtedly prove immensely useful to many scholars, in a way that enriches what is sure to be the standard edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités for years to come. J e f f r e y D . B u r s o n Georgia Southern University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"158 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46549359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aristotle on the Concept of Shared Life by Sara Brill (review)","authors":"Zoli Filotas","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"149 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46886912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conflicting Appearances, Suspension of Judgment, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism without Commitment","authors":"Tamer Nawar","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0052","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:By means of the Ten Modes, Pyrrhonian skeptics appeal to conflicting appearances to bring about suspension of judgment. However, precisely how the skeptic might do so in a nondogmatic manner is not entirely clear. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of the Modes face significant objections, and I defend an alternative account that better explains the logical structure, rational nature, and effectiveness of the Modes. In particular, I clarify how the Modes appeal to concerns about epistemic impartiality and circularity, the nature of the skeptic's nondoxastic attitude(s), and how the skeptic can employ the Modes nondogmatically.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"537 - 560"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46586661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hume's Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl (review)","authors":"Stefanie Rocknak","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"700 - 701"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46350389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analogous Unity in the Writings of John Duns Scotus","authors":"Domenic D'ettore","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0053","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Aristotle identifies four modes of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous. Recent scholarship has renewed the Renaissance and early Modern Thomist critique that John Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) doctrine of the univocity of being is based on a failure to appreciate proportional unity. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the copious literature on Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being by presenting and offering an analysis of the texts where Scotus addresses the topic of proportional or analogous unity. The paper argues that Scotus's early and mature works consistently reject the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. Nonetheless, Scotus's early remarks on an analogous unity that is mind-independent provide both an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists over whether a single concept can signify analogously—a dispute that features such distinguished participants as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) and Bartolomaeus Mastrius (1602–73)—and an avenue for further investigation into the thought of the Subtle Doctor.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"561 - 589"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44776685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Pleasure Thesis in the Eudemian Ethics","authors":"Giulia Bonasio","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0051","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:This paper argues that in the Eudemian Ethics (EE), Aristotle aims to prove the Pleasure Thesis (PT). According to the Pleasure Thesis, happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. Through a reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT, this paper shows that happiness is most pleasant for three reasons: (1) it is pleasant by definition; (2) it is constituted by the most pleasant activities (virtuous actions and contemplation); (3) it is pleasant by nature. A reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT is philosophically interesting not only in order to better understand the argument in the EE—and in particular the debated status and role of NE VII/EE VI.11–14—but also insofar as it sheds light on the relation between the pleasant and the good.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"521 - 536"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47022364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}