{"title":"Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment by Karen Green (review)","authors":"Alan M. S. J. Coffee","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"and Locke; furthermore, it is foundational, both to Buffier’s “psychologie rationnelle” and to Buffier’s notion of common sense (32–42). If the first foundational principle of truth is “sens intime” or “sentiment intérieur,” then “sens commun” is the second (47). Because of the inevitable limits of logic and speculative reason, and because of our intimate sense of ourselves as a union of soul and body, Buffier maintains that an intersubjective common sense “se fonde sans cesse sur le témoignage des autres” (60). Rouquayrol develops his treatment of Buffier’s notion of common sense with a useful comparison of Buffier and Thomas Reid drawn from his own close readings of the two, as much as from the important study by Louise Marcil-Lacoste, Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers ([Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982], 52–57). Like so many early modern philosophers and érudits of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century studied by Richard Popkin in The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and more recently, Anton Matytsin in The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), the common sense of Buffier proceeded from a species of “practical reason” or “mitigated skepticism,” not as a means of deducing a metaphysical system, but as principles of acting in the world on the basis of practical moral certitude (60). Beyond its instructive front matter and scholarly bibliography, the Rouquayrol edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités also includes the less well-known appendix to the 1732 edition of the Traité (291–306); Buffier’s earlier and separately published remarks on the metaphysical principles of Descartes (307–17); his remarks on the metaphysics of John Locke published in response to Pierre Coste’s first translation of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1700 (318–30); and his “Observations sur la métaphysique du Père Malebranche” published in the latter’s 1712 work, De la recherche de la verité (331–35). As if that were not enough, Rouquayrol publishes Buffier’s observations on the metaphysics of LeClerc (336), the logic of de Crousaz (337–43), and the logic of Pierre Sylvain Régis (344–46). Having all of these scattered reflections by the famed Jesuit philosopher and longtime editor of Mémoires de Trévoux published in one place will undoubtedly prove immensely useful to many scholars, in a way that enriches what is sure to be the standard edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités for years to come. J e f f r e y D . B u r s o n Georgia Southern University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"158 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0012","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
and Locke; furthermore, it is foundational, both to Buffier’s “psychologie rationnelle” and to Buffier’s notion of common sense (32–42). If the first foundational principle of truth is “sens intime” or “sentiment intérieur,” then “sens commun” is the second (47). Because of the inevitable limits of logic and speculative reason, and because of our intimate sense of ourselves as a union of soul and body, Buffier maintains that an intersubjective common sense “se fonde sans cesse sur le témoignage des autres” (60). Rouquayrol develops his treatment of Buffier’s notion of common sense with a useful comparison of Buffier and Thomas Reid drawn from his own close readings of the two, as much as from the important study by Louise Marcil-Lacoste, Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers ([Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982], 52–57). Like so many early modern philosophers and érudits of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century studied by Richard Popkin in The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and more recently, Anton Matytsin in The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), the common sense of Buffier proceeded from a species of “practical reason” or “mitigated skepticism,” not as a means of deducing a metaphysical system, but as principles of acting in the world on the basis of practical moral certitude (60). Beyond its instructive front matter and scholarly bibliography, the Rouquayrol edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités also includes the less well-known appendix to the 1732 edition of the Traité (291–306); Buffier’s earlier and separately published remarks on the metaphysical principles of Descartes (307–17); his remarks on the metaphysics of John Locke published in response to Pierre Coste’s first translation of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1700 (318–30); and his “Observations sur la métaphysique du Père Malebranche” published in the latter’s 1712 work, De la recherche de la verité (331–35). As if that were not enough, Rouquayrol publishes Buffier’s observations on the metaphysics of LeClerc (336), the logic of de Crousaz (337–43), and the logic of Pierre Sylvain Régis (344–46). Having all of these scattered reflections by the famed Jesuit philosopher and longtime editor of Mémoires de Trévoux published in one place will undoubtedly prove immensely useful to many scholars, in a way that enriches what is sure to be the standard edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités for years to come. J e f f r e y D . B u r s o n Georgia Southern University
和洛克;此外,它是基础,无论是布菲的“心理学理性”和布菲的常识概念(32-42)。如果真理的第一个基本原则是“内在感觉”或“内在情感”,那么“共同感觉”是第二个原则(47)。由于逻辑和思辨理性的不可避免的局限性,以及我们将自己视为灵魂和身体的结合体的亲密感觉,Buffer坚持认为,主体间的常识“在导演的创作过程中是不必要的”(60)。Rouquayrol通过对Buffer和Thomas Reid的有益比较,以及Louise Marcil Lacoste、Claude Buffeer和Thomas Reid:two common sense Philosophers([蒙特利尔:麦吉尔女王大学出版社,1982年],52–57)的重要研究,发展了他对Buffeer常识概念的处理。就像理查德·波普金在《从伊拉斯谟到斯宾诺莎的怀疑主义史》(伯克利:加州大学出版社,1979年)中以及最近在《启蒙时代怀疑主义的幽灵》(巴尔的摩:约翰斯·霍普金斯大学出版社,2016年)中研究的许多17世纪末和18世纪初的早期现代哲学家和理论家一样,布菲尔的常识源于一种“实践理性”或“缓和的怀疑论”,不是作为推导形而上学系统的手段,而是作为在实践道德确信的基础上在世界上行动的原则(60)。除了其具有指导意义的前沿内容和学术参考书目外,鲁奎罗版的布菲尔的《Traitédes premières vérités》还包括1732年版的《Traté》(291–306)的不太知名的附录;布菲尔早期和单独发表的关于笛卡尔形而上学原理的评论(307–17);他对约翰·洛克形而上学的评论发表于1700年(318–30),以回应皮埃尔·科斯特对洛克《关于人类理解的随笔》的第一次翻译;以及他在后者1712年的著作《真实研究》(331–35)中发表的“对Père Malebranche医学的观察”。似乎这还不够,Rouquayrol发表了Buffer对LeClerc的形而上学(336)、de Crousaz的逻辑(337-43)和Pierre Sylvain Régis的逻辑(344-46)的观察。著名的耶稣会哲学家、《Mémoires de Trévoux》的长期编辑将所有这些零散的思考集中在一个地方发表,无疑将对许多学者非常有用,从而丰富了未来几年肯定会成为标准版的《Buffer’s Traitédes premières vérités》。J e f f r e y D。佐治亚南方大学
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