JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Editorial Consultants","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909140","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Baumgarten's Aesthetics: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives ed. by J. Colin McQuillan (review)","authors":"Emine Hande Tuna","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909135","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: Baumgarten's Aesthetics: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives ed. by J. Colin McQuillan Emine Hande Tuna J. Colin McQuillan, editor. Baumgarten's Aesthetics: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021. Pp. viii + 364. Hardcover, $130.00. Contemporary philosophers have often overlooked the originality and impact of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's views on aesthetics, and his contribution to the field is often reduced to his introduction of the term 'aesthetics' into the philosophical lexicon. By illuminating the seminal character of Baumgarten's aesthetics and its enduring significance, J. Colin McQuillan's collection of twelve essays endeavors to rectify this neglect, particularly within the anglophone philosophical community. The collection aims to make recent scholarship on Baumgarten's aesthetics more accessible, with translated works from German scholars and their English counterparts presented in a single volume to entice anglophone readers. It stands as the first collection of essays devoted to Baumgarten's aesthetics to be published in English. Through the essays contained in this volume, readers are offered a comprehensive overview of Baumgarten's aesthetic theory and its progression as well as a deeper understanding of his substantial and influential contributions to the field. The collection begins with a comprehensive introduction by McQuillan, which provides insightful analysis of the reasons behind Baumgarten's neglected status and a concise biography of the philosopher. McQuillan lucidly summarizes Baumgarten's goals for his new science of aesthetics, the extent to which he was able to accomplish these goals, and what remained unfinished. McQuillan highlights Baumgarten's view that his aesthetics was not just a theoretical exercise, but rather had practical implications, such as the potential to enhance poetry, rhetoric, and other arts, and more generally all sensible cognition. The opening two essays of the collection offer dual perspectives on Baumgarten's aesthetics, one exploring the connection of his theories to the pursuit of establishing art as the presentation or representation of the absolute and the other presenting his aesthetics as modeled on the \"art of invention\" (ars inveniendi). Ursula Franke's essay contextualizes [End Page 711] Baumgarten's ideas within the historical framework and demonstrates his impact on the development of German idealist aesthetics, but it also serves as a valuable guide for further research on Baumgarten by providing an overview of contemporary research and avenues for engagement with his work. In the second essay, Stefanie Buchenau offers an insightful examination of the relationship between Baumgarten and Cicero, illuminating how the former crafted aesthetics as a new method of invention. The third and fourth essays of the collection have a narrower focus. In his analysis, Matthew McAndrew, following George Friedrich Meier, posits tha","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"\"Every Perception Is Accompanied by Pain!\": Theophrastus's Criticism of Anaxagoras","authors":"Wei Cheng","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909124","url":null,"abstract":"abstract: Anaxagoras is notorious for his view that every perception is accompanied by pain but that not all concurrent pains are distinctly felt by the perceiving subject. This thesis is reported and criticized by Aristotle's heir Theophrastus in his De Sensibus . Traditionally, scholars believe that Theophrastus rejects Anaxagoras's thesis of the ubiquity of pain as counterintuitive, with the appeal to unfelt pain looking like a desperate category mistake given that pain is nothing but a feeling. Contra the traditional view, this paper argues that Theophrastus neither aims to defend ordinary phenomenology nor is bothered by the concept of unfelt pain; instead, he develops a series of new Aristotelian arguments to defend a controversial, optimistic picture about the distribution of affective qualities in animal life. More than a supplement to Aristotle's psychology, his engagement with Anaxagoras reveals an important yet often ignored ethical concern behind the Peripatetic philosophy of perception.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mary Wollstonecraft and Adam Smith on Gender and Self-Control","authors":"Lauren Kopajtic","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909127","url":null,"abstract":"abstract: Mary Wollstonecraft is an early and important critic of Adam Smith, engaging with his Theory of Moral Sentiments in her Vindication of the Rights of Woman . Given Wollstonecraft's arguments against moralists who \"give a sex to virtue,\" what did she make of Smith's use of gender-coded language and the oft-cited passage where he claims that \"humanity is the virtue of a woman, generosity of a man\" ( TMS IV.2.10)? This paper revisits the scholarly debate over gender essentialism in Smith, arguing that Smith's view of virtue is not gender essentialist, and that Wollstonecraft saw this and did not target Smith with her critique. Instead, Wollstonecraft affirms Smith's claims, leveraging them in order to advocate for educational and social reform. Reading these texts together corrects the tenacious reading of Smith as a gender essentialist, while also illuminating the differences between Smith's and Wollstonecraft's conceptions of self-control.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata by Boethius of Dacia (review)","authors":"Julie Brumberg-Chaumont","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909131","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata by Boethius of Dacia Julie Brumberg-Chaumont Boethius of Dacia. Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata. Edited by Sten Ebbesen and Irène Rosier-Catach. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 9. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2021. Pp. 624. Hardback, 400.00 DKK. This volume offers a reliable and accurate scholarly edition of two collections of thirteenthcentury sophismata (logical and grammatical puzzles) contained in ms. Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek 509 (=B) and ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana 12 sin. 3 (=F). Taken together, these two collections constitute a set of twenty-three sophismata called \"Sophismata Florentino-Brugensia\" in the catalogue published by Sten Ebbesen and Frédéric Goubier (A Catalogue of Thirteenth-Century Sophismata [Paris: Vrin, 2010]). These sophismata were previously available only in partial editions. Specifically, the two versions of the sophisma \"Omnis homo de necessitate est animal,\" previously both ascribed to Boethius of Dacia, were partially edited from F by Grabmann in 1940 and from B by Roos in 1962. Other sophismata in this collection have been previously edited by Ebbesen, but their editions should now be considered \"obsolete,\" according to the editor himself (9). Each sophisma is identified by an S followed by a number (S1, S2, etc.). In turn, each sophisma deals with several issues or problems, each one of which is identified by a P followed by a number (P1, P2, etc.). The volume is very usefully completed by an index of explicit and implicit references to other works and an index of parallel passages, both compiled by Kristian Thomsen Purreskov (591–601). Finally, this edition is accompanied by a selective but still rich index of words, where special attention has been dedicated to the sophismata by Boethius of Dacia (603–24). All the material is presented in a clear and accurate way. There are only a few minor material errors (specifically, the running titles for problems in S4 are messy; at 33, \"a*\" should be read as \"b*\"; at 49, \"S14\" should be read as \"S18\"). Sten Ebbesen is the sole editor of all sophismata except for the three that deal with grammatical subjects, for which Irène Rosier-Catach is the main editor, with Ebbesen serving as a coeditor. Concerning the authorship of each sophisma, Ebbesen follows the indications contained in F, but he also provides some independent discussions (24–26). Thus, he ascribes two sophismata to Boethius of Dacia, ten to Peter of Auvergne, one to an otherwise unknown Nicholas of Normandy, and the remaining ten to anonymous masters. They are listed in detail in the \"Index sophismatum et problematum\" (65–69). After a summary of the contents of the volume, Ebbesen's introduction contains five sections of different lengths: first, a history of the edition (7–9); second, a general description of the structure and functioning of sophismata (9–13); third, a description of the seven manuscr","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aristotle's Unified Soul: The Figure-Soul Analogy and Its Context","authors":"Rory Hanlon","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909123","url":null,"abstract":"abstract: I provide a novel interpretation of Aristotle's account of the unity of soul, treating it as resolving the apparent incompatibility of the existence of psychic parts and the soul's status as a unifying form. This incompatibility, I contend, rests on a problematic assumption: mereological actualism, or the claim that parts are actually distinct and prior to the whole. Aristotle successfully undermines actualism and formulates an alternative conception of parthood within De Anima 's figure-soul analogy. As triangles are only potentially present within quadrilaterals, so lower psychic parts are potential parts of higher souls. This picture treats a soul not as a mere aggregate of capacities, but as essentially unified and prior to its parts. Finally, I argue that this picture can be illuminated and must be read against the background of his hylomorphic account of the unity of form given in Metaphysics H.6.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg by Véronique Decaix (review)","authors":"Brian Francis Conolly","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909132","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg by Véronique Decaix Brian Francis Conolly Véronique Decaix. Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2021. Pp. 336. Paperback, $48.00. Dietrich of Freiberg's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect, as presented in his De origine rerum praedicamentalium, has proved unusually resistant to contextualization within the philosophical and theological discussions at the University of Paris in the last two decades of the thirteenth century. There is little indication in the quodlibet literature that any of his contemporaries were aware of his unusual doctrine, let alone interested in responding to it, and Dietrich himself provides few hints as to which quaestiones of contemporary interest he is responding to. One therefore welcomes this study by Véronique Decaix in which it is argued that \"il est irréfutable que les concepts centraux du De origine ont été forgés dans une discussion permanente avec Henri de Gand\" (223). Drawing upon and developing the work of Pasquale Porro, Jan Aersten, and others, Decaix establishes Dietrich's indebtedness to Henry of Ghent, all while providing a comprehensive and remarkably clear, detailed, and precise presentation of Dietrich's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect. [End Page 706] Particularly noteworthy is the manner in which Decaix clarifies that there are several distinct ways in which the intellect, on Dietrich's theory, exercises its constitutive power. Thus, for instance, \"categorial constitution,\" whereby certain relations and the six posterior relative categories are constituted, is distinguished from \"quidditative constitution,\" wherein a real natural thing is constituted in its quidditative being, which is at the same time the mode or manner in which the intellect constitutes its own proper object. Decaix clarifies that such modes of constitution differ not only with respect to what is constituted, but by the kind of causality exercised by the intellect. Categorial constitution is a kind of formal causality—because it concerns only accidents, and because intellect grasps these accidents \"sur une modalité déduite d'un élément extrinsèque\" (284)—whereas quidditative constitution is efficient—it is \"plus fondamentale, car elle est plus essentielle et plus intérieure\" and \"s'exerce sur la forme substantielle et cause l'étant en tant qu'étant\" (286). In either case, whether the mode of constitution is categorial or quidditative, Decaix makes clear that constitution is not creation, and does not pertain to the reality or absolute entity of the thing affected by the intellect's constitutive power. Rather, constitution in the relevant sense here entails introducing and imposing upon the real natural thing a new mode of being: with respect to categorial constitution, that mode of being is ad aliud (to be in relation to another); with respect ","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135661524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Kant's Mathematical World: Mathematics, Cognition, and Experience by Daniel Sutherland (review)","authors":"David Hyder","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909136","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: Kant's Mathematical World: Mathematics, Cognition, and Experience by Daniel Sutherland David Hyder Daniel Sutherland. Kant's Mathematical World: Mathematics, Cognition, and Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 300. Hardcover, $99.99. In this lengthy book, Daniel Sutherland proposes to rectify our long neglect of Kant's theory of mathematics by means of both historical and systematic analyses. This is a worthy undertaking, since the scope and significance of that theory were lost from view during the twentieth century. In fact, the theory of mathematics spans the first several hundred pages of the first Critique. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, the pure unquantified homogeneous multiplicities of space and time are posited as structures of human perception. The Analytic begins by defining 'number' set-theoretically, as a property of sets of elements that can be linearly ordered, while explicating the concept of a set (Menge) in terms of pure logic, augmented by the abstract concept of a multiplicity. In the Axioms of Intuition, the concept of space \"as it is required in geometry\" is defined as the concept of a continuous extended geometrical magnitude, that is to say, a homogeneous manifold whose elements can be described by a coordinate system. In the Antinomies of the Dialectic, Kant addresses problems of completeness and incompleteness, which emerge when we try to extend this concept ad infinitum, and so follows through on Leibniz's distinction between finitary and infinitary proofs. Finally, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), Kant turns to the applied mathematical foundations of Eulerian mechanics, producing a relativistic derivation of the sine law for the composition of velocities. By attaching his theory to the structures that guided physicists and mathematicians over the next century, Kant ensured his own work would be carried on the wave. The topics just mentioned were taken up, criticized, and modified by Helmholtz, Klein, Cournot, Hamilton, Frege, Cantor, Russell, Hilbert, Poincaré, Einstein, Wittgenstein, and Weyl. This theory was, in other words, the backbone of the nineteenth-century tradition that became what we today call \"philosophy of science\" and \"philosophy of mathematics.\" Unfortunately, Sutherland's book says nothing about that theory, nor about the traditions that preceded it or followed in its wake. In fact, if Sutherland's interpretation is correct, Kant's project cannot succeed. For Sutherland, it is essential to our understanding of Kant, and of eighteenth-century science and mathematics more generally, that we recognize that period as essentially Hellenistic. It is fundamentally different from what he calls \"our modern\" point of view, according to which mathematics is a science of number, which only emerged \"over the course of the nineteenth century\" (4–6). Therefore, it is to the Greeks that we must turn to understand Kant, not to the mathematicians whose wor","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Bounds of Self: An Essay on Heidegger's by R. Matthew Shockey (review)","authors":"Nicolai Knudsen","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909138","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: The Bounds of Self: An Essay on Heidegger's by R. Matthew Shockey Nicolai Knudsen R. Matthew Shockey. The Bounds of Self: An Essay on Heidegger's Being and Time. New York: Routledge, 2021. Pp. 224. Hardcover, $160.00. In this rich and ambitious book, R. Matthew Shockey controversially claims that Heidegger's Being and Time (SZ) is an heir to the rationalism of Descartes and Kant. To show this, Shockey develops a provocative account of phenomenological ontology as the normatively inert outcome of reflective and imaginative philosophical self-questioning. Four questions of an increasingly higher order frame the book (2–6): (1) How shall I live? (2) What is it to be the kind of being who can and must ask \"how shall I live?\" (3) What unity is there to the various ways in which things are taken to be? (4) Why should we pursue metaphysics and ontology? Chapters 1–6 reconstruct Heidegger's answers to the second- and third-order questions, while chapter 7 relates them back to the questions of the first- and fourth-order. The key claim is that Heidegger was a \"Kantian Cartesian.\" Shockey, however, admits that Heidegger was not \"driven by a need to refute skepticism, a proponent of a worldly subjectivism, a representationalist epistemologist, or a substance dualist\" (9). Rather, the claim is that Heidegger follows Kant and Descartes in believing, first, that ontology must identify a form of \"a priori knowledge\" as the basis of intelligibility and, second, that ontological inquiry requires a deliberate, reflective, and self-questioning method. The argument rests on a reconstruction of the published parts of SZ as involving a series of meditative steps that are supposed to take us from the analytic of Dasein (the second-order question) to the meaning of being (the third-order question). Chapter 1 explains why the Seinsfrage (the third-order question) requires the analytic of Dasein (the second-order question) and argues that ontology requires that we abstract from all our ontical characteristics (i.e. all the things that make me, me and you, you) insofar as the aim of ontology is to identify the \"bounds\" that are shared by any ontological inquirer (47). This, Shockey claims, makes Heidegger's existential analytics critical in a roughly Kantian way and meditational in a roughly Cartesian way (31, 47). Chapter 2 follows the analysis of worldhood and being-with in introducing us to three regions of entities that we are not: the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, and other Dasein. The next chapters turn away from our understanding of \"outward\" entities and initiates a series of \"inward\" meditative steps supposed to clarify the unitary and a priori basis rendering [End Page 718] these regions intelligible. Chapter 3 analyzes the first meditative step, namely, Heidegger's account of being-in and the trinity of understanding, discourse, and self-finding that constitute the structure of care. Chapter 4 shows, in a second step, that the care structure i","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contents for Volume LXI (2023)","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909141","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}