JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Mill on Moral Rules in \"Whewell on Moral Philosophy\"","authors":"Jonathan Sarnoff","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a916713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a916713","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>abstract:</p><p>Interpreters of John Stuart Mill's moral philosophy have long disagreed about whether he was an act or rule utilitarian. Though debate has often focused on <i>Utilitarianism</i>, this paper instead analyzes a less studied work, \"Whewell on Moral Philosophy,\" which contains a more detailed and systematic discussion of moral rules. \"Whewell,\" I argue, favors reading Mill as an act utilitarian: it understands the importance of rules in moral reasoning to arise from the uncertainty under which human action occurs, not from any direct role that rule compliance plays in determining right action.</p></p>","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Women and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Germany ed. by Corey W. Dyck (review)","authors":"Julia Borcherding","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a916718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a916718","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;In lieu of&lt;/span&gt; an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:&lt;/span&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt; &lt;span&gt;Reviewed by:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;ul&gt; &lt;li&gt;&lt;!-- html_title --&gt; &lt;em&gt;Women and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Germany&lt;/em&gt; ed. by Corey W. Dyck &lt;!-- /html_title --&gt;&lt;/li&gt; &lt;li&gt; Julia Borcherding &lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt; Corey W. Dyck, editor. &lt;em&gt;Women and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Germany&lt;/em&gt;. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 272. Hardback, $85.00. &lt;p&gt;In more ways than one, this volume constitutes an important contribution to ongoing efforts to reconfigure and enrich our existing philosophical canon and to question the narratives that have led to its current shape. To start, while there is a growing amount of research dedicated to recovering the contributions of women to early modern philosophy, much of this work focuses on the seventeenth century, and geographically centers on England, France, and Italy. By turning the spotlight on eighteenth-century Germany, this volume broadens the scope of these efforts in an important way. Further, with the historiography of this period still shaped by a long-standing dismissive treatment of post-Leibnizian German philosophy and by the long shadow cast by the success of Kant's Critical philosophy, which eclipsed many of the thinkers opposed to it, challenges to its traditional narratives seem especially important. The editor's earlier collection (coedited with Falk Wunderlich) on Kant and his German contemporaries already succeeded in mounting such a challenge by showing that German philosophy throughout the eighteenth century in fact presents us with an extraordinarily rich tableau of intellectual life (&lt;em&gt;Kant and His German Contemporaries. Vol. 1: Logic, Mind, Epistemology, Science and Ethics&lt;/em&gt; [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018]).&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The present volume stands as a further valuable contribution to relativizing the still dominant narrative of German philosophy as the story of a select few brilliant minds. It successfully dispenses not only with the idea that those minds were few, but also with the equally persistent one that they were exclusively male. Already in the nineteenth century, we find historians such as Karl Joël explicitly casting the new age of German philosophy inaugurated by Kant as its \"masculine epoch\"—an image undoubtedly furthered by its main protagonist, who cast philosophical acumen in decidedly male terms when he observed that \"[a] woman who has a head full of Greek, like Madame Dacier, or one who engages in debate about the intricacies of mechanics, like the Marquise du Châtelet, might just as well have a beard; for that expresses in a more recognizable form the profundity for which she strives\" (Karl Joël, &lt;em&gt;Die Frauen in der Philosophie&lt;/em&gt; [Hamburg, 1896], 48; Immanuel Kant, &lt;em&gt;Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen&lt;/em&gt; [Königsberg, 1764], translation in Londa Schiebinger, &lt;em&gt;The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science&lt;/em&gt; [Cambridge, M","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Brethren of Purity on Justice for Animals and the Moral Demands of Rational Hierarchy","authors":"Bligh Somma","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a916710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a916710","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>abstract:</p><p>This paper intervenes in a contemporary debate on the animal ethics of the Brethren of Purity's (Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ) epistle on animals. I argue that they present a case for justice for animals by rejecting the fallacious link between ontological superiority and moral superiority. Since human beings are vice-regents of God and since the rational soul is the vice-regent, the Brethren's account of human beings as superior in virtue of their rationality establishes a moral obligation toward animals. The Brethren develop this account partially under the influence of the Muʿtazilī theological tradition, and as a result, their position falls in line with other positions on justice for animals found during their time. Even on the issue of animal use, the Brethren maintain that the human need for animal labor emphasizes the obligation to treat animals justly. In the end, the greater rational capacity of human beings entails greater moral responsibility toward animals, not moral impunity.</p></p>","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Kant and the Possibility of Progress: From Modern Hopes to Postmodern Anxieties ed. by Paul T. Wilford and Samuel A. Stoner (review)","authors":"Benedikt Brunner","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a916720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a916720","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;In lieu of&lt;/span&gt; an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:&lt;/span&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt; &lt;span&gt;Reviewed by:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;ul&gt; &lt;li&gt;&lt;!-- html_title --&gt; &lt;em&gt;Kant and the Possibility of Progress: From Modern Hopes to Postmodern Anxieties&lt;/em&gt; ed. by Paul T. Wilford and Samuel A. Stoner &lt;!-- /html_title --&gt;&lt;/li&gt; &lt;li&gt; Benedikt Brunner &lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt; Paul T. Wilford and Samuel A. Stoner, editors. &lt;em&gt;Kant and the Possibility of Progress: From Modern Hopes to Postmodern Anxieties&lt;/em&gt;. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021. Pp. 328. Hardback, $65.00. &lt;p&gt;Our present does not invite, let alone suggest, particularly optimistic expectations for the future. This volume, edited by Paul Wilford and Samuel Stoner, not only analyzes the historical foundations of Kant's idea of progress but also explores contemporary reflections on such questions as the following: Do we still believe in the possibility of progress? And if not, why has this ability been lost? What about liberal democracy, which is contested from many sides?&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In addition to a lucid introduction, which clarifies the concepts of modernity and postmodernity, the volume assembles thirteen chapters. While the first seven chapters deal with the idea of progress in Kant, the remaining six contributions shed light on the history of that idea after Kant. Within the framework of this review, only selected articles can be discussed. In chapter 1, Oliver Sensen examines the idea of moral progress in the individual. In chapter 2, Kate Moran asks the fundamental question: should we believe in moral progress? According to Kant, the human being possesses \"a duty to avoid despondency\" (46). Following Kant, she encourages us not to go down the road of misanthropy as a consequence of one's own or others' moral failure, but \"to be generous in our assessments of others\" (46). In chapter 3, Jens Timmermann takes up this aspect again and illustrates clearly how complex Kant's concept of moral progress is. Moreover, he highlights that moral progress has a double meaning for Kant: \"first in a fundamental change of priorities—privileging morality over self-interest—and then in an ever-closer approximation to a perfectionist ideal of virtue\" (61). Like some of the other contributors to this volume, however, Timmermann remains rather vague regarding possible avenues for further research. Two other contributions deal specifically with Kant's relationship to religion. In chapter 5, Naomi Fisher asks how God, teleology, and progress are connected in the third &lt;em&gt;Critique&lt;/em&gt;. She argues that in the 1790s, Kant made concrete new efforts to integrate different strands of his philosophy \"and to develop a more unified view of the human being as free and natural\" (93). Chapter 6 is a joint contribution by the two editors of this volume entitled \"Realizing the Ethical Community.\" Their focus is on Kant's religious writings and their role in the context of a \"Reformation of Culture.\" They notice—an observation as impo","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aristotle on How Animals Move: The De incessu animalium. Text, Translation, and Interpretative Essays ed. by Andrea Falcon and Stasinos Stavrianeas (review)","authors":"Pavel Gregorić","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a916716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a916716","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;In lieu of&lt;/span&gt; an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:&lt;/span&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt; &lt;span&gt;Reviewed by:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;ul&gt; &lt;li&gt;&lt;!-- html_title --&gt; &lt;em&gt;Aristotle on How Animals Move: The&lt;/em&gt; De incessu animalium. &lt;em&gt;Text, Translation, and Interpretative Essays&lt;/em&gt; ed. by Andrea Falcon and Stasinos Stavrianeas &lt;!-- /html_title --&gt;&lt;/li&gt; &lt;li&gt; Pavel Gregorić &lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt; Andrea Falcon and Stasinos Stavrianeas, editors. &lt;em&gt;Aristotle on How Animals Move: The De incessu animalium. Text, Translation, and Interpretative Essays&lt;/em&gt;. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xv + 315. Hardback, $120.00. &lt;p&gt;Aristotle was deeply fascinated by animals on account of their self-motion—that is, animals move themselves from one place to another in response to their needs and desires rather than in mechanical or chemical reaction to things in their environment, as inanimate things and plants do. This ability requires sensory awareness of one's environment and sophisticated control of one's body. Moreover, Aristotle was intrigued by the sheer variety of ways animals move themselves and of the parts they employ to do so. Indeed, this variety was something Aristotle systematically observed and held in need of scientific explanation, which is precisely what he delivers in the short treatise, &lt;em&gt;On Progression of Animals&lt;/em&gt; (&lt;em&gt;De incessu animalium&lt;/em&gt;, henceforth &lt;em&gt;IA&lt;/em&gt;).&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;To explain the variety of animal locomotion and their locomotory parts, Aristotle relied on three very general principles: first, nature does nothing in vain; second, there are six functionally determined spatial directions; and third, pushing and pulling are the most basic mechanical actions of locomotion. He also developed a relevant taxonomy (two-footed/four-footed/many-footed/footless) and devised a highly abstract notion of the bodily architecture of animals (single origin of motion in the middle of the body; a certain number of peripheral \"points of motion\"; bending as the fundamental operation of limbs). Aristotle's enterprise is likely to strike us as alien because it is entirely disconnected from Linnaean taxonomy and evolutionary theory, as well as from the essentials of biomechanics. However, we cannot fail to be impressed by his achievement in terms of generality, systematicity, and explanatory power—all this in the absence of anyone's shoulders to stand on.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Although &lt;em&gt;IA&lt;/em&gt; provides an excellent glimpse into Aristotle's scientific methodology, from antiquity to the present day it has been one of his least studied works. This volume—the first book-length study of &lt;em&gt;IA&lt;/em&gt; in any modern language—takes a first step toward correcting this unfortunate situation. It is, quite simply, the only companion to &lt;em&gt;IA&lt;/em&gt; that we have, and it is likely to remain the best one for many years to come. This volume contains a critical edition of the Greek text, an accompanying English translation, and a commentary in the form of nine sections that discuss one or","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139376269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering by Mara van der Lugt (review)","authors":"Stefano Brogi","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a916723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a916723","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;In lieu of&lt;/span&gt; an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:&lt;/span&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt; &lt;span&gt;Reviewed by:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;ul&gt; &lt;li&gt;&lt;!-- html_title --&gt; &lt;em&gt;Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering&lt;/em&gt; by Mara van der Lugt &lt;!-- /html_title --&gt;&lt;/li&gt; &lt;li&gt; Stefano Brogi &lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt; Mara van der Lugt. &lt;em&gt;Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering&lt;/em&gt;. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021. Pp. xi + 450. Hardback, $37.00. &lt;p&gt;Mara van der Lugt's book (awarded Honorable Mention for the &lt;em&gt;JHP&lt;/em&gt; Book Prize in 2022) has the merit of bringing attention to some crucial yet often overlooked topics by providing a contribution that cannot fail to elicit broad interest. Her book does not simply discuss the theodicy and anti-theodicy of the modern age; against this background, she also brings out the often-ignored tradition of philosophical pessimism. What interests van der Lugt, however, is not \"future-oriented\" pessimism, which is opposed to \"progressivist\" theories of history, but an ontological or \"value-oriented\" pessimism that stresses \"the terrible side of &lt;strong&gt;[End Page 163]&lt;/strong&gt; life\" in order to answer a series of crucial questions in a way very different from Leibniz's or Pope's approaches: Are there more evils than goods in our lives? Is life worth living for all of us, for any of us? Why do some people choose death despite their blessings? Why do some people choose life despite their sufferings? Do animals suffer as we do? Are we responsible for our own happiness? Is it better never to have been? According to van der Lugt, \"The various ways in which these questions have been answered throughout the centuries have created the competing philosophical traditions known as optimism and pessimism. This book traces the intersection of the debate on the problem of evil with the debate on pessimism from the late seventeenth century onwards, seeking throughout to evaluate pessimism on its own terms\" (20).&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;A reassessment of this kind of pessimism serves an explicitly theoretical and moral purpose: van der Lugt herself states that her book is not exclusively a contribution to the history of philosophy, but \"partly ethical or evaluative\" (18). Indeed, pessimism and optimism \"go hand in hand\": they stem from a moral need and aim to respond to the evil present in the world by opening up glimmers of \"&lt;em&gt;hope, compassion&lt;/em&gt;, and &lt;em&gt;consolation&lt;/em&gt;\" (12, emphasis in original). Pessimism, in particular, is not intended to be \"a philosophy of despair\"; rather, it draws its strength from an \"ethical commitment.\" Stemming from the latter is a tradition that \"may be reinterpreted as a moral source\" (22) and which \"has not only its own epistemological and methodological concerns and presuppositions but, crucially, its own sets of virtues and moral aims\" (13).&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The theoretical/moral purpose of &lt;em&gt;Dark Matters&lt;/em&gt; is evident through its unfolding, even though eight of its nine chapters are roughly devoted to provi","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Descartes on What We Can Hardly Do","authors":"Thomas M. Lennon","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909125","url":null,"abstract":"abstract: Descartes makes apparently contradictory claims about what we are able to do in response to clear and distinct perception of truth or goodness. An altogether novel interpretation of his concept of moral possibility has recently been advanced, aimed at resolving the contradiction. The argument here is that the basic text from which the interpretation is launched involves a serious mistranslation, and that in any case, the interpretation itself is implausible. The thrust is not merely corrective, however, for the issues raised have systematic repercussions on Descartes's views concerning freedom and the will, and on his method of doubt. They particularly affect libertarian interpretations of Descartes, three of which are discussed here, one in some detail. At the end, a more plausible account is indicated.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135661156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Spinoza's Religion: A New Reading of the Ethics by Clare Carlisle (review)","authors":"Hasana Sharp","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909134","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: Spinoza's Religion: A New Reading of the Ethics by Clare Carlisle Hasana Sharp Clare Carlisle. Spinoza's Religion: A New Reading of the Ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021. Pp. 288. Hardcover, $29.95. Despite its contemplative, earnest, and, at times, disarmingly conversational tone, Spinoza's Religion is a rather provocative book. The epithets thrown at Spinoza throughout the early modern period—referring to the Theological-Political Treatise as that most \"pestilential book,\" \"forged in hell\" by a godless rebel and atheist—are today badges of pride. Spinoza is celebrated among scholars and in popular culture for his uncompromising iconoclasm. He is admired for his refusal, following his ban from Judaism as a young man, to align with any religious faith. Regarded as a staunch critic of religion, Spinoza is credited with paving the way for secular morality, guided by scientific and rational knowledge. With Spinoza's Religion, Carlisle urges us to understand the Ethics as a fundamentally religious text, which, at the same time, transforms our ideas of what religion is. Rather than insisting that her interpretation replace the dominant, secular one, Carlisle proposes that it be allowed to sit alongside it, as an equal. She writes, \"We must acknowledge the possibility that the Ethics is positively, irresolvably ambiguous, lending itself to two equally plausible, equally coherent interpretations: either as a religious philosophy or as a secular philosophy\" (11). She offers her interpretation as one of several ways to regard the \"exquisitely carved crystal\" that is Spinoza's Ethics—a complex, reflective surface, where each angle discloses a different aspect, leading to \"numerous interconnected chambers and corridors\" (35). Carlisle provides an appealing, even beautiful, picture of Spinoza's religio, a term she leaves in the Latin to defamiliarize it, setting it off from our default associations with the word 'religion.' Carlisle cites Cicero and Aquinas, who both observe that the word religio can be translated as rereading (164). Carlisle presents the Ethics as religious in form and content. As a \"sculptural\" piece of literature, the text ushers its readers through a spiritual practice of repeated reading, drawing our attention, again and again, to our beingin-God. In terms of content, the profound and simple message of the Ethics is that we exist in-another rather than in-ourselves. In contrast to many interpreters, Carlisle presents the satisfaction and peace we feel through knowing and loving ourselves and others as beingsin-God as a higher achievement than autonomy, or self-legislation (132). The religio of the Ethics promises a liberating conversion, but one that does not depend upon any doctrinal or ecclesial commitments. 'Religio' names a virtue, an acquired habit, that follows from a profound affective transformation (acquiescentia in se ipso). Carlisle offers a careful scholarly analysis of this elusive phenome","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aristotle on Thought and Feeling by Paula Gottlieb (review)","authors":"Corinne Gartner","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909130","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: Aristotle on Thought and Feeling by Paula Gottlieb Corinne Gartner Paula Gottlieb. Aristotle on Thought and Feeling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 173. Hardback, $99.99. Paula Gottlieb's recent book is an illuminating, synoptic study of Aristotle's theory of human motivation, according to which his innovative notion of prohairesis (choice)—specifically, the virtuous agent's prohairesis—is the cornerstone. She argues against both Kantian-flavored readings, which prioritize reason's role in motivating ethical action, and Humean-flavored readings, which emphasize the virtuous agent's well-habituated feelings. Gottlieb's account explains how the virtuous agent's prohairesis incorporates his or her feelings, desires, and thoughts, building in the motivational contributions of both the rational and nonrational parts of the psyche. The resulting treatment does justice to Aristotle's prima facie incongruous characterizations of prohairesis: on the one hand, it is the conclusion of deliberation, an explicitly rational process; on the other, it is an expression of character virtue. Although prohairesis is the unifying focus of the book, Gottlieb's project touches on a number of related controversies concerning Aristotle's ethics, including the process of moral habituation, the thorny phenomenon of akrasia, the relationship between contemplation and practically virtuous activity, and how to conceive of the connection between the aesthetic and ethical sides of to kalon (the fine). And it does so in a way that is attuned to ongoing scholarly debates without getting bogged down in them. Similarly, while she primarily concerns herself with the Nicomachean Ethics, Gottlieb helpfully draws upon material from other parts of the corpus—for example, she invokes, with appropriate caveats, Aristotle's discussion of feelings in the Rhetoric as well as De Anima. Lastly, some interesting subsidiary motifs animate the book, perhaps the most novel and provocative of which is the through line that connects her insightful understanding of eleos—which she translates, with helpful qualifications, as \"sympathy\" rather than \"pity\" (31)—with learning to be virtuous, as her fresh reading of Aristotle's Neoptolemus case exemplifies (98–102, 134–35). According to Gottlieb's hybridized picture of the good person's motivation, in the rational part of the soul the agent's wish is channeled via deliberation, which itself involves situation-specific information from the feelings, into the agent's prohairesis. In the nonrational part of the soul, the agent experiences a feeling that, strictly speaking, includes (a) a physiological component; (b) an impression of the circumstances, itself partly shaped by the agent's thought; and (c) a specific desire (chapter 2). The virtuous agent's nonrational desire will always correspond to—indeed, it, too, is channeled into—his or her prohairesis (79), the unified desiderative thought or thoughtful desire (NE VI.2, 113","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135705992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fichte's Perfectionist Solution to the Problem of Autonomy","authors":"Karin Nisenbaum","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a909128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a909128","url":null,"abstract":"abstract: This paper has two related aims. The first is to argue that Fichte's concept of freedom is perfectionist. By 'perfectionism,' I mean a moral theory according to which our good, ultimately, is realizing our true nature; Fichte also holds a perfectionist view of freedom, according to which we achieve freedom only to the extent that we succeed in making ourselves good or realizing our true nature. The second aim of this paper is to show how Fichte's perfectionist concept of freedom solves two problems confronting Kantian autonomy: the \"paradox\" of Kantian autonomy and the \"dilemma\" of post-Kantian autonomy. As I contend, Fichte's perfectionist concept of freedom avoids these two problems by enabling us to view self-determination as a form of self-causation, and by showing that we can be responsible for our immoral actions even if we are not fully free when we perform them.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"157 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}