Philosophical Issues最新文献_第4页

Incompatibilism and the garden of forking paths 不相容与岔路花园

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12247

Andrew Law

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引用次数: 0

“Free will” is vague “自由意志”是模糊的

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12238

Santiago Amaya

引用次数: 0

Determination from Above 从上面决定

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12256

Kenneth Silver

引用次数: 0

Epistemic control without voluntarism 没有自愿主义的认识论控制

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12245

Timothy R. Kearl

引用次数: 0

It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore, it isn't 如果相容论是真的，那就糟了;因此，它不是

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12257

Patrick Todd

{"title":"It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore, it isn't","authors":"Patrick Todd","doi":"10.1111/phis.12257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12257","url":null,"abstract":"I want to suggest that it would be bad if compatibilism were true, and that this gives us good reason to think that it isn't. This is, you might think, an outlandish argument, and the considerable burden of this paper is to convince you otherwise. There are two key elements at stake in this argument. The first is that it would be ‐ in a distinctive sense to be explained ‐ bad if compatibilism were true. The thought here is that compatibilism ultimately presents us with a picture on which, in principle, powerful manipulators can effectively guarantee that finite moral agents should become blameworthy. To my mind, this isn't just false ‐ though I think that it is ‐ it is also such that it would be bad (unfortunate, undesirable…) if it were true. The second is that the fact that it would be ‐ in this sense ‐ bad if true gives us reason to think that it isn't. It may be bad that there is no afterlife. But that, in itself, hardly gives us reason to think that there is an afterlife. That is true, but ‐ as others before me have suggested ‐ when the object of the relevant badness is morality itself, the inference seems secure. A more general aim of the paper is to investigate the nature of this very form of argument in itself, and I compare my argument (inter alia) to a recent argument from Sayre–McCord against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46879602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Libertarianism and agentive experience 自由意志主义与代理经验

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12240

Justin A. Capes

引用次数: 0

A new solution to the problem of luck 运气问题的新解决方案

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12260

Ann Whittle

引用次数: 0

From responsibility to causation: The intransitivity of causation as a case study 从责任到因果:因果关系的非及物性个案研究

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12254

Carolina Sartorio

引用次数: 0

I didn't think of that 我没想到

IF 0.7 3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12241

Randolph Clarke

引用次数: 0

Agency and responsibility: The personal and the political 代理和责任:个人和政治

3区哲学

Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12243

Sofia Jeppsson

{"title":"Agency and responsibility: The personal and the political","authors":"Sofia Jeppsson","doi":"10.1111/phis.12243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12243","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I review arguments according to which harsh criminal punishments and poverty are undeserved and therefore unjust . Such arguments come in different forms. First, one may argue that no one deserves to be poor or be punished, because there is no such thing as desert‐entailing moral responsibility. Second, one may argue that poor people in particular do not deserve to remain in poverty or to be punished if they commit crimes, because poor people suffer from psychological problems that undermine their agency and moral responsibility. Third, one may argue that poor and otherwise marginalized people frequently face external obstacles that prevent them from taking alternative courses of action. The first kind of argument has its place in the philosophy seminar. Psychological difficulties may be important to attend to both in personal relationships and when holding ourselves responsible. Nevertheless, I argue that neither type of argument belongs in political contexts. Moral responsibility scepticism ultimately rests on contested intuitions. Labelling certain groups of people particularly irrational, weak‐willed, or similar is belittling and disrespectful; such claims are also hard to prove, and may have the opposite effect to the intended one on people's attitudes. Arguments from external obstacles have none of these problems. Such arguments may not take us all the way to criminal justice reform, but in this context, we can supplement them with epistemic arguments and crime prevention arguments.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136336356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0