发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Philosophical Issues最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1 代理商：让我们注意什么是根本1
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12258
R. Wallace
{"title":"Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1","authors":"R. Wallace","doi":"10.1111/phis.12258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12258","url":null,"abstract":"The standard event‐causal theory of action says that an intentional action is caused in the right way by the right mental states. This view requires reductionism about agency. The causal role of the agent must be nothing over and above the causal contribution of the relevant mental event‐causal processes. But commonsense finds this reductive solution to the “agent‐mind problem”, the problem of explaining the relationship between agents and the mind, incredible. Where did the agent go? This paper suggests that this challenge against event‐causal reductionism is importantly related to debates about fundamentality. It also suggests that extant event‐causal answers to the agent‐mind problem, ones that suggest that part of an agent's mind can stand proxy for the agent herself, fail against the challenge. It sketches an alternative reductive view that appeals to entity grounding. This view resolves the commonsense challenge and promises to be theoretically fruitful with respect to other longstanding problems with the event‐casual view. The paper concludes with a burden‐shifting argument against emergentist agent‐causal theories and non‐reductive event‐causal theories of agency.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49299799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Higher‐order omissions and the stacked view of agency 高阶遗漏与代理的叠加视角
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12251
Joseph Metz
{"title":"Higher‐order omissions and the stacked view of agency","authors":"Joseph Metz","doi":"10.1111/phis.12251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12251","url":null,"abstract":"Omissions are puzzling, and theyraise myriad questions for many areas of philosophy. In contrast, omissions ofomissions are not usually taken to be very puzzling since they are oftenthought to just be a fancy way of describing ordinary “positive” events, statesof affairs, or actions. This paper contends that – as far as agency isconcerned – at least some omissions of omissions are omissions, not actions. First,this paper highlights how our actions are accompanied by many first‐orderomissions ‐ i.e., omissions to act – and that there already are many strongreasons to think that at least some of these first‐order omissions are agentiallydistinct from simultaneous actions and from other first‐order omissions. Itthen argues that our actions and first‐order omissions are also accompanied byhigher‐order omissions – i.e., omissions to omit to act – and that higher‐orderomissions are distinct from actions and first‐order omissions for similarreasons. Higher‐order omissions also illuminate a more holistic picture of agency,which involves recognizing that our exercises of agency at a moment in timeinclude all of our overlapping behaviors – our actions, first‐order omissions,and higher‐order omissions. This paper concludes by exploring the impacts ofhigher‐order omissions.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48408558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history‐sensitive structuralism 为什么历史对道德责任很重要:评价历史敏感的结构主义
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12242
Taylor W. Cyr
{"title":"Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history‐sensitive structuralism","authors":"Taylor W. Cyr","doi":"10.1111/phis.12242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12242","url":null,"abstract":"Is moral responsibility essentially historical, or does an agent's moral responsibility for an action depend only on their psychological structure at that time? In previous work, I have argued that the two main (non‐skeptical) views on moral responsibility and agents’ histories—historicism and standard structuralism—are vulnerable to objections that are avoided by a third option, namely history‐sensitive structuralism. In this paper, I develop this view in greater detail and evaluate the view by comparing it with its three dialectical rivals: skepticism about moral responsibility, historicism, and standard structuralism. Each comparison includes discussion of new work on moral responsibility and agents’ histories, and along the way I offer new arguments for preferring history‐sensitive structuralism, paying special attention to the view's explanatory power.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42983431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Flickering the W‐Defense 引爆W‐Defense
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12253
Michael Robinson
{"title":"Flickering the W‐Defense","authors":"Michael Robinson","doi":"10.1111/phis.12253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12253","url":null,"abstract":"One way to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt‐style cases is to challenge the claim that agents in these scenarios are genuinely morally responsible for what they do. Alternatively, one can grant that agents are morally responsible for what they do in these cases but resist the idea that they could not have done otherwise. This latter strategy is known as the flicker defense of PAP. In an argument he calls the W‐Defense, David Widerker adopts the former approach. I argue that, while Widerker's argument does a poor job showing that these agents are not morally responsible for what they do, it does a very good job highlighting the alternative possibilities that remain open to agents in these cases and illustrating their moral significance (or robustness). In doing so, my aim is to co‐opt Widerker's argument to bolster the most promising versions of the flicker defense.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48860536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public artifacts and the epistemology of collective material testimony 公共文物与集体物质证言的认识论
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12224
Quill R Kukla
{"title":"Public artifacts and the epistemology of collective material testimony","authors":"Quill R Kukla","doi":"10.1111/phis.12224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12224","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48800489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust 1 有价值和有害的集体智力自我信任
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12228
Nadja El Kassar
{"title":"Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust\u0000 1","authors":"Nadja El Kassar","doi":"10.1111/phis.12228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12228","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46110943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On the Independence of belief and credence 论信仰与信任的独立性
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12225
Elizabeth Jackson
{"title":"On the Independence of belief and credence","authors":"Elizabeth Jackson","doi":"10.1111/phis.12225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12225","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43306948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
TRUST AS PERFORMANCE 信任即绩效
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-11-02 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12214
J. Carter
{"title":"TRUST AS PERFORMANCE","authors":"J. Carter","doi":"10.1111/phis.12214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12214","url":null,"abstract":"It is argued that trust is a performative kind and that the evaluative normativity of trust is a special case of the evaluative normativity of performances generally. The view is shown to have advantages over competitor views, e.g., according to which good trusting is principally a matter of good believing (e.g., Hieronymi, 2008; McMyler, 2011), or good affect (e.g., Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996), or good conation (e.g., Holton, 1994). Moreover, the view can be easily extended to explain good (and bad) distrust , where the latter is understood as aimed (narrow-scoped) forbearance from trusting. The over-arching framework—which assimilates the evaluative norms of trusting (and distrusting) to performance-theoretic norms—supplies us with an entirely new lens to view traditional philosophical problems about what is involved in trusting and distrusting well and badly, and thus, places our capacity to make progress on problems in this area on a new footing.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45979534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me, is it the group or are we all to blame? 认知合作中的责任：是我，是团队，还是我们都应该受到谴责？
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12230
S. Palermos
{"title":"Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me, is it the group or are we all to blame?","authors":"S. Palermos","doi":"10.1111/phis.12230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12230","url":null,"abstract":"According to distributed virtue reliabilism (Palermos, 2020b), epistemic collaborations—such as Transactive Memory Systems and Scientific Research Teams—can be held epistemically responsible at the collective level. This raises the question of whether participants of epistemic collaborations are exempt from being held individually responsible. In response, this paper explores two possible ways in which attributions of individual responsibility may still be appropriate within epistemic collaborations: (I) Individuals can be held epistemically responsible for their individual shortcomings, but no amount of individual epistemic responsibility can replace collective epistemic responsibility. (II) Even if it is denied that participants of epistemic collaborations can be held epistemically responsible at the individual level, they may be held structurally , perhaps morally , and even legally responsible at the individual level for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of the epistemic collaboration.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49087847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Radical Internalism 激进Internalism
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-28 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12235
Zoë A. Johnson King
{"title":"Radical Internalism","authors":"Zoë A. Johnson King","doi":"10.1111/phis.12235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12235","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42219446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信