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Being understood 被理解
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2024-09-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12267
Samuel Dishaw
{"title":"Being understood","authors":"Samuel Dishaw","doi":"10.1111/phis.12267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12267","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical work in the ethics of thought focuses heavily on the ethics of <jats:italic>belief</jats:italic>, with, in recent years, a particular emphasis on the ways in which we might wrong other people either through our beliefs about them, or our failure to believe what they tell us. Yet in our own lives we often want not merely to be believed, but rather to be <jats:italic>understood</jats:italic> by others. What does it take to understand another person? In this paper, I provide an account of interpersonal understanding that speaks to this widespread human desire to be understood by others. On the view I defend, to be understood by another person is for them to see our motivating reasons as justifying reasons, whether or not they actually take our reasons to have that normative force. I then provide an explanation of why such understanding is valuable in our lives, which emphasizes how being understood by another person is a way of being more fully with them.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142236748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Adaptive abilities 自适应能力
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-09-02 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12249
Erasmus Mayr, Barbara Vetter
{"title":"Adaptive abilities","authors":"Erasmus Mayr, Barbara Vetter","doi":"10.1111/phis.12249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12249","url":null,"abstract":"Abilities, in contrast to mere dispositions, propensities, or tendencies, abilities seem to be features of agents that put the agent herself in control. But what is the distinguishing feature of abilities vis‐à‐vis other kinds of powers? Our aim in this paper is to point, in answer to this question, to a crucial feature of abilities that existing accounts have tended to neglect: their adaptivity. Adaptivity is a feature of how abilities are exercised. The main reason for its relative neglect has been that most extant accounts have focused solely on whether abilities are exercised successfully in certain possible situations and have mostly understood the exercise of an ability in terms of complete successful performance. We begin by pointing out two aspects of abilities with regard to which current accounts seem (at best) incomplete: control and exercise. We then introduce adaptivity as we understand it, and end by putting it to work in developing a fuller understanding of abilities that does better than current accounts.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44804937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Freedom, foreknowledge, and betting 自由、预知和博彩
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-30 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12255
Amy Seymour
{"title":"Freedom, foreknowledge, and betting","authors":"Amy Seymour","doi":"10.1111/phis.12255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12255","url":null,"abstract":"Certain kinds of prediction, foreknowledge, and future‐oriented action appear to require settled future truths. But open futurists think that the future is metaphysically unsettled: if it is open whether p is true, then it cannot currently be settled that p is true. So, open futurists—and libertarians who adopt the position—face the objection that their view makes rational action and deliberation impossible. I defuse the epistemic concern: open futurism does not entail obviously counterintuitive epistemic consequences or prevent rational action.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43885660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Practical understanding 实际的理解
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12252
L. O’Brien
{"title":"Practical understanding","authors":"L. O’Brien","doi":"10.1111/phis.12252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12252","url":null,"abstract":"Well‐functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional actions. This phenomenon is often characterized as knowledge of what one is doing and labeled “practical knowledge”. But when we examine it carefully, it seems to require a particular kind of understanding ‐ understanding of the normative structure of one's action. Three lines of argument are offered to support this Necessity of Understanding thesis. The first appeals to the nature of intentional action and the second to our everyday reasons explanation of action. The final line of argument draws on a practical amnesia case in which an agent forgets her overall goal while acting. Implications of the Necessity of Understanding thesis for the widely endorsed non‐observational view of practical knowledge are briefly discussed. It is argued that support for the non‐observational view is weaker than has been appreciated.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48336751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Freedom, moral responsibility, and the failure of universal defeat 自由，道德责任，以及普遍失败的失败
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12246
A. Latham, Hannah Tierney, S. Varga
{"title":"Freedom, moral responsibility, and the failure of universal defeat","authors":"A. Latham, Hannah Tierney, S. Varga","doi":"10.1111/phis.12246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12246","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of manipulation arguments against compatibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the manipulator intends that an agent perform a particular action) do not impact judgments about free will and moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people's judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: people judged that an agent was less free and responsible when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least one but not all agents) than when the manipulation was universal (impacting every agent). This study examines people's judgements about existential and universal manipulation cases that involve both intentional and non‐intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation scope also affects people's free will and responsibility judgments in manipulation cases involving both intentional and non‐intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we also found that manipulation type influences the effect that manipulation scope has on people's free will judgments but not their moral responsibility judgments, which indicates that people's free will and responsibility judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and moral responsibility are conceptually bound together.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45908805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reasons‐responsiveness, control and the negligence puzzle 原因——反应、控制和疏忽之谜
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12248
Yael Loewenstein
{"title":"Reasons‐responsiveness, control and the negligence puzzle","authors":"Yael Loewenstein","doi":"10.1111/phis.12248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12248","url":null,"abstract":"A longstanding puzzle about moral responsibility for negligence arises from three plausible yet jointly inconsistent theses: (i) an agent can, in certain circumstances, be morally responsible for some outcome O, even if her behavior with respect to O is negligent (i.e., even if she never adverted to the possibility that the behavior might result in O), (ii) an agent can be morally responsible for O only if she has some control over O, (iii) if an agent acts negligently with respect to O, then she has no control over O. This paper is in two parts. First, I argue that reasons‐responsiveness models of moral responsibility can be applied naturally to negligence scenarios; indeed, agents are intuitively responsible for the outcomes of their negligent behavior just when they meet the conditions for responsibility given by the best reason‐responsiveness theories. Second, if the reasons‐responsiveness conditions are applicable to negligence scenarios then one of two things follows: either agents can have direct control over outcomes they never adverted to, or reasons‐responsiveness is not a condition of control but of something else connected to moral responsibility. Each possibility would be important in its own right—and each can solve the negligence puzzle.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44154112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A timid response to the consequence argument 对后果论的怯懦回应
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12250
Michael McKenna
{"title":"A timid response to the consequence argument","authors":"Michael McKenna","doi":"10.1111/phis.12250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12250","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I challenge the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism by arguing that the inference principle it relies upon is not well motivated. The sorts of non‐question‐begging instances that might be offered in support of it fall short.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41644777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths 自由意志与自我表达:岔路的相容花园
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12259
R. Waller
{"title":"Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths","authors":"R. Waller","doi":"10.1111/phis.12259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12259","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44905747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Responsibility and iterated knowledge 责任和迭代知识
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12244
Alex Kaiserman
{"title":"Responsibility and iterated knowledge","authors":"Alex Kaiserman","doi":"10.1111/phis.12244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12244","url":null,"abstract":"I defend an iterated knowledge condition on responsibility for outcomes: one is responsible for a consequence of one's action only if one was in a position to know that, for all one was in a position to know, one's action would have that consequence.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43949649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist 相信的实践理由、行动的认识理由和困惑的行动理论家
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12239
Nomy Arpaly
{"title":"Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist","authors":"Nomy Arpaly","doi":"10.1111/phis.12239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12239","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that unless belief is voluntary in a very strict sense – that is, unless credence is simply under our direct control – there can be no practical reasons to believe. I defend this view against recent work by Susanna Rinard. I then argue that for very similar reasons, barring the truth of strict doxastic voluntarism, there cannot be epistemic reasons to act, only purely practical reasons possessed by those whose goal is attaining knowledge or justified belief.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43976520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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