{"title":"The relationship between the Big Five personality traits and earnings: Evidence from a meta-analysis","authors":"Melchior Vella","doi":"10.1111/boer.12437","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12437","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This meta-analysis examines the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and earnings. The results reveal that openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion exhibit positive correlations with earnings, whereas agreeableness and neuroticism are inversely correlated with earnings. Overall, personality has a modest-to-small effect on earnings, with variations in results depending on econometric models used. Accounting for publication bias, socioeconomic background, and cognitive ability in models affects effect sizes. The findings also underscore the potential for omitted variable bias in the reported personality effects on earnings when relevant factors are omitted from the earnings equation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 3","pages":"685-712"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/boer.12437","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139764290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A theory of entry dissuasion","authors":"Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti","doi":"10.1111/boer.12441","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12441","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In an industry with homogeneous goods, this note compares the standard incumbent's strategic capacity choice versus the incumbent's pre-emptive payment (profit) transfer (PPT) strategy (i.e., pre-entry acquisition). It is shown that via the transfer option, the incumbent holds its monopoly position “dissuading” the potential competitor entry for a range of fixed costs larger than under strategic capacity. Moreover, in that range, at least one firm is better off under PPT, while the other is indifferent between PPT and capacity choice. That is, in contestable markets, the incumbent can keep its dominant position in an easier way than standard models predict.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 3","pages":"666-684"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139764127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multiple regimes in the preferences for redistribution","authors":"Andros Kourtellos, Kyriakos Petrou","doi":"10.1111/boer.12443","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12443","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper provides novel evidence of nonlinearities in the formation of preferences for redistribution by uncovering evidence of multiple regimes consistent with the presence of multiple equilibria and multiple steady states. Using threshold regressions that account for the endogeneity of the threshold variable, countries are classified into three groups that share common characteristics. Finally, our analysis reveals substantial evidence of parameter heterogeneity in the coefficient estimates of threshold regressions.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 3","pages":"650-665"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/boer.12443","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139680114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Linas Jurkšas, Rokas Kaminskas, Deimantė Vasiliauskaitė
{"title":"ECB monetary policy communication events: Do they move euro area yields?","authors":"Linas Jurkšas, Rokas Kaminskas, Deimantė Vasiliauskaitė","doi":"10.1111/boer.12439","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12439","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study aims to determine and compare the impact of four different types of European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy communication events on euro area sovereign yields on an intraday basis since 2014. Our paper distinguishes it from similar studies in that we analyze a broad range of ECB communication types. The results reveal that ECB decisions and press conferences have the most substantial intraday impact on normalized sovereign yields while the impact of speeches and accounts appears to be much weaker. Countries with the highest debt levels (such as Italy, Spain, and France) experienced the most robust changes in fiscal costs, while the period encompassing the economic shock induced by the Covid-19 pandemic shows weaker effects.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 2","pages":"596-625"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139589399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous timing of R&D decisions with spillovers: Output versus research subsidies","authors":"Jiaqi Chen, Doori Kim, Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/boer.12440","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12440","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study considers an endogenous timing game of R&D decisions with research spillovers and compares the effects of output and research subsidies. We show that the simultaneous-move (sequential-move) game is an equilibrium if the spillover rate is low (high) under an output subsidy while this equilibrium is socially beneficial if the spillover rate is high or low enough. Under a research subsidy, however, the simultaneous-move game is a unique equilibrium regardless of the spillover rate, which is always socially beneficial. We also show that an output subsidy in the simultaneous-move game provides higher (lower) social welfare than a research subsidy if the spillover rate is low (high). Finally, we provide the robustness of our findings and some policy-relevant discussions.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 3","pages":"631-649"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139589223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Class size reduction, bullying, and violent behavior: Evidence from West Bank schools","authors":"Sameh Hallaq","doi":"10.1111/boer.12438","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12438","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Class size is one of the predominant topics in educational policy debate, as its impact on academic performance has not always yielded consistent findings. Nevertheless, less emphasis was paid to noncognitive outcomes such as well-being and behavioral issues. This study employs rich administrative and survey data to investigate the effects of class size on students’ bullying and violent behavior as well as cognitive abilities tests. The study uses the maximum class size rule to create a regression discontinuity (RD) relation between cohort enrollment size and class size in the public and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency school system in the West Bank. Further, this study provides evidence that there is no violation of the RD assumptions resulting from discontinuities in the relationship between enrollment and students’ household background at cutoff points induced by a maximum class size rule. The findings suggest that class size reduction improves the quality of life for children by mitigating bullying and violent behavior among pupils, which might have long-term adverse effects on academic attainment. Finally, peer relationships and mental health problems are identified as potential mechanisms through which class size influences self-reported levels of bullying and violent behavior among students.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 2","pages":"545-595"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139518046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inflation response in a New Keynesian model with money illusion","authors":"Kenichi Tamegawa","doi":"10.1111/boer.12430","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12430","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the role of money illusion (MI) in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We introduce MI such that households, in their intertemporal optimization, erroneously recognize nominal variables as real ones. We find that first, our model could exhibit money nonneutrality in the long run; second, the Taylor principle is a sufficient condition for determinacy but not a necessary condition; third, the response to output in monetary policy rule matters for the model not to exhibit money nonneutrality in the long run; and finally, MI could flatten the slope that represents the output-inflation trade-off.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 2","pages":"529-544"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139459810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Passive cross-holdings, horizontal differentiation, and welfare","authors":"Jing Fang, Jingyi Huang, Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.1111/boer.12436","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12436","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how passive cross-holdings affect product differentiation and welfare in a Cournot duopoly. We show that increasing unilateral ownership stimulates total investments, and therefore improves social welfare. Such cross-holdings should not be controlled in view of social welfare. However, we identify an inverted-U (a negative) relationship between consumer surplus and ownership when the demand is small (large). Then a government might apply intervention thresholds for passive ownership if it uses consumer surplus as the appropriate standard for antitrust enforcement. We further consider symmetric bilateral cross-holdings and show that our results are in general robust, but increasing ownership will generate more serious competition harms than unilateral cross-holdings. Thus, special concerns need to be given to bilateral cross-holdings.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 2","pages":"508-528"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139398381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate social responsibility and tariff policy in a differentiated mixed duopoly","authors":"Xingtang Wang, Leonard F. S. Wang","doi":"10.1111/boer.12432","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12432","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we assume that the domestic public firm competes in the market with a foreign private firm that cares about consumer surplus and the domestic government imposes tariffs on foreign firm. We aim to analyze the influence of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) level of foreign firm on privatization and tariff policy. It shows that if the government implements a privatization policy for the domestic public firm, the optimal degree of privatization decreases in the CSR level of foreign firm. Under the optimal privatization policy, if the product differentiation is relatively small, the equilibrium tariff increases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is relatively large, the equilibrium tariff decreases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is moderate, the relationship between the equilibrium tariff and CSR level is an inverted U-shape. We further consider the policy implications under sequential moves of firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 2","pages":"470-487"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139376460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm information and risk: Evidence from the role of 10-K report readability","authors":"Sang Jun Cho, Changhwan Choi, Chune Young Chung","doi":"10.1111/boer.12435","DOIUrl":"10.1111/boer.12435","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study uses the Plain Writing Act of 2010 as an exogenous variation in the readability of 10-K reports to establish the impact of report improvements on firm risk. We find that better readability significantly decreases total and idiosyncratic risks for US firms experiencing shocks to their readability environment during 2001–2016. The impact is stronger among firms with poorer governance, less external monitoring, and greater product market competition. The results based on supporting the causal impact of readability on firm risk are robust. Our findings suggest that more readable 10-K reports facilitate investor monitoring, inducing firms to manage risk better.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 2","pages":"488-507"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139376131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}