Argumentation最新文献

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High Costs and Low Benefits: Analysis and Evaluation of the “I’m Not Stupid” Argument 高成本低效益:“我不笨”论的分析与评价
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09592-4
Henrike Jansen
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引用次数: 1
On Halting Meta-argument with Para-Argument 用Para变元中止元变元
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09602-z
Scott Aikin, John Casey
{"title":"On Halting Meta-argument with Para-Argument","authors":"Scott Aikin,&nbsp;John Casey","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09602-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09602-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recourse to meta-argument is an important feature of successful argument exchanges; it is where norms are made explicit or clarified, corrections are offered, and inferences are evaluated, among much else. Sadly, it is often an avenue for abuse, as the very virtues of meta-argument are turned against it. The question as to how to manage such abuses is a vexing one. Erik Krabbe proposed that one be levied a fine in cases of inappropriate meta-argumentative bids (2003). In a recent publication (2022) Beth Innocenti expands on this notion of a penalty, arguing that some meta-arguments should be halted with “shouting, cussing, sarcasm, name-calling.” In this essay, we review Innocenti’s case that these confrontations and haltings improve the argumentative circumstances. We provide three reasons that this promise is not well-founded. First, that such confrontations have a significant audience problem, in that they are more likely to be interpreted as destroying the argumentative context than improving it. Second, that Innocenti’s procedural justification, that those who lose meta-discussions should pay a penalty, is not satisfied if the meta-discussion is halted. And third, there is a boundary problem for the cases, since it seems there is no principled reason to restrict halting meta-arguments just to these cases (especially if there is no meta-discussion on the matter to make the bounds explicit). Though expressions of anger can be appropriate in argument, we argue, it cannot take the place of argument.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 3","pages":"323 - 340"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50474476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Fallacy Fallacy: From the Owl of Minerva to the Lark of Arete 谬论:从密涅瓦的猫头鹰到阿雷特的云雀
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09595-9
Andrew Aberdein
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引用次数: 0
Introduction to the Special Issue on Fallacies 谬论特刊简介
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09607-8
Hans V. Hansen
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue on Fallacies","authors":"Hans V. Hansen","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09607-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09607-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This short essay is an introduction to the essays included in this special issue of <i>Argumentation</i> devoted to fallacies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 2","pages":"159 - 165"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50468211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Committing Fallacies and the Appearance Condition 犯罪谬误及其产生条件
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09606-9
Hans V. Hansen
{"title":"Committing Fallacies and the Appearance Condition","authors":"Hans V. Hansen","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09606-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09606-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This appearance condition of fallacies refers to the phenomenon of weak arguments, or moves in argumentation, appearing to be okay when really they aren’t. Not all theorists agree that the appearance condition should be part of the conception of fallacies but this essay explores some of the consequences of including it. In particular, the differences between committing a fallacy, causing a fallacy and observing a fallacy are identified. The remainder of the paper is given over to discussing possible causes of mistakenly perceiving weak argumentation moves as okay. Among these are argument caused misperception, perspective caused misperception, discursive environment caused misperception and perceiver caused misperception. The discussion aims to be sufficiently general so that it can accommodate different models and standards of argumentation that make a place for fallacies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 2","pages":"253 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09606-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9341662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Textbook Treatments of Fallacies 谬论的教科书处理
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09600-1
David Hitchcock
{"title":"Textbook Treatments of Fallacies","authors":"David Hitchcock","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09600-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09600-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his <i>Fallacies</i>, Hamblin (1970) castigated what he called the “standard treatment” of fallacies in introductory textbooks of his day as debased, worn-out, dogmatic, and unconnected to anything else in modern logic. A bit more than 50 years later, I investigate the treatment of fallacies in six English-language introductory textbooks with a section on fallacies that have gone into 10 or more editions, to see whether their treatment of fallacies has taken account of the scholarship on fallacies that Hamblin’s book evoked and is better than the treatment that Hamblin described. The answer is: not much. I conclude by setting out criteria for an adequate treatment of fallacies in an introductory textbook.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 2","pages":"233 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09600-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50464753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social Justice, Fallacies of Argument, and Persistent Bias 社会正义、论证谬误和持续的偏见
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09603-y
Catherine Hundleby
{"title":"Social Justice, Fallacies of Argument, and Persistent Bias","authors":"Catherine Hundleby","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09603-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09603-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The fallacies approach to argument evaluation can exacerbate problems it aims to address when it comes to social bias, perpetuating social injustice. A diagnosis that an argument commits a fallacy may flag the irrelevance of stereotypical characterizations to the line of reasoning without directly challenging the stereotypes. This becomes most apparent when personal bias is part of the subject matter under discussion, in ethotic argument, including <i>ad hominem</i> and <i>ad verecundiam</i>, which may be recognized as fallacious without addressing whether the ethotic presumptions are true. Yap (2013; 2015) makes this case for <i>ad hominem</i> and the pragma-dialectical understanding of fallacies, expanded here to show related patterns in some other fallacies, and employing the argument schemes understanding of fallacies. Adding critical questions increases the ways reasoners can dismiss arguments as fallacious, and could include directly addressing bias, but if an argument fails on a different critical question, that may yet allow the bias to pass. The fallacies approach is a form of meta-debate and techniques of meta-debate need to address the ubiquity of social bias, not convey them as specialized problems. The view that the fallacies approach to argument evaluation can provide neutrality is dangerously false. Arguers thus should avoid using fallacies for argument evaluation where social stereotypes or schemas might be involved, especially when the subject matter relates closely to social justice.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 2","pages":"281 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50438504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Locke and “ad” 洛克与“广告”
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09594-w
Richard Davies
{"title":"Locke and “ad”","authors":"Richard Davies","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09594-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09594-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In IV, xvii, 19–22 of his <i>Essay</i>, Locke employs Latin labels for four kinds of argument, of which one (<i>ad hominem</i>) was already in circulation and one (<i>ad judicium</i>) has never had much currency. The present proposal seeks to locate and clarify what Locke was aiming to describe, and to contrast what he says with some subsequent uses that have been made of these labels as if they named fallacies. Though three of the four kinds of argument that Locke picks out are often less than decisive, he casts no aspersion on the legitimacy of their use in debate.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 3","pages":"473 - 492"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50430926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Free Speech Fallacies as Meta-Argumentative Errors 作为元论证错误的言论自由谬误
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-01-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09601-0
Scott F. Aikin, John Casey
{"title":"Free Speech Fallacies as Meta-Argumentative Errors","authors":"Scott F. Aikin,&nbsp;John Casey","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09601-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09601-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Free speech fallacies are errors of meta-argument. One commits a free speech fallacy when one argues that since there are apparent restrictions on one’s rights of free expression, procedural rules of critical exchange have been broken, and consequently, one’s preferred view is dialectically better off than it may otherwise seem. Free speech fallacies are meta-argumentative, since they occur at the level of assessing the dialectical situation in terms of norms of argument and in terms of meta-evidential principles of interpreting how and why people follow (or fail to follow) argumentative rules. Our plan here is to begin with a brief explanation of meta-argument and meta-argumentative fallacy. We will then turn to the variety of forms of the free speech fallacy, which we will explain as meta-argumentatively erroneous.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 2","pages":"295 - 305"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09601-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50517619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What Do We Mean by ‘That’s a Fallacious Narrative’? 我们所说的“这是一个荒谬的叙述”是什么意思?
IF 1.2 2区 文学
Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-01-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09599-5
Paula Olmos
{"title":"What Do We Mean by ‘That’s a Fallacious Narrative’?","authors":"Paula Olmos","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09599-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09599-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper tries to offer a descriptive account of the normative workings of evaluative fallacy charges directed to narratives. In order to do that, I first defend the continuity and mutual dependence, as based on a dynamical conception of argument, between the ‘belief conception’ and the ‘argumentative conception’ of fallacy. Then, I construe a catalogue of ‘fallacy charges’ based on both such a continuity and the variety of counterarguments explored by the theoretical framework of Argument Dialectics. And finally, I apply these ideas and distinctions in the analysis of four examples of published texts in which the charge of ‘fallacious narrative’ is issued by a discursive agent against other discursive agents’ either full-fledged narratives or narrative assumptions. The analyses confirm some of the characteristics mentioned in the catalogue as well as the argumentative nature of fallacy charges, even when the censored discourse does not exactly or explicitly contain an argument. The analyses also help understand the distinction between a rather concrete ‘linguistic’ use of the term narrative and a more abstract and elusive ‘discursive’ one, in which the difficulties of both identifying the object of censorship and the exact meaning of the fallacy charge multiply.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 2","pages":"307 - 321"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09599-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50517620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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