{"title":"The Union Defence Force and the suppression of the Bondelswarts Rebellion, 1922","authors":"Evert Kleynhans, Antonio Garcia","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2100621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2100621","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT From the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had been deployed to suppress several internal disturbances. These unrests varied in terms of their scale, intensity, and geographic location, and represented dissatisfied and disenfranchised parts of the population, both in the Union and South West Africa (now Namibia). The uprisings in turn tested the organisation, force structure and strategies of the defence force. The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922, although brave and tragic, provides a lens through which to investigate the first large scale rural counterinsurgency operation conducted by South African forces after the end of the First World War. These operations occurred only months after the quelling of the 1922 Rand Revolt on the Witwatersrand. The reputation of the Bondelswarts as guerrilla fighters, and the fear of further unrest breaking out across the territory, prompted the South African authorities to seek a rapid resolution to the simmering unrest in the desolate terrain of southern South West Africa. The result of this brief and violent conflict also held far reaching political consequences. This article investigates the uprising and rural counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the South African authorities in suppressing the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45028631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transfers of colonial (dis)order: guerrilla warfare and the British military thought after the Great War","authors":"S. Malkin","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2102306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2102306","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article analyses the gaps and ties betweenthe doctrine and theory, in contrast with the practice, of countering subversive movements in the British Empire during the Interbellum. Contradictions between security services led to the articulation and promotion of different models of counterinsurgency. The research contains an analysis of the guerrilla warfare concept’ evolution within the military thought, through the second Boer war, Irish warof Independence and the second Arab rising in Palestine, reflecting different thoughts on interrelated problems of the ‘revolutionary movements’ and ‘sub-war’ after the Great War. Particular attentionis paid to military and political incentives and constrains of the counterinsurgency doctrine, reflecting the bureaucratic logic that stood behind the implementation of the guerrilla warfare concept at the levels of doctrine and theory in the context of the systemic crisis of empire and the growth of external pressure over the questions of the imperial defense and self-determination. Conflicting coexistence of internal security models tested within the British Empire during the Interbellum is observed in the conclusion,as well as perspectives of transfers of colonial (dis)order in front of the ‘sub-war’, as it was understood among the military circles through the prism of the guerrilla warfare concept.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48662146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Patrick Afamefune Ikem, Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha, H. C. Edeh, O. Ononogbu, Chukwuemeka Enyiazu
{"title":"Decoding the message: understanding soldiers’ mutiny in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency fight","authors":"Patrick Afamefune Ikem, Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha, H. C. Edeh, O. Ononogbu, Chukwuemeka Enyiazu","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2101331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2101331","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the commencement of the counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram, the Nigerian Army has been faced with internal crises, such as corruption, poor welfare conditions for soldiers, among others, which have undermined efforts at defeating the insurgents. Military authorities have both down-played and denied these internal challenges. The result is frequent mutiny by soldiers. This paper examines the drivers, dynamics, and responses to mutiny within the Nigeria Army in the context of ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) operation in the northeast. Anchored on the analytical framework of Tactical Communication Strategy, the paper contends that resort to mutiny is a strategy by soldiers to open up dialogue with the military authority and communicate to the public the internal factors that account for battlefield failures. Hence, the paper recommends that soldiers’ welfare be given high priority rather than resort to punitive measures.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47436591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Party system change and internal security: evidence from India, 2005-2021","authors":"Subhasis Ray","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2098662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2098662","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Has the consolidation of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the dominant party at the national level since the 2014 Lok Sabha election affected internal security outcomes in India? This question assumes particular significance because of the primacy accorded to the use of force in the BJP’s counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. Using sub-national data on insurgency-related fatalities from 2005–2021, I examine whether states where the BJP received the largest share of votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha election subsequently experienced any significant changes in the pattern of fatalities. Implementing a difference-in-difference econometric specification, I show that the BJP states experienced a relatively sharper decline in security force fatalities from pre-2014 compared to non-BJP states. However, there was no such effect on civilian fatalities or the total number of insurgency-related incidents. Taken together, these findings show that the greater thrust towards militarism in COIN strategy under the BJP, has, paradoxically, increased the security of military/police personnel involved in COIN operations, without commensurate changes in the security of those whom they are mandated to defend.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42162964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal allegiances in nineteenth-century China’s southern borderland insurgencies","authors":"L. Vu","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2098663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2098663","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A coalition of Chinese, Vietnamese, and French authorities spent much of 1878–1879 putting down a thousands-strong revolt led by Li Yangcai, an officer dismissed from the Guangxi provincial army. Using Chinese and Vietnamese court records, newspapers, and memoirs, I argue that the Li Yangcai rebellion and the imperial reactions, albeit ephemeral and limited compared to other revolts and their responses in the tumultuous nineteenth century, underline the crucial element of personal connections in borderland insurgencies during the last decades of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Literature on these figures highlights how personal circumstances, particularistic connections, and the borderland setting played a key role in facilitating the growth of these small but influential insurgencies. My examination of Li Yangcai, focusing on similar elements, contributes to the growing scholarship on limited wars. Additionally, I show how the state, in addition to using official bureaucratic channels, relied on personal relationships with influential characters in the local communities to suppress the rebels. I demonstrate not only how people behaved within institutional constraints but also how the state incorporated personal ties into its institutional arsenal.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41724054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Peace suspended by a sword: honor & justifications of violence in Breaker Morant","authors":"J. Potter","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2098666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2098666","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Breaker Morant dramatizes the historical trial of a trio of Australian lieutenants who were court-martialed for executing unarmed prisoners during the Second Boer War. The midpoint turned culmination of New Australian Cinema, this film serves as an instructive case study in how soldiers justify harsh acts of violence to themselves and others. The primary mouthpieces for such explanations are the title character and the defense attorney, Major Thomas. This article argues that these justifications are rooted in factors that both men cite repeatedly – the conduct of the enemy, the chain of command, and the nature of the conflict itself.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49501942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pastoralist, farmers and desertification induced conflict in North Central and Southern Nigeria","authors":"I. Bello, Sophie Kazibwe","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2061149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2061149","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74036118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tribal mobilisation during the Syrian civil war: the case of al-Baqqer brigade","authors":"Haian Dukhan","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2069970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2069970","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As a result of the debilitating situation that the Syrian state reached during the Syrian Civil War, the government relies heavily on paramilitary groups to confront security challenges. Existing studies imply that all the paramilitary groups in Syria were formed in a largely top-down process. Focusing on the rise of al-Baqqer Brigade in Syria and relying on a series of in-depth interviews with members of the al-Baggara tribe who make up most of this militia, this paper challenges that assumption. The paper shows that the emergence of tribal militias is principally a grassroots phenomenon stemming from competition over local resources. It argues that the Syrian state has seized this opportunity and outsourced some of its security and counterinsurgency tasks to the group.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44704877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Troops or Tanks? Rethinking COIN mechanization and force employment","authors":"Ryan C. Van Wie, Jacob Walden","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2067431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2067431","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Are some conventional military units better equipped to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations than others? COIN theorists and practitioners disagree about mechanization’s impact on COIN effectiveness. We suggest that mechanization is not the critical determinant of COIN effectiveness. Rather, mechanization’s effects vary based on a unit’s force employment approach within local scope conditions. To test our hypothesis, we explore how mechanization impacts COIN operations in Ramadi and Basra and find that force employment is the critical determinant in COIN effectiveness. We introduce an adaptive force employment hypothesis that outlines how mechanization includes costs to exposing dismounted troops and benefits in information-sharing, conditional on local insurgent strength. This hypothesis suggests that mechanized forces provide significant benefits to counterinsurgents when clearing high strength insurgents, outweighing benefits from dismounted civilian interaction. Following successful clearance operations when government control is increased and insurgent strength is reduced, requirements for armored protection decrease while civilian tips become increasingly important to target remaining insurgents. In the hold and build stages, counterinsurgents can increasingly rely on dismounted troops.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44295802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Operation Intradon in the Musandam,1970-1971: what this counterinsurgency operation says about British military operations in the Arabian Gulf","authors":"A. Yates, G. Hughes","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2022.2066305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2066305","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines Operation Intradon, a covert British counter-insurgency operation in the northern Omani enclave of Musandam. The operation, which ran from December 1970 to March 1971, was driven by the political aim of forcing the Sultan of Oman to take administrative control of this ungoverned enclave. This would then provide protection to the Strait of Hormuz oil route and remove a threat to the process of federating British protected states into what became the United Arab Emirates. We conclude by identifying what the operation says about how British military operations were crafted in Britain’s informal empire in the Gulf.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46419634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}