Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal最新文献

{"title":"An Ethical Framework for Presenting Scientific Results to Policy-Makers","authors":"S. Schroeder","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0002","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Scientists have the ability to influence policy in important ways through how they present their results. Surprisingly, existing codes of scientific ethics have little to say about such choices. I propose that we can arrive at a set of ethical guidelines to govern scientists' presentation of information to policymakers by looking to bioethics: roughly, just as a clinician should aim to promote informed decision-making by patients, a scientist should aim to promote informed decision-making by policymakers. Though this may sound like a natural proposal, I show it offers guidance that conflicts with standard scientific practices. I conclude by considering one cost of the proposal: that it would prevent scientists from acting as advocates in a way that is currently common in certain fields. I accept that the proposal would restrict scientists' political advocacy rights, but argue that the benefits of adopting it—promoting democratic governance—justify the restriction.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"33 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46363026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Editor's Note, March 2022","authors":"S. Harvard, Eric Winsberg, S. Schroeder, Tobias Schönwitz, S. Tresker, D. Howard, A. Omelianchuk","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0000","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between internal/external phases in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a unique epistemic risk, no less significant than inductive risk. We outline the implications of each proposal for current debates in the values in science literature.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"1 - 101 - 103 - 126 - 31 - 33 - 67 - 69 - E-1 - E-12 - E-8 - E-8 - ix - vi - vi - vii"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49448198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Values in Science, Biodiversity Research, and the Problem of Particularity","authors":"Tobias Schönwitz","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0003","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:How to deal with non-epistemic values in science presents a pressing problem for science and society as well as for philosophers of science. In recent years, accounts of democratizing science have been proposed as a possible solution to this. By providing a case study on the establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy comment: Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services comment: (IPBES), I argue that such accounts run into a problem when values are embedded in the general scientific and societal setup to such an extent that they shape the terrain upon which such a democratization needs to take place. I introduce the notion of particularities as manifestations of values in science and state a problem of particularity, posed by the ways in which the interactive dimension of particularities interferes with democratic procedures for resolving value judgements in science. As a possible remedy, I propose enriching accounts of democratizing science by agonistic theories of democracy.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"101 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48564260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Review of Metagnosis: Revelatory Narratives of Health and Identity","authors":"D. Howard","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Danielle Spencer’s book, “Metagnosis: Revelatory Narratives of Health and Identity,” does many things. It is a work of autotheory, putting Spencer’s own embodied narrative in constant conversation with the testimony of others along with a remarkably diverse set of critical and theoretical approaches. In the book, Spencer coins a new term, “metagnosis”, which occurs when one is newly diagnosed in adulthood with a lifelong condition. The book explores Spencer’s own metagnostic experience involving her eyesight along with chronicling the experiences of others to highlight the ways in which newfound knowledge of a diagnosis can in itself transform us. Born with strabismus—“misaligned eyes,” Spencer is practiced at negotiating the meaning of having a non-normative visual experience and presentation. For the most part, growing up with the condition and frequently subjected to medical attention because of it, Spencer remained largely unconcerned about whether or not she saw differently. But, as the book chronicles, in adulthood, after enduring subpar medical treatment and a series of frustrating surgeries, Spencer is additionally diagnosed with a different visual field condition, homonymous hemianopia, that was likely sustained in infancy, but which up until the diagnosis neither she nor her various doctors had detected. Spencer describes how she discovers in her orthoptist’s office that she can see only half of the visual world of each eye. This discovery leads to a deep ambivalence on Spencer’s part—which includes feelings of physical vulnerability, shame that the condition had gone unnoticed for so long, as well as relief for not having to suffer through the stigma and exclusion that may have come with the additional medical diagnosis in childhood. It also leads to a theoretical examination of the limited narrative and theoretical resources that avail us in trying to make sense of such revelatory experiences and the frustrating inexplicability that such transformative experiences can have for others. This intimate narrative approach democratizes theory. As Spencer says near the end of the book, WEB CONTENT ONLY","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"E-1 - E-8"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49457358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unreliable Threats: Conflicts of Interest Disclosure and the Safeguarding of Biomedical Knowledge","authors":"S. Tresker","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0004","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Medical epistemology lately has seen a strengthening of the view that the construction of evidence should be sensitive to the social context in which it is produced. A poignant illustration of this is the undue influence of the pharmaceutical industry on research results and reporting. I challenge a particular application of this view by examining a common practice in the medical and scientific community: mandatory author disclosure of conflicts of interest (COIs) in published articles. In illustrating problems with COI disclosure policies in biomedical publishing, including unappreciated shortcomings of the scant empirical data supporting mandatory disclosure, I hope to demonstrate that the value given to journal COI disclosure policies as a way to protect the reliability of medical evidence might well be misplaced. Rather than extract away the \"messy\" details of the real world, the analysis is ultimately more responsive to how medical knowledge is produced and disseminated.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"103 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49488258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Medicalization, Contributory Injustice, and Mad Studies.","authors":"Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0023","DOIUrl":"10.1353/ken.2022.0023","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>One recent body of work has concerned medicalization and how it can create epistemic injustice. It focuses on medicalization as a hermeneutical process that shapes the conceptual framework(s) we use to refer to some conditions/experiences. In parallel, some scholars with lived experience of madness have started to explore the epistemic harms suffered by the Mad community. Building on this, I argue that the process of medicalization in psychiatry affects the Mad community in a specific way that has been overlooked in the literature on medicalization and epistemic injustice. That is, medicalization can create what is called \"contributory injustice.\" This form of injustice occurs when marginalized communities have been able to create alternative hermeneutical resources, but these resources are dismissed or discredited by the dominant group. I argue that the emerging field of Mad Studies is a victim of this type of injustice when Mad experiences are unilaterally medicalized.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"401-434"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45682080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Editor's Note June 2022.","authors":"Quill Kukla","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 2","pages":"vii-ix"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40491548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"\"White, Fat, and Racist\": Racism and Environmental Accounts of Obesity.","authors":"Megan Dean, Nabina Liebow","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0024","DOIUrl":"10.1353/ken.2022.0024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper offers a novel argument for the claim that \"environmental\" explanations of obesity meant to help address racial health disparities may actually reinforce racism. While some contend that these explanations reinforce racist and sizeist interracial dynamics, we argue that environmental explanations can bolster intraracial hierarchies of whiteness that reinforce white supremacy. Deployments of environmental accounts in contexts like the U.S. invoke and intertwine two damaging dichotomies: the \"good fatty/bad fatty\" and the \"good white person/bad white person.\" This supports a cultural system that oppresses people of color and enables thin, white proponents to position themselves as \"good white people\" against those who deploy racist, moralizing accounts of obesity, and against fat white people, who are implicitly framed as morally inferior. This analysis furthers our understanding of racist and sizeist discourse about fatness and the insidious ways that attempts to address racism can reinforce it.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 1","pages":"435-461"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44999284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Suffering in Animal Research: The Need for Limits and the Possibility of Compensation.","authors":"David Wendler","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0019","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Guidelines and regulations for medical research recognize that the experiences of humans and animals both matter morally. They thus set a presumption against harming research subjects, whether humans or animals, and mandate that the harms subjects experience should be the minimal necessary for achieving the scientific aims of the study. Beyond this, guidelines and regulations place upper limits on the extent to which human, but not animal, subjects may be harmed. They also mandate that human, but not animal, subjects should be compensated for the harms they experience. In this article, I argue that this common approach to regulating medical research is mistaken. In particular, there are upper limits on the extent to which animals may ethically be harmed in order to collect data to benefit others, and there are moral reasons to compensate them for the harms they experience. I conclude that guidelines and regulations for research with animals should be revised accordingly.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 3","pages":"297-311"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10103024/pdf/nihms-1885476.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9652567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Epistemic Equality: Distributive Epistemic Justice in the Context of Justification.","authors":"Boaz Miller,&nbsp;Meital Pinto","doi":"10.1353/ken.2022.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2022.0011","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality. We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to be justly distributed among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"32 2","pages":"173-203"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40491550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}