Philosophical Explorations最新文献_第4页

On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action 论无差别身体行为的自我归属

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021

Víctor M. Verdejo

引用次数: 0

Motivation reasons, responses and the Taking Condition 动机原因、反应与接受条件

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-02-10 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2172202

Jean Moritz Müller

引用次数: 1

Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa 自我疾病模糊和神经性厌食症

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2168033

Anna Drożdżowicz

引用次数: 0

On the immediate mental antecedent of action 基于行动的直接心理前因

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2160875

Michael Omoge

引用次数: 0

Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality 积极幻觉与实体理性和结构理性的规范性

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2160876

T. Ho

引用次数: 0

How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova 如何克服成瘾中的自我疾病模糊:理解一个人的成瘾，而不是仅仅拒绝它。这是对麦康奈尔和戈洛娃的回复

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-11-27 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2140186

A. Snoek

{"title":"How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova","authors":"A. Snoek","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2140186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2140186","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT McConnell and Golova [2022. “Narrative, Addiction, and Three Aspects of Self-Ambiguity.” Philosophical Explorations. doi:10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532] argue that people with addiction often struggle to recover because there is a conflict between their self-narrative of ‘hopeless addict’ and their evaluative judgment that they value recovery. They add ‘narrative ambiguity’ as a third source of self-ambiguity, next to essential characteristics/embodiment and values/judgments. I argue that McConnell and Golova [2022. “Narrative, Addiction, and Three Aspects of Self-Ambiguity.” Philosophical Explorations. doi:10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532] pay insufficient attention to how a self-narrative of ‘hopeless addict’ is formed. This hopeless script is not a given narrative, but emerges due to conflicts in the other two sources of self-ambiguity: long-term addiction changes embodiment, and results in the experience that people fail to let their behaviour be guided by their values. Hence, they label themselves hopeless and not able to recover. In that sense, narrative ambiguity is not simply a third source of self-ambiguity, but is both a standalone source, as an organizing principle that tries to make sense of conflicts in the other sources of self-ambiguity. To overcome this narrative ambiguity, it is important to make sense of one’s addiction, rather than experiencing it as simply alienating. I give some examples of how people manage to do this: to incorporate their years of addiction into their life story without identifying with it in a hopeless manner.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"86 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44633551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Know thyself: bipolar disorder and self-concept 了解你自己:双相情感障碍和自我概念

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-11-21 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2147982

Sidney Carls-Diamante

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引用次数: 2

‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge “成为我是什么样的”:从偏执和投射到同情和自知之明

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-11-19 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2146160

L. Braddock

{"title":"‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge","authors":"L. Braddock","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2146160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2146160","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Projection does not reliably serve cognition; it all too often contributes to failures of knowledge. Our projecting not only imaginatively misrepresents the world by attributing a feature of ourself to it. In doing so it can misrepresent us as lacking that feature. It is an act of the imagination which re-locates unwanted attributes into a motivated misrepresentation which distorts our grasp of reality and of ourselves. The imaginative act itself is not consciously intended so that we take the resulting picture at face value, despite the distortion. Without a strong reason to question this misperception the projection remains undetected and the misrepresentation affects our relations to others. Projection serving motivated self-deception thus evades correction. Realistic self-knowledge becomes possible through psychoanalysis when the patient's projections are received by the analyst as communications impinging on her capacity for sympathy. I show how the psychology of sympathy we find in Hume and Smith provides a philosophical frame of reference for understanding this interaction between sympathy and projection. I bring sympathy together with contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to explain how psychoanalytic interpretation engages with this interaction to reduce the effects of projection and enable a self-knowledge grounded in the subject's own experience of herself.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"254 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45419549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Grief, alienation, and the absolute alterity of death 悲伤，疏离，和死亡的绝对交替

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-10-31 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2137568

E. Hughes

引用次数: 1

Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy 欲望，想象，和感性的类比

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-10-19 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2136397

Kael McCormack

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引用次数: 1