Philosophical Explorations最新文献

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Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)? 情绪对道德判断是必要和充分的吗(它会告诉我们什么)?
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-11 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2121848
Daniel Eggers
{"title":"Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?","authors":"Daniel Eggers","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2121848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2121848","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The eighteenth century debate between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists has seen a striking renaissance in the past decades, not least because of research into the nature of moral judgement conducted by empirical scientists such as social and developmental psychologists and neuroscientists. A claim that is often made in the current discussion is that the evidence made available by such empirical investigations refutes rationalist conceptions of moral judgement and vindicates the views of Hume or other moral sentimentalists. For example, Jesse Prinz and Hanno Sauer have recently argued that the available data demonstrates that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgement and that the best or the only way to make sense of these findings is to conclude that moral judgements are constituted by emotions. The aim of this paper is to thoroughly examine this argument and the underlying empirical evidence and to show that there is currently no compelling evidence for the truth of either the necessity or the sufficiency thesis and that, even if both theses were true, they would fail to provide a sound basis for a plausible sentimentalist constitution claim.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"214 - 233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46880379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity 叙事、成瘾和自我模糊的三个方面
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-04 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532
Doug McConnell, A. Golova
{"title":"Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity","authors":"Doug McConnell, A. Golova","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘Self-ambiguity’, we suggest, is best understood as an uncertainty about how strongly a given feature reflects who one truly is. When this understanding of self-ambiguity is applied to a view of the self as having both essential and shapable components, self-ambiguity can be seen to have two aspects: (1) uncertainty about one's essential or relatively unchangeable characteristics, e.g. one's sexuality, and (2) uncertainty about how to shape oneself, e.g. which values to commit to, actions to pursue, or essential features to identify with. We explain how a narrative account of agency can accommodate these forms of self-ambiguity and argue that such an account also reveals another kind of self-ambiguity, namely, (3) uncertainty about whether one's established self-narrative represents who one really is. We illustrate this third form of self-ambiguity in the context of addiction where people's established addiction self-narratives make it difficult to identify with recovery. We argue that recovery will require embracing, especially, our third form of self-ambiguity as a chance for positive self-transformation. Treatment for addiction should, therefore, support people in going through and ultimately narratively resolving the inevitable self-ambiguities of the recovery process.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"66 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46546013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement 他律缺失导致的自我异化:丧亲之痛案例
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2051590
A. Køster
{"title":"Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement","authors":"A. Køster","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2051590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2051590","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Losing an intimate other to death belongs to the most uprooting experiences in human life. Not only is it accompanied by a range of negative emotions such as sorrow, longing, anger etc., but profound grief is a limit experience that causes a rupture in the sense of self of the bereaved. This experience is often expressed in identity statements such as ‘I no longer feel like myself’ or ‘I am missing part of myself’. Although such experiences are richly reported in empirical studies on grief and implemented in diagnostic criteria for pathological grief, their experiential meaning is largely left unexplored. In this article, I suggest that being bereaved of an intimate other is self-alienating because our sense of self is a distributed phenomenon relying on daily confirmation through interaction with our habitual environment. When our lives are intertwined with intimate others, this habitual identity become a dyadic structure, relying on a heteronomy. Being bereaved of this intimate other leads to a profound impoverishment of the habituated sense of self, leading to self-alienation. Finally, I discuss the process of returning to a non-alienating state and suggest that this is not exclusively a cognitive process, but equally an embodied process of appropriating a habitual identity.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"386 - 401"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49302105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Extending knowledge-how 延长知道
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2116090
Gloria Andrada
{"title":"Extending knowledge-how","authors":"Gloria Andrada","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2116090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2116090","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge-how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge-how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails to properly distinguish between cognitive outsourcing and extended knowing-how. I then introduce a solution to this problem which rests on the distribution of tasks between agent and non-biological entity. On closer inspection, I show that this solution is ultimately unsatisfactory, though its failure is instructive as it illuminates the important role played by an agent’s skilled interaction with an external entity. Drawing on key anti-intellectualist ideas, as well as on insight from cognitive psychology, I propose an account according to which what ultimately matters for extending knowledge-how is whether a hybrid ability is self-regulated. In closing, I illuminate the practical value of extended knowledge-how vis-à-vis cognitive outsourcing.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"197 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47622337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation 自我植入歧义?理解脑深部刺激中的自我相关变化
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2065342
R. Bluhm, L. Cabrera
{"title":"Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation","authors":"R. Bluhm, L. Cabrera","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2065342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2065342","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Deep brain stimulation (DBS) uses electrodes implanted in the brain to modulate dysregulated brain activity related to a variety of neurological and psychiatric conditions. A number of people who use DBS have reported changes that affect their sense of self. In the neuroethics literature, there has been significant debate over the exact nature of these changes. More recently, there have been suggestions that this debate is overblown and detracts from clinically-relevant ways of understanding these effects of DBS. In this paper, we offer an alternative approach to understanding the effects of DBS on the self, drawing on John Sadler’s work on self-illness ambiguity. We argue that self-illness ambiguity is a complex concept, with at least three different aspects, and that each of the three aspects we identify also characterizes one kind of DBS-related change. Our analysis also suggests ways of helping patients to adjust to life as a DBS user.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"367 - 385"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45466214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility 精神病小说与责任叙事
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2116473
S. Wilkinson
{"title":"Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility","authors":"S. Wilkinson","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2116473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2116473","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I explore the relationship between psychiatric fictionalism and the attribution of moral responsibility. My central claim is as follows. If one is a psychiatric fictionalist, one should also strongly consider being a fictionalist about responsibility. This results in the ‘intrinsic view’, namely, the view that mental illness does not just happen to interfere with moral responsibility: that interference is an intrinsic part of the narrative. I end by discussing three illustrative examples.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"91 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46721839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency 道德侵占与统一代理的理想
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-08-25 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2115533
Cory Davia
{"title":"Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency","authors":"Cory Davia","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2115533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2115533","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to the moral encroachment thesis, moral features of a situation can affect not just what we’re practically justified in doing but also what we’re epistemically justified in believing. This paper offers a new rationale for that thesis, drawing on observations about the role of reflection in agency.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"179 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47873269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker 强迫性复查者的多嘴多舌
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2111454
Juliette Vazard
{"title":"The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker","authors":"Juliette Vazard","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2111454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2111454","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Incessant checking is undeniably problematic from a practical point of view. But what is epistemically wrong with checking again (and again)? The starting assumption for this paper is that establishing what goes wrong when individuals check their stove ten times in a row requires understanding the nature of the doxastic attitude that compulsive re-checkers are in, as they go back to perform another check. Does the re-checker know that the stove is off, and is thus looking for more of what she already has (Whitcomb, D. 2010. “Curiosity was Framed.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 664–687.)? Or is she an inquirer who repeatedly loses her knowledge and finds herself inquiring again and again into the same question (Friedman, J. 2019. “Checking Again.” Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 84–96.)? I present what I see as the three main hypotheses currently available, and propose a refinement to Taylor's ‘what-if questioning’ account (2020).","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"45 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48596728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration 论中断的重要性:转型经验与叙事过程
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-08-04 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2099564
Line Ryberg Ingerslev
{"title":"On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration","authors":"Line Ryberg Ingerslev","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2099564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2099564","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this comment, I argue that transformative experiences such as experiences of grief often imply a break in one's coherent, non-fictional and biographical narratives and practical identities. The nature of these breaks is of a certain kind, as they interrupt even the process of narration. To insist that the process of narration as well as the narratives themselves belong to one and the same process of adjustment in transformative experiences such as grief might overlook the importance of such breaks, namely that the contain a moment of refusal and revolting against mourning. The tension involved in such breaks might not allow to be circumscribed into narratives nor do they fit into the process of narration as a destabilizing moment; the breaks insist on the incomprehensibility of each loss and they remain part of what it means to survive and to undergo transformative experiences.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"338 - 342"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41864463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’ Selves被劫持:“自我疾病模糊”中的情感和人格
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2093393
Anna Bortolan
{"title":"Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’","authors":"Anna Bortolan","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2093393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2093393","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affects – i.e. moods or existential feelings – alterations of which are often present in mental ill-health. Also through the exploration of the phenomenology of acute and long-term anxiety, I suggest that self-illness ambiguity originates in the presence of moods or existential feelings that are in tension with the ones that structure the person’s experience prior to the onset of the illness or when its symptoms are not experienced. More specifically, I claim that due to their ability to ‘block’ or ‘suspend’ some of the person’s affective and cognitive responses, such affective orientations may unsettle one’s self-defining evaluative perspective, leading to uncertainty and doubting about one’s personal self.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"343 - 362"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49145497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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