Philosophical Explorations最新文献_第6页

Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will 为什么造成差异的心理因果关系不能拯救自由意志

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-22 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2100458

Alva Stråge

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引用次数: 0

My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash 我的病，我的自我和我:当自我叙述和疾病叙述发生冲突

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-11 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2097300

Ş. Tekin

引用次数: 0

Self-illness ambiguity, affectivity, and affordances 自我疾病的模糊性、情感性和可视性

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2094999

M. Maiese

引用次数: 0

Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them 通过自我描述来权威地表达你的想象

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-06-12 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2086995

Benjamin Winokur

引用次数: 0

Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity 集体道德能动性与自我诱导的道德无能

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-06-12 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2086994

Niels de Haan

引用次数: 5

Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’ 评论“感觉不像自己有什么特别的”?”

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-06-10 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2077978

M. Schechtman

引用次数: 0

Grief, self and narrative 悲伤、自我和叙事

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-05-11 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2070241

M. Ratcliffe, E. A. Byrne

引用次数: 13

What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity “感觉不像自己”有什么特别之处?对自我(疾病)模棱两可的紧缩描述

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-22 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2051592

Roy Dings, L. D. De Bruin

{"title":"What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity","authors":"Roy Dings, L. D. De Bruin","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2051592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2051592","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article provides a conceptualization of self(-illness) ambiguity and investigates to what extent self(-illness) ambiguity is ‘special’. First, we draw on empirical findings to argue that self-ambiguity is a ubiquitous phenomenon. We suggest that these findings are best explained by a multidimensional account, according to which selves consist of various dimensions that mutually affect each other. On such an account, any change to any particular self-aspect may change other self-aspects and thereby alter the overall structural pattern of self-aspects, potentially leading to self-ambiguity. Second, we propose that self-ambiguity comes in degrees and should be understood as a spectrum (as opposed to there being qualitative differences among instances of self-ambiguity). Third, we argue that complexity is the most useful dimension to organize cases of self-ambiguity, with mundane instances of self-ambiguity on the one end and self-illness ambiguity on the other end of the spectrum. Fourth, we address the promises and perils of narrativity with regard to self-ambiguity. Finally, we link our deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity to pattern theories of self.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"269 - 289"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41729869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation? 休谟的动机理论有多简单？

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-17 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2051591

Olof Leffler

引用次数: 1

Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery 解决自身疾病的模糊性：构建重发现的案例

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-17 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2051589

Sofia M. I. Jeppsson

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引用次数: 2