Philosophical Explorations最新文献_第7页

Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance 意志的困难与品质:对道德无知的启示

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-10 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2042585

Anna Hartford

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引用次数: 2

Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (β) 再次回顾McKay和Johnson的反例(β)

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-28 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2034917

Pedro Merlussi

引用次数: 1

Can realists reason with reasons? 现实主义者能用理由推理吗?

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-27 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2042587

C. Kietzmann

引用次数: 1

Then again, what is manipulation? A broader view of a much-maligned concept 再说一遍，什么是操纵？对一个备受诟病的概念的更广泛的看法

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-27 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2042586

A. Fischer

引用次数: 2

How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority? 你将如何回答这个问题？信仰的性格分析能解释第一人称权威吗？

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-17 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2033818

Nicole Rathgeb

引用次数: 0

Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions 不安和实际决策的意向性

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-10 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2033819

E. Coffman

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引用次数: 0

Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology 为什么（获得）承认（权利）的现象学对认识论很重要

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-01-07 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.2021275

Hagit Benbaji

引用次数: 0

On the fittingness of agential evaluations 论代理评价的拟合性

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2021-12-17 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.2009547

R. Keller

{"title":"On the fittingness of agential evaluations","authors":"R. Keller","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.2009547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.2009547","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them. Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations: admiration casts people in a completely positive light, while contempt casts aspersion on them. Therefore, insofar as they lack the capacity for nuance, these emotions are systematically unfitting and misleading. This paper discusses this objection as originally formulated by John Doris as well as Macalester Bell’s response. Drawing from research on emotional intentionality, it will be argued that Doris’ and Bell’s accounts are respectively misguided criticisms and inadequate defences of these emotions. Their mistake lies in an invalid transition from the claim that these emotions are intentionally directed towards persons to the claim that they deliver global evaluations of those towards whom they are directed. By rejecting this inference, it will be shown that these emotions can deliver nuanced and fitting evaluations in a way Doris’ objection overlooks and Bell’s response precludes us from articulating.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"25 1","pages":"251 - 268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46505400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Skepticism about reasons for emotions 对情绪原因的怀疑

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1989477

H. Naar

引用次数: 3

Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception 无能的感知者，可分辨的幻觉和知觉现象学。知觉活动观的几个问题

IF 0.6 3区哲学

Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2021-10-14 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1985598

Alfonso Anaya

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引用次数: 0