{"title":"Towards a theory of offense","authors":"A. Sneddon","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42891338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice","authors":"Jonathan J. Hall","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44423120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What do my problems say about me?","authors":"S. de Haan","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2205416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2205416","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘If I experience X, is it because of the illness, the medication, or is it ‘just me’?’ (Karp 2009) [Is it me or my Meds? Living with Antidepressants. Harvard University Press]. This issue is known as self-illness ambiguity (SIA) (Sadler 2007) [\"The Psychiatric Significance of the Personal Self.\" Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 70 (2): 113–129]. In her paper Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-concept, Carls-Diamante (2022) [“Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-Concept.” Philosophical Explorations, 1–17] offers a taxonomy of different ways in which Bipolar Disorder can be related to one’s self and self-concept. In contrast to the essentialist model of mental disorders she seems to adopt, I propose a different outlook on SIA, following an enactive approach to psychiatric disorders as disorders of sense-making. One’s way of making sense of the world and/or oneself can become stuck in a rigid pattern that is stronger than oneself and at odds with how one would want to be. I argue that it is helpful to distinguish between the experiential SIA of specific experiences (Am I over/underreacting?) and the long term concerns of existential SIA (How to live my life in accordance with what matters to me despite/while having certain vulnerabilities?). I conclude that knowing oneself is not an intra-individual matter, nor primarily a matter of reflection: it is rather a relational and material practice of trying to live your life in accordance with what matters to you.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"159 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46993625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editorial: self-illness ambiguity and narrative identity","authors":"Roy Dings, L. D. De Bruin","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2203709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2203709","url":null,"abstract":"Although the concept of self-illness ambiguity is relatively new, the phenomenon is not. It seems likely that people have struggled with the oftentimes ambiguous relation between themselves and their illness ever since the dawn of modern (mental) health care. It is therefore exciting, both from a philosophical as well as clinical point of view, that the concept of self-illness ambiguity is increasingly gaining attention. The history of this concept can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, when qualitative research started to elucidate how complex the relation between ‘self’ and ‘illness’ is from the perspective of the diagnosed individual (see e.g. Estroff 1989; Estroff et al. 1991). Sociologist David Karp coined the term ‘illness ambiguity’ (e.g. Karp 1992, 1994) to explicate the confusion that often arose when psychiatric patients tried to clarify this relation. Psychiatrist John Sadler, drawing on some of this pioneering qualitative research, offered the first philosophical analysis of this phenomenon and coined the term ‘self-illness ambiguity’ to underscore that both sides of the relation are complex and may as such contribute to the ambiguity of the self-illness relation (Sadler 2003, 2007). Recent years have also witnessed a renewed interest in the ‘self’ in the context of psychiatry, not only because of theoretical considerations (e.g. Tekin 2019), but also because of developing trends in mental health care, such as recovery-oriented care, self-management and person-centered care (e.g. Glas 2019; Slors and Strijbos 2020). This in turn has led to a renewed interest in the phenomenon of self-illness ambiguity (e.g. Dings 2020; Dings and Glas 2020). However, there are still various questions about and domains of self-illness ambiguity that demand further consideration. This special issue seeks to facilitate and focus the debates surrounding these questions and to further philosophical and empirical investigations into key domains of self-illness ambiguity.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"147 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49030858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dimensions of self-illness ambiguity – a clinical and conceptual approach","authors":"G. Glas","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2199013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2199013","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article investigates the concept of self-illness ambiguity (SIA), which was recently re-introduced in the philosophy of psychiatry literature. SIA refers to situations in which patients are uncertain about whether features (symptoms, signs) of their illness should be attributed to their illness or to their ‘selves’. Identification of these features belongs to a more encompassing process of self- definition and -interpretation. The paper introduces a distinction between the notions of self-relatedness, self-referentiality (or: implicit self-signification), self-awareness and self-interpretation. Each of these notions offers a different perspective on SIA, but these perspectives do not exclude one another. A further distinction will be developed between primary, secondary and tertiary forms of self-referentiality. The practical and conceptual relevance of these distinctions will be illustrated with case vignettes. Throughout the paper our findings will placed in the context of other philosophical work on the self, especially in the field of narrative theory (Ricoeur), phenomenology (Ratcliffe) and philosophy of mind. The article closes with a brief discussion about the appropriateness of the term ambiguity and the potential of SIA as concept in the context of clinical psychiatry. Directions for future work will be indicated.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"165 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48819645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Empirical imperatives in understanding self-related changes","authors":"Fredric Gilbert, Joel Smith","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2185660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2185660","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Bluhm and Cabrera advance that Sadler’s ‘Archimedean point’ is an example of integration of sub-perspectives by an overall self, as such a self who may be reconciled and understood to be caused by DBS systems. Although this suggests great avenues to explore, we stress that the Archimedean viewpoint is strictly bound to a metaphorical domain. We argue that what is needed to help (prospective) DBS patients is not a metaphorical viewpoint, but a scientific viewpoint, rooted in empirical evidence.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"155 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43889396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is the relationship between grief and narrative?","authors":"R. Fabry","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2183241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2183241","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49593125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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