{"title":"Wide computationalism revisited: distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability","authors":"Luke Kersten","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2024.2332171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2332171","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen a surge of interest in applying mechanistic thinking to computational accounts of implementation and individuation. One recent extension of this work involves so-called ‘wide...","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140297986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions","authors":"Xavier Castellà","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2024.2309402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2309402","url":null,"abstract":"It is a widely-held thesis that the content of intentions can be characterized in terms of the truth of a proposition. In this paper I try to reject this idea. First, I argue that, at least for ord...","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139910297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’","authors":"Tom Frankfort","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2291583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2291583","url":null,"abstract":"Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and...","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139465232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism","authors":"Marcela Herdova","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2259403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2259403","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism.KEYWORDS: Compatibilismincompatibilismmoral responsibilitydeterminism AcknowledgmentsFirst and foremost, I would like to thank Stephen Kearns for his comments on many drafts of this paper. I am also very grateful to Randy Clarke, Al Mele, Thomas Reed, and the two anonymous referees for helping me improve the paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 Some further direct arguments for compatibilism include the Paradigm Case argument (Flew Citation1955) and its semantic counterpart (Turner Citation2013), the Mind argument (Hobart Citation1934), and the defense and developments of new dispositionalism (Clarke and Reed Citation2015). Though such arguments are often for the compatibility of free will and determinism, minor adjustments can make them arguments for the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism.2 If moral responsibility requires free will (which is extremely plausible), this paper also serves as an argument that compatibilism about free will is true. I shall not explore this idea further in what follows.3 When I say that Sam is more praiseworthy for donating blood than Dean is for stealing it, I do not mean to claim that Dean is praiseworthy to any (positive) degree, though this may often be conversationally implicated by such a comparison (but I do not think it is entailed). The important point is that there is a difference between Sam and Dean with respect to their praiseworthiness. While Sam is praiseworthy to some (positive) degree, Dean is not. I take this to entail that Sam is more praiseworthy than Dean (which is precisely why I formulate my claims in this way).If one disagrees that there is any such entailment, my point can be expressed differently (though slightly more verbosely): Sam is praiseworthy to a degree greater than any degree, if there is any, to which Dean is praiseworthy. This claim is certainly entailed by the fact that Sam is praiseworthy to some positive degree and Dean is not. The same basic point applies to blameworthiness, guilt, desert, etc., mutatis mutandis. See also endnote 6 for a similar issue regarding the below equality theses. Thank you to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to these issues.4 One may take fittingness (like truth) to be something that doesn’t come in degrees. Perhaps surpri","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136130058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies","authors":"Harold Langsam","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2237976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2237976","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43445498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts","authors":"A. Hossein Khani","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2232798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2232798","url":null,"abstract":"A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal or cognitively ideal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson’s view is much closer to a non-reductionist First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account. (2) Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts; the notion of an interpreter still plays an essential role in the latter ones.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48795517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry","authors":"M. Salcedo-Gómez, C. García","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2229858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2229858","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45801980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A moral freedom to which we might aspire","authors":"A. Eshleman","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2227202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2227202","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49093045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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