{"title":"关于我们普通意图的非命题内容","authors":"Xavier Castellà","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2024.2309402","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It is a widely-held thesis that the content of intentions can be characterized in terms of the truth of a proposition. In this paper I try to reject this idea. First, I argue that, at least for ord...","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions\",\"authors\":\"Xavier Castellà\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13869795.2024.2309402\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It is a widely-held thesis that the content of intentions can be characterized in terms of the truth of a proposition. In this paper I try to reject this idea. First, I argue that, at least for ord...\",\"PeriodicalId\":46014,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophical Explorations\",\"volume\":\"38 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophical Explorations\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2309402\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Explorations","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2309402","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions
It is a widely-held thesis that the content of intentions can be characterized in terms of the truth of a proposition. In this paper I try to reject this idea. First, I argue that, at least for ord...