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Understanding dogwhistles politics 理解狗哨政治
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-06-08 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.22510
José Ramón Torices
{"title":"Understanding dogwhistles politics","authors":"José Ramón Torices","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.22510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.22510","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to deepen our understanding of so-called covert dogwhistles.  I discuss whether a covert dogwhistle is a specific sort of mechanism of manipulation or whether, on the contrary, it draws on other already familiar linguistic mechanisms such as implicatures or presuppositions. I put forward a series of arguments aimed at illustrating that implicatures and presuppositions, on the one hand, and covert dogwhistles, on the other, differ in their linguistic behaviour concerning plausible deniability, cancellability, calculability and mutual acceptance. I concluded this paper by outlining a simple theory for covert dogwhistles according to which they are attitude-foregrounders.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75587942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Adolfo García de la Sienra. 2019. A Structuralist Theory of Economics
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-05-01 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.22653
D. Serrano
{"title":"Adolfo García de la Sienra. 2019. A Structuralist Theory of Economics","authors":"D. Serrano","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.22653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.22653","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81875460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Predictive coding and the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability 预测性编码和认知穿透性的强命题
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-03-22 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.21949
Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa
{"title":"Predictive coding and the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability","authors":"Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.21949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.21949","url":null,"abstract":": In this paper, I discuss the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability (CPs), to wit, that the perceptual states (P) of a subject (S) are pervasively influenced, affected, or caused by cognitive factors (C) as expectations, memories, thoughts, goals, and so on, at all levels of perceptual processing. I argue that following the predictive coding models of perception (PC), the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability is to be expected.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73787495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Defending the motivational theory of desire 捍卫欲望的动机理论
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-03-17 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.21489
David Pineda-Oliva
{"title":"Defending the motivational theory of desire","authors":"David Pineda-Oliva","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.21489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.21489","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I offer a defense of the motivational theory of desire. According to the motivational view, a desire is basically a disposition to bring about the desire’s content. First, I argue that two rival views on the nature of desire, the evaluative theory and the deontic theory, fall prey to the problem of the death of desire and that, when one tries to develop a plausible version of these theories which is able to overcome this problem, one ends up with a view that is not relevantly different from the evaluative view. Second, I respond to some objections to the claim that motivations are sufficient for desire, namely, the Radioman objection and the objection that some motivational states like intentions and habits are not desires. ","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74680000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
No matter who: What makes one a relativist? 不管是谁:是什么让一个人成为相对主义者?
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-03-13 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.22067
Eduardo Pérez-Navarro
{"title":"No matter who: What makes one a relativist?","authors":"Eduardo Pérez-Navarro","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.22067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.22067","url":null,"abstract":"As part of her argument that relativism and contextualism are nothing but notational variants of each other, Stojanovic holds that contextualism is flexible enough to achieve whatever relativism might do if the matter is what truth-value is assigned to each pair of sentence and context. In this paper, I reply to this statement by arguing that contextualism cannot be made as flexible as relativism without in fact turning it into a version of relativism. The key to my response to Stojanovic is that, while relativism relativizes utterance truth, contextualism does not, so parameters that are not fixed at the context of utterance will be accessible for the relativist, but not for the contextualist. Although the relativity of utterance truth follows as soon as propositional truth is relativized to contexts of assessment, as the relativist does, it is easy to lose sight of this fact if we identify the context of assessment with the  assessor’s context . Hence, the point of this paper is that the difference between relativism and contextualism is not one as to whose parameters play a role in determining the sentence’s truth-value. If it were, contextualism could indeed be made just as flexible as relativism.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77753000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Mechanisms, good and bad 机制，有好有坏
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.21757
H. Kincaid
{"title":"Mechanisms, good and bad","authors":"H. Kincaid","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.21757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.21757","url":null,"abstract":"The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) mechanisms that are horizontal – between cause and effect – and mechanisms that are vertical – they realize in lower-level terms causal properties –: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of causal claims. The paper shows that mechanisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context, using the now standard graphical causal structure framework. These conclusions also support the larger philosophy of science moral that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empirical, not a priori and universal.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90172166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Fictionalism and Meinongianism 虚构主义和迈农主义
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-02-16 DOI: 10.1387/theoria.21727
Nathaniel Gan
{"title":"Fictionalism and Meinongianism","authors":"Nathaniel Gan","doi":"10.1387/theoria.21727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21727","url":null,"abstract":"Fictionalism about a kind of disputed object is often motivated by the fact that the view interprets discourse about those objects literally without an ontological commitment to them. This paper argues that this motivation is inadequate because some viable alternatives to fictionalism have similar attractions. Meinongianism —the view that there are true statements about non-existent objects—is one such view. Meinongianism bears significant similarity to fictionalism, so intuitive doubts about its viability are difficult to sustain for fictionalists. Moreover, Meinongianism avoids some of fictionalism’s weaknesses, thus it is even preferable to fictionalism in some respects.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73600422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Referees for THEORIA (2019-2020) THEORIA (2019-2020)
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-02-16 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.22543
Theoria
{"title":"Referees for THEORIA (2019-2020)","authors":"Theoria","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.22543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.22543","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74300747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Errata in Middle-range theory: Without it what could anyone do? by Nancy Cartwright 中庸理论的勘误表:没有它人们能做什么?南希·卡特赖特著
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-02-16 DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.22542
Theoria
{"title":"Errata in Middle-range theory: Without it what could anyone do? by Nancy Cartwright","authors":"Theoria","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.22542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.22542","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88038464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Discharging the moral responsibility for collective unjust enrichment in the global economy 为全球经济中的集体不正当致富承担道德责任
IF 0.6 4区 哲学
THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2021-02-16 DOI: 10.1387/theoria.21237
F. Corvino, Alberto Pirni
{"title":"Discharging the moral responsibility for collective unjust enrichment in the global economy","authors":"F. Corvino, Alberto Pirni","doi":"10.1387/theoria.21237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21237","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we wonder how a person can discharge the political responsibility for supporting and benefiting from unjust social structures. Firstly, we introduce the concept of structural injustice and defend it against three possible objections: ‘explanatory nationalism’, a diachronic interpretation of the benefits of industry-led growth, being part of a social structure does not automatically mean being responsible for its negative consequences. Then, we hold that both Iris Marion Young’s ‘social connection model’ and Robin Zheng’s ‘role-ideal model’ provide clear indications on how to unload responsibility for supporting/participating in unjust social structures, but fail to explain how to get rid of responsibility for unjust enrichment. We maintain that both models should be complemented with a global redistributive scheme that allows to disgorge the benefits that are unfairly obtained in the global economic system, besides undertaking collective transformative actions and assuming ideal-role responsibilities.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90264549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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