{"title":"Another problem with RBN models of mechanisms","authors":"Alexander Gebharter","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.14502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.14502","url":null,"abstract":"Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson (2011) suggest to model mechanisms by means of recursive Bayesian networks (RBNs) and Clarke, Leuridan, and Williamson (2014) extend their modelling approach to mechanisms featuring causal feedback. One of the main selling points of the RBN approach should be that it provides answers to questions concerning manipulation and control. In this paper I demonstrate that the method to compute the effects of interventions the authors mentioned endorse leads to absurd results under the additional assumption of faithfulness, which can be expected to hold in most RBN models of mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"13 1","pages":"177-188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87000891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Empiricism and Relationism Intertwined: Hume and Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity","authors":"Matias Slavov","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.14846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.14846","url":null,"abstract":"Einstein acknowledged that his reading of Hume influenced the development of his special theory of relativity. In this article, I juxtapose Hume’s philosophy with Einstein’s philosophical analysis related to his special relativity. I argue that there are two common points to be found in their writings, namely an empiricist theory of ideas and concepts, and a relationist ontology regarding space and time. The main thesis of this article is that these two points are intertwined in Hume and Einstein.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"53 1","pages":"247-263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77769564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simplicity, Language-Dependency and the Best System Account of Laws","authors":"Billy Wheeler","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.14558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.14558","url":null,"abstract":"It is often said that the best system account of laws (BSA) needs supplementing with a theory of perfectly natural properties. The ‘strength’ and ‘simplicity’ of a system is language-relative and without a fixed vocabulary it is impossible to compare rival systems. Recently a number of philosophers have attempted to reformulate the BSA in an effort to avoid commitment to natural properties. I assess these proposals and argue that they are problematic as they stand. Nonetheless, I agree with their aim, and show that if simplicity is interpreted as ‘compression’, algorithmic information theory provides a framework for system comparison without the need for natural properties.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"45 1","pages":"189-206"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81794999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"José L. Zalabardo. 2015. Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus","authors":"Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16258","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"4 1","pages":"272-275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85416804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fictional Names and Literary Characters: A Defence of Abstractism","authors":"Eleonora Orlando","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.15193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.15193","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is focused on the abstractist theory of fiction, namely, the semantic theory according to which fictional names refer to abstract entities. Two semantic problems that arise in relation to that position are analysed: the first is the problem of accounting for the intuitive truth of typically fictive uses of statements containing fictional names; the second is the one of explaining some problematic metafictive uses, in particular, the use of intuitively true negative existentials.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"23 1","pages":"143-158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79026132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Andrea Bianchi, ed. 2015. On Reference","authors":"P. Stalmaszczyk","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16252","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"32 1","pages":"267-270"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88457923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La crítica de Leibniz a los números infinitos y su repercusión en la metafísica de los cuerpos","authors":"R. Fazio","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.14935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.14935","url":null,"abstract":"En el trabajo evaluamos el impacto que la critica de Leibniz a los numeros infinitos tiene en el desarrollo de su metafisica de los cuerpos. Luego de exponer el vinculo que el filosofo aleman traza entre el cuerpo, la extension y las cantidades infinitas en su periodo juvenil (1663-1672), analizamos sus reflexiones del periodo parisino sobre las paradojas de los numeros infinitos (1672-1676) y argumentamos que la defensa de la inconsistencia de tales numeros constituye un punto de inflexion en su comprension de los cuerpos y, asimismo, marca el inicio de su ofensiva contra la res extensa .","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"81 1","pages":"159-175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73601756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unification and confirmation","authors":"I. Niiniluoto","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.13084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.13084","url":null,"abstract":"According to the traditional requirement, formulated by William Whewell in his account of the “consilience of inductions” in 1840, a scientific hypothesis should have unifying power in the sense that it explains and predicts several mutually independent phenomena. Variants of this notion of consilience or unification include deductive, inductive, and approximate systematization. Inference from surprising phenomena to their theoretical explanations was called abduction by Charles Peirce. As a unifying theory is independently testable by new kinds of phenomena, it should also receive confirmation from its empirical success. The study of the prospects of probabilistic Bayesianism to motivate this kind of criterion for abductive confirmation is shown to lead to two quite distinct conceptions of unification.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"75 1","pages":"107-123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83779616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Difference making, explanatory relevance, and mechanistic models","authors":"D. Eck, Raoul Gervais","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.13282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.13282","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we consider mechanistic explanations for biological malfunctions. Drawing on Lipton's (1993) work on difference making, we offer three reasons why one should distinguish i) mechanistic features that only make a difference to the malfunction one aims to explain, from ii) features that make a difference to both the malfunction and normal functioning. Recognition of the distinction is important for a) repair pur- poses, b) mechanism discovery, and c) understanding. This analysis extends current mechanistic thinking, which fails to appreciate the distinction. We illustrate our contribution with a case on sleeping disorders as arising from disruptions of circadian rhythms.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"31 1","pages":"125-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89875427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant and Natural Kind Terms","authors":"Luca Forgione","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.14436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.14436","url":null,"abstract":"As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches (cf. §3), touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kant’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections (cf. § 2), to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference (cf. §4). Starting with textual evidence even from the logical corpus (cf. §§5-6), in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant’s adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference (§§7-8).","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"31 1","pages":"55-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77708608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}