PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)最新文献

Social Status and Prosocial Behavior 社会地位与亲社会行为

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3889113

Jin Di Zheng, Arthur Schram, Tianle Song

引用次数: 0

Time Consistent Fair Social Choice 时间一致的公平社会选择

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-06-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3862288

Kaname Miyagishima

引用次数: 0

False Information from Near and Far 来自远近的虚假信息

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-05-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3853916

C. Bravard, J. Durieu, S. Sarangi, S. Sémirat

{"title":"False Information from Near and Far","authors":"C. Bravard, J. Durieu, S. Sarangi, S. Sémirat","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853916","url":null,"abstract":"We study the transmission of messages in social networks in the presence of biased and unbiased<br>agents. Biased agents prefer a specific outcome while unbiased agents prefer the true state of the world. Each agent who receives a message knows the identity (but not the type) of the person from whom the message originates and only the identity and types of their immediate neighbors. After learning the true state of the world, depending on their type, the root agent creates and transmit a message about the state to her neighbors who may then decide to transmit it forward depending on their type. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, and show that the social network acts as a filter: distance between the source and the other agents who form posteriors beliefs about the true state based on the message received now depends on the distance a message travels. Thus, unbiased agents, who receive a message from a biased agent, are more likely to transmit it further by assigning higher credibility to it when they are further away from the source. For a given network, we compute the probability that it will always support the transmission of messages by biased agents. We establish that star networks maximize the probability that messages will be transmitted. Finally, we establish that under some parameters, this probability increases when agents have uncertainty about their location in the network.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127007117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Worth 1000 Words: The Effect of Social Cues on a Fundraising Campaign in a Government Agency. A 价值1000字:社会线索对政府机构筹款活动的影响。一个

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3728290

M. Sanders, D. Reinstein, Alex Tupper

引用次数: 2

Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms 再分配机制

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3609182

M. Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak, S. Kominers

引用次数: 33

Ostracism in Japan 日本的排外主义

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3706315

J. Ramseyer, E. Rasmusen

引用次数: 0

Piercing the Veil of Political Altruism, or, Why Political Rules Are Weird 揭开政治利他主义的面纱，或者，为什么政治规则是奇怪的

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3702733

E. Alston

{"title":"Piercing the Veil of Political Altruism, or, Why Political Rules Are Weird","authors":"E. Alston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3702733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3702733","url":null,"abstract":"Defining rules politically poses the general question of which aspects of social ordering are tractable to public institutional resolution. But not all institutions emerge from the same processes of spontaneous ordering; self-interest subject to market discipline looks very different than self-interest subject to political discipline. Because of the structural way in which changes to political rules result in distributional consequences compared to the political status quo, their emergence is fundamentally governed by the dynamics of political self-interest. In contrast, while the public definition of economic institutions is also governed by political self-interest, economic dynamics can redefine this political self-interest in socially beneficial ways. Through the analysis of the emergence of the Australian ballot and the general corporate form in the 19th Century US, I argue that public economic institutional change is a process more tractable to constructivist influence. This is because dynamic economic forces (which operate through mutually beneficial exchange) can disrupt political economic equilibria. In contrast, constructivist political change is necessarily competitive, which makes such change less intrinsically related to longer-term emergent benefits to social ordering.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129304134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Breaking Down the Strategic Marketing: Three Approaches for Compensatory or Transformative Social Enterprises 打破战略营销:补偿型或变革性社会企业的三种途径

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-09-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3685189

L. Nascimento, F. Steinbruch, D. Oliveira, J. Costa, Fernando Bins Luce

{"title":"Breaking Down the Strategic Marketing: Three Approaches for Compensatory or Transformative Social Enterprises","authors":"L. Nascimento, F. Steinbruch, D. Oliveira, J. Costa, Fernando Bins Luce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3685189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3685189","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the relevance of social enterprises on social value creation, the marketing field is increasing its attention to these organizations. However, there seems to be no consensus in the literature on how strategic marketing can improve the performance of social enterprises. Face this, we propose the decomposition of strategic marketing into three approaches: commercial, social, and societal, which constitutes a theoretical contribution to the marketing field. Then, we develop a conceptual model that demonstrates how these strategic marketing approaches relate to the compensatory or trans-formative approaches of social entrepreneurship to improve social enterprise performance. Specifically, we argue that social enterprises can have three types of performance: commercial, social, and societal, and each one can be maximized by its corresponding strategic marketing approach. Such relations can leverage social impact, which we conceptualize as compensatory or trans-formative. Regarding practical implications, the model contributes to the possible improvement of strategic marketing decision by marketers and entrepreneurs in social entrepreneurship.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130824907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Prize Sharing Rules in Collective Contests: When Does Group Size Matter? 集体竞赛的奖金分享规则:团队规模何时重要?

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3657330

D. Gupta

引用次数: 0

Ex-Ante Estate Division under Strong Pareto Efficiency 强帕累托效率下的事前地产划分

PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3168679

J. Schumacher

{"title":"Ex-Ante Estate Division under Strong Pareto Efficiency","authors":"J. Schumacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3168679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168679","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The bankruptcy problem is to divide a homogeneous divisible good (the “estate”) between claimants, when the sum of the claims exceeds the value of the estate. When the problem is looked at from an ex-ante point of view (i.e. before the size of the estate is revealed), it is possible to formulate a notion of Pareto efficiency that is stronger than when the more common ex-post perspective is taken. Under the assumption of common beliefs, the strong notion of efficiency leads, in combination with the requirement that all claims should be fulfilled when the value of the estate is equal to the sum of the claims, to a uniquely defined division rule when utility functions for all agents are given. The resulting rule can be represented in the form of a parametric function. For the case in which all agents are equipped with the same utility function, the class of parametric functions that can be obtained in this way is characterized. In particular, it is shown that two well-known division rules for the bankruptcy problem, namely Constrained Equal Losses and Proportional Division, can be rationalized under strong Pareto efficiency by constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion respectively.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123228193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0