PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Human Resources and Social Activity, As Engines of Social Development","authors":"V. Terziev, S. Dimitrova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3166678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3166678","url":null,"abstract":"Key factor for socio-economic development are people. They are the foundation of social management as a separate managerial area, the goal of which is the management of the interaction between the subject and the object, (having their social character), occurring in a particular social environment. To what degree the actions of the subject and the object, as elements of social management are adequate to the changes in the environment, is determined by their activity. Moreover, the rationalization of social managerial decisions is directly dependent on the social policy carried out. The social policy as a set of principles, legal norms, institutions and activities, aimed at creating conditions ensuring the quality of life of the citizens of a country, is an expression of the social relations between the state and its citizens. The social policy determines the safety (social, health, economic) and security of the people in the socium. This is why it is defined as \"philosophy, ideology, program for influence on the demographic situation, employment of the population, level, way and quality of living of the population, its income level and structure of consumption of material and cultural wealth,... forms of social security, social services to the population, ... providing targeted state aid to the most unprotected, the most vulnerable and poor layers of the population,… measures aimed at creating conditions for self-defense in order to maintain and improve the level of well-being...\". It is noteworthy that within the scope of social policy is included a wide arsenal of concepts (social protection, social safety, social support, social self-protection, quality of life), defined in the quoted edition.From here, in the content of social policy are differentiated concrete actions of the state bodies, non-state institutions, public associations, related to the implementation of tactical and strategic objectives for the harmonization of public relations. Since the foundation of these relations are the people with their actions and skills, they are a crucial factor of social policy. Inside it are synthesized and multiplied the other components of a country's resources and thus they are transformed into a finished product in the planning of the goals for achieving socio-economic development, making it possible to carry out an effective social policy. Moreover, researches show that \"70% of the world's wealth is in the form of human capital - the skills and knowledge of the people and not in physical or financial capital. The strategy of many companies today is clearly guided by the idea of human resources, stressing on individualization, service and innovation\". Put another way, human resources are the people in an organization who, by their professional and personal qualities make it possible to achieve its strategic objectives. Together with rest of the resources, they should meet the needs of the organization, and the way they are transformed into abiliti","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131698117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Clan and the Corporation: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe","authors":"A. Greif, G. Tabellini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2565120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565120","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines – analytically and historically – the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128774653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Income Redistribution a Form of Insurance, a Public Good or Both?","authors":"Peter G. Backus, Alejandro Esteller-Moré","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2535933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2535933","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an empirical study of redistributive preferences. Our interest is what motivates net contributors to support redistributive policies. Using instrumental variable estimation and exploiting a particularity of the Spanish labour market we estimate how workers’ declared preferences for unemployment benefits spending respond to changes in the local unemployment rate. We then decompose this response into the part explained by risk aversion, and thus demand for insurance, and the part explained by the public goods nature of redistribution. Our results suggest that the declared preferences of workers for unemployment benefits spending are driven by demand for insurance rather than any public goods component. We show how these results suggest that preferences for redistribution in the form of unemployment benefits are driven by insurance considerations rather than by any public goods consideration.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129148267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Formal Theory of Politogenesis: Towards an Agent Simulation of Social Complexity Origins","authors":"C. Cioffi-Revilla","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2429322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2429322","url":null,"abstract":"Agent-based social simulation models are beginning to make significant contributions to scientific understanding of origins of human social complexity (politogenesis). However, social theory remains unclear about the prerequisites of social complexity origins; about things people must have known before the simplest societies could self-organize. In addition, there is a paucity of formal theories of politogenesis. I present a formal mathematical theory of social complexity focused on the phase of human history preceding its initial emergence in selected world regions ca. 10,000 years ago (early Holocene epoch). The formalism uses probability theory and analysis to derive a set of basic, testable results. The main prediction of the theory supports the rare nature of initial social complexity, consistent with observation. Further geospatial applications of the theory predict expected locations for politogenesis, based on prior, causal, theoretically predicted potentials.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"10 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121634429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Impact at the 'Bottom of the Pyramid': The Role of Social Capital in Capability Development and Community Empowerment","authors":"S. Ansari, K. Munir, Tricia Gregg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2034297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2034297","url":null,"abstract":"Rooted in the notion of inclusive capitalism, the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) approach argues for the simultaneous pursuit of profit and social welfare by creating markets for the poor. This idea has both been celebrated and criticized in the literature. We do neither in this paper. Instead, by leveraging insights from Amartya Sen’s work on capability development and the literature on social capital, we offer a more socially embedded and community-centric BoP approach. By redefining poverty not just as a lack of income, but also a lack of “capabilities” in Sen’s sense that can be developed through leveraging social capital, we offer a systemic framework for understanding the societal impact of business-driven ventures in the BoP and empowering BoP communities through these ventures. Specifically, we argue that any business initiative in the BoP ought to be evaluated on the basis of whether it advances capability transfer and retention by a) enhancing the social capital between a particular community and other more resource rich networks and b) preserving the existing social capital in the community.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128842247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Demographic Transition and Economic Welfare: The Role of Humanitarian Aid","authors":"S. Miller, K. Neanidis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2010796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2010796","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the effects of humanitarian aid on economic welfare through a demographic transition channel. We develop a two-period overlapping generations model where reproductive agents face a non-zero probability of death in childhood. As adults, agents allocate their time to work, leisure, and child rearing activities. Health status in adulthood exhibits “state dependence,” as it depends on health in childhood. In this framework, we examine the effects of changes in in-kind and monetary humanitarian aid on economic welfare. We conclude that if parents strongly value children, giving monetary aid produces more children and yields higher welfare. This positive welfare effect dominates an indirect negative welfare effect due to a lower growth rate. But, if parents value the quality of their children (health status), they achieve greater utility by in-kind aid, which also lowers fertility and augments economic growth.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123520763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Inventing Paradigms, Monopoly, Methodology, and Mythology at 'Chicago': Nutter and Stigler","authors":"E. Schliesser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1628102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1628102","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on Warren Nutter’s The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly in the United States, 1899-1939. This started out as a (1949) doctoral dissertation at The University of Chicago, part of Aaron Director’s Free Market Study. Besides Director, O.H. Brownlee and Milton Friedman were closely involved with supervising it. It was published by The University of Chicago Press in 1951. In the 1950s the book was explicitly understood as belonging to the “Chicago School” (Dow and Abernathy 1963). By articulating the content, context, and reception of Nutter’s monograph, this paper discusses four larger themes. First, I introduce the importance of Kuhnian conceptions of science to the methodological and institutional understanding of economics in the development of a ‘Chicago’ school of economics. I do this in context of previously unpublished Stigler-Kuhn exchange. While Thomas Kuhn was widely read and adopted in the social sciences and humanities in the 1960s and 70s (and thereafter), I argue that at ‘Chicago,’ proto-Kuhnian language can be found going back to the 1940s; in those early days it is partly used to disparage the achievements of economic theorizing as promoted by others. A more self-congratulatory Kuhnian self-understanding of economics as a mature paradigm starts to get adopted around 1955 by George Stigler. One important new claim is that the later Kuhnian language gets adopted in part to divest ‘Chicago’ from its shared roots with Institutionalist economics. So, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the formation of a shared narrative at ‘Chicago.’ Second, I introduce contextual themes from Milton Friedman’s writings in the late 40s and 50s to help us understand the nature of realism at Chicago. Nutter’s dissertation helps in reading and illuminating Milton Friedman’s famous 1953 methodology paper in historical and intellectual context. Third, while this chapter notes some of the political ramifications of Chicago economics, my main aim is to help explain the manner in which Chicago attempted to chart a distinctive methodological course. This methodology has often been described as Marshallian with debts to the large-scale NBER studies. Rather than going over familiar territory, I call attention to the importance of proxies in Nutter’s empirical methodology. It is an unappreciated feature of the inductive, quantitative method that focused on the component structures of the economy that characterizes Chicago’s methodological outlook in this period. I show this by comparing Nutter’s dissertation to work done by Stigler, then at Columbia. We know from Stigler’s correspondence with Friedman that in this period they discussed methodological matters. What is less well known is that Friedman is explicitly credited for Stigler’s methodological insights in Stigler's Five Lectures at LSE. The fifth lecture, “Competition in the United States,” covers similar territory as Nutter’s project. Comparing the work by Stigler and Nutter she","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126946420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games","authors":"M. Montero","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1112626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1112626","url":null,"abstract":"This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most natural bargaining protocol, both expected payoffs and actual payoff division are proportional to the voting weights provided that the set of winning coalitions of minimum weight is weakly balanced and that the breakdown probability tends to 0. Homogeneity of the voting weights is neither necessary nor sufficient for proportional payoffs. Intermediate values of the breakdown probability produce predictions consistent with the empirical evidence on portfolio allocation in Europe: a moderate propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the proposer.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126758649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}