THEORIA最新文献

{"title":"Logical exceptionalism: Development and predicaments","authors":"Bo Chen","doi":"10.1111/theo.12533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12533","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the conceptions of logic from Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and Ayer, and regards the six philosophers as the representatives of logical exceptionalism. From their standpoints, this paper refines the tenets of logical exceptionalism as follows: logic is exceptional to all other sciences because of four reasons: (i) logic is formal, neutral to any domain and any entities, and general; (ii) logical truths are made true by the meanings of logical constants they contain or by logicians' rational insight to consequence relations; (iii) logical truths are analytical, <jats:italic>a prior</jats:italic> and necessary, so not‐revisable; and (iv) logical laws are normative for how to correctly think. However, logical exceptionalism has encountered difficult open problems: What are logical constants? How to justify basic laws of logic? How are logical laws accessible to us? How to explain the reasonability of rival logics and select from them? How to explain the universal applicability of logical laws? How to explain the normativity of logical laws for correct thinking? This paper concludes that logical anti‐exceptionalism is more hopeful to successfully answer these questions than logical exceptionalism.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141195289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Definitions by abstraction and Leibniz's notion of quantity","authors":"Filippo Costantini","doi":"10.1111/theo.12523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12523","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the abstractionist account of quantity championed by Leibniz, especially in the 1680s. Leibniz introduced the notion of quantity in an indirect way, via an abstraction principle. In the first part of the paper, I identify the context in which this approach arose in light of Leibniz's criticism of his earlier dream of an ‘alphabet of human thought’. Recognising the impossibility of such a project led him to realise that, when dealing with terms referring to abstract objects, we should always consider them within the true sentences in which they occur. In the second part, I describe this approach in detail. This allows us to look at some key concepts of Leibniz's theory of quantity. In particular, I raise the problem of the relationship between the two sides of the abstraction principle: how should we think of the relation between the claim that <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> are equal, and the claim that the quantity of <i>a</i> is identical to the quantity of <i>b</i>? I argue that we can find a positive answer to this problem in Leibniz.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140581988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Overcoming von Wright's anxiety","authors":"Andrew Halpin","doi":"10.1111/theo.12519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12519","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the anxiety expressed by von Wright over the status of the deontic permission, <jats:italic>P</jats:italic>, as an independent normative category, given the interdefinability between <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>O</jats:italic> at the foundation of deontic logic. Two concerns are noted: the reducibility of <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> to <jats:italic>O</jats:italic>, and the inadequacy of <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> to convey a full permission in a social setting. Drawing on resources from the Hohfeldian analytical framework, the relational and aggregate features of permission are explored, and an aggregate conception of permission, P, is recognized. With the assistance of insights from Demey and Smessaert on duals, Hansson on formalization, and Soames on interdefinability, it is concluded that the interdefinability thesis can be defended without threatening the independent status of <jats:italic>P</jats:italic>. Additional grounds for reaching this conclusion are provided from a detailed analysis of the relationship between <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> and P. Some implications of the more expansive notion of permission, P, are considered with regard to the resources of deontic logic and their application.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The surplus value of knowledge","authors":"Wolfgang Spohn","doi":"10.1111/theo.12521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12521","url":null,"abstract":"The <jats:italic>Meno</jats:italic> problem, asking for the surplus value of knowledge beyond the value of true justified belief, was recently much treated within reliabilist and virtue epistemologies. The answers from formal epistemology, by contrast, are quite poor. This paper attempts to improve the score of formal epistemology by precisely explicating Timothy Williamson's suggestion that ‘present knowledge is less vulnerable than mere present true belief to rational undermining by future evidence’. It does so by combining Nozick's sensitivity analysis of knowledge with Spohn's fact‐asserting epistemic interpretation of conditionals. Accordingly, the surplus value of knowledge lies in a specific kind of stability of knowledge, which differs, though, from that claimed by other so‐called stability analyses of knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction to: Ethics and democracy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/theo.12520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12520","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bilateralism, collapsing modalities, and the logic of assertion and denial","authors":"Nils Kürbis","doi":"10.1111/theo.12516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12516","url":null,"abstract":"Rumfitt has given two arguments that in unilateralist verificationist theories of meaning, truth collapses into correct assertibility. In the present paper I give similar arguments that show that in unilateral falsificationist theories of meaning, falsehood collapses into correct deniability. According to bilateralism, meanings are determined by assertion and denial conditions, so the question arises whether it succumbs to similar arguments. I show that this is not the case. The final section considers the question whether a principle central to Rumfitt's first argument, ‘It is assertible that <mjx-container aria-label=\"upper A\" ctxtmenu_counter=\"0\" ctxtmenu_oldtabindex=\"1\" jax=\"CHTML\" role=\"application\" sre-explorer- style=\"font-size: 103%; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\"><mjx-math aria-hidden=\"true\"><mjx-semantics><mjx-mrow><mjx-mi data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic- data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\"><mjx-c></mjx-c></mjx-mi></mjx-mrow></mjx-semantics></mjx-math><mjx-assistive-mml aria-hidden=\"true\" display=\"inline\" unselectable=\"on\"><math altimg=\"/cms/asset/b9f1cf52-d732-424a-be82-cd61386f4221/theo12516-math-0001.png\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"><semantics><mrow><mi data-semantic-=\"\" data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\">A</mi></mrow>$$ A $$</annotation></semantics></math></mjx-assistive-mml></mjx-container> if and only if it is assertible that it is assertible that <mjx-container aria-label=\"upper A\" ctxtmenu_counter=\"1\" ctxtmenu_oldtabindex=\"1\" jax=\"CHTML\" role=\"application\" sre-explorer- style=\"font-size: 103%; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\"><mjx-math aria-hidden=\"true\"><mjx-semantics><mjx-mrow><mjx-mi data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic- data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\"><mjx-c></mjx-c></mjx-mi></mjx-mrow></mjx-semantics></mjx-math><mjx-assistive-mml aria-hidden=\"true\" display=\"inline\" unselectable=\"on\"><math altimg=\"/cms/asset/39fd4d93-311c-4f8c-b2e5-da8117ff21cf/theo12516-math-0002.png\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"><semantics><mrow><mi data-semantic-=\"\" data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\">A</mi></mrow>$$ A $$</annotation></semantics></math></mjx-assistive-mml></mjx-container>’, is one that bilateralists can reject, and concludes that they cannot. It follows that the logic of assertibility and deniability, according to a result by Williamson, is the little known modal logic K4 studied by Sobociński. The paper ends with a <i>plaidoyer</i> for bilateralists to adopt this logic.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140146909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Gender issues in philosophy publishing","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/theo.12518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12518","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140146815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sidgwick and Bentham's “double aspect” of utilitarianism revisited","authors":"Yanxiang Zhang","doi":"10.1111/theo.12517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12517","url":null,"abstract":"In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self-preference and thus adopted a self-preference and artificial means-based approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self-preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction-of-interests-prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self-preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Metaphysical explanations: The case of singleton sets revisited","authors":"Kai Michael Büttner","doi":"10.1111/theo.12511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12511","url":null,"abstract":"Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression “{Socrates}” is a shorthand either for the expression “the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates” or for the expression “the set that contains Socrates and nothing else”. However, Socrates' existence does not explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140019834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Friendship and the grades of doxastic partiality","authors":"Hamid Vahid","doi":"10.1111/theo.12514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12514","url":null,"abstract":"It has been claimed that friendship not only involves partial treatment of one's friends but that it also involves some degree of doxastic partiality towards them. Taking these claims as their starting points, some philosophers have argued that friendship not only involves such partiality but that this is also what is normatively required. This gives rise to the possibility of conflict between the demands of friendship on the one hand and the demands of epistemic norms on the other. In this paper, I consider some of the responses to this claim and show why they fail. I distinguish between different grades of doxastic partiality and explain why, although low grades of doxastic partiality fall within the bounds of the standard epistemic norm, the higher grades might infringe such norms. I conclude with an explanation of a fundamental intuition that seems to lie at the heart of the thesis of epistemic partiality.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139956189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}